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Chapter 1IntrodutionGame theory is a branh of mathematis, desribing and analyzing the interationamong deision makers. Where deision theory omprises the problem of nding apreferred alternative when only one deision maker is present, game theory assumesthe existene of more than one deision maker while the ations of one deisionmaker possibly have an eet on the outome for others. Central in game theory arethe onit situations arising from this interation. These onit situations an beof diverse nature, e.g., the fundamental onit situation of warfare, the evolutionof speies in biology, voting in politis and prot sharing in eonomis.The publiation by Von Neumann (1928) laid the groundwork for game theory,but not before the book by Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) game theoryattrated the attention of a wider audiene. Generally, game theory is divided intotwo main parts: non-ooperative game theory and ooperative game theory.In non-ooperative game theory, the involved parties, or players, at in self-interest and the ompetitive nature of interation is dominant. A fous is on ndingrational outomes, equilibria: those strategy ombinations where none of the playersan improve by unilaterally hanging his strategy. Ex ante the players annot makebinding agreements.In ooperative game theory, the main topi of this dissertation, the players areassumed to ooperate to ahieve an outome preferred by the group as a wholeand the onit arises from dividing the jointly ahieved payo stemming from thisoutome. So, the fous is on sharing the prot obtained from ooperation. Thetype of ooperative games onsidered in this thesis, are transferable utility games.In this framework, players are allowed to transfer utility, suh as money, from oneplayer to another. Contrary to the non-ooperative setup there is a mehanism,1
2 Chapter 1. Introdutionsuh as a legal system, allowing the players ex ante to make binding agreements ondividing the joint payo. An important modeling aspet is an adequate translationfrom the onit situation to a ooperative game, in whih one expliitly denes theapabilities of subgroups of the players. A solution onept assigns an alloationto eah game in a lass of transferable utility games. To divide the joint prots,multiple solution onepts have been developed to apture dierent notions of theidea of a `fair' alloation. A entral notion is the ore, the set of those alloationsfor whih no group of players has an inentive to split o.A spei area of appliation, as disussed in this thesis, is joint deision makingwithin the eld of operations researh. Operations researh deals with optimizationproblems in business and industry, often with a ombinatorial aspet. When dier-ent players are involved in the deision making proess or in the exeution of tasks,we enter the area of operations researh games.This thesis an roughly be divided into three parts. After the preliminaries, Chap-ter 3 and 4 of this dissertation ontain ontributions to the theory of transferableutility games in general. Then, the next two hapters analyze spei ooperativesituations originating from operations researh problems. The last hapter is some-what of an outlier as it does not involve transferable utility games but provides ataxonomy of rankings in tournaments.As mentioned before, in ooperative game theory a number of solution oneptsattrated attention. The Shapley value, the nuleolus and the ompromise valueare three of these well-studied solution onepts. For games with a non-emptyore Chapter 3, whih is based on Tijs et al. (2011), introdues an alternative tothese onepts alled the Alexia value. This solution onept is dened via so-alledlexinals. Given an ordering on the set of players, the orresponding lexinal is suhthat every player takes the maximum he an obtain, respeting the restritions ofthe ore and the amounts already alloated to his predeessors. Subsequently, toobtain the Alexia value one averages all lexinals.The Alexia value is analyzed for several lasses of games. Sine the Alexia valuedepends on the game through its ore only, we fous on lasses of games for whihthe ore has a nie struture. A key onept in this analysis is ompromise stability:for sublasses of the lass of ompromise stable games suh as strongly ompromiseadmissible games and big boss games, we show that the Alexia value oinides with
3the nuleolus. Also, we relate the Alexia value to onepts originating from thetheory of bankrupty situations.A transferable utility game is alled exat if there exists for every oalition, analloation in the ore suh that this oalition reeives exatly their value in the game.To hek for exatness of a game, Csóka et al. (2011) introdued the equivalentonept of exat balanedness. Chapter 4, whih is based on Lohmann et al. (2011),introdues minimal exat balaned olletions as those exat balaned olletions,for whih no proper subset exists that is also exat balaned. We show that all otherexat balaned olletions are redundant for determining exatness of the game. Thissigniantly redues the number of onditions to be heked for exatness. An exatbalaned olletion not ontaining the grand oalition is minimal exat if and onlyif the orresponding exat balaned weight vetor is unique. On the other hand, anexat balaned olletion ontaining the grand oalition is minimal exat if and onlyif all orresponding exat balaned weight vetors impose an equivalent onditionon the game.Furthermore, it is shown that the lass of minimal exat balaned olletionsan be partitioned into three types. The rst type is the lass of minimal balanedolletions. The seond type is formed by those olletions that an be obtainedfrom a minimal balaned olletion by replaing one oalition, with a weight stritlysmaller than one, by its omplement. Finally, the third type is formed by all minimalbalaned olletions for every proper subgame, to whih two oalitions are added:the grand oalition of the subgame, and the grand oalition of the original game.Chapter 5, whih is based on Tejada et al. (2011), disusses a general frameworkfor games derived from a non-negative, square matrix in whih every entry representsthe value obtained from ombining the orresponding row and olumn. We assumethat every row and every olumn is assoiated with a player, where every playeris assoiated to at most one row and at most one olumn simultaneously. In thespeial ase that every player is assoiated with one row or one olumn only, themodel boils down to the assignment problem (f. Shapley and Shubik (1972)), in thespeial ase that every player is assoiated with both a olumn and a row, the modelorresponds to the permutation problem (f. Tijs et al. (1984)). Within the generalframework, we an assoiate every assignment problem to a permutation problem.We show how all extreme points of the ore of the related permutation game an be
4 Chapter 1. Introdutionviewed as extreme points of the ore of the underlying assignment game. Althoughin general not all extreme points of the underlying assignment game are overed inthis way, we prove that this is the ase within the speial lass of Bohm-Bawerkassignment games.In the last part of Chapter 5 the attention is shifted to permutation situationsand games only. We study the struture of the set of all matries that lead topermutations games with the same ore. Moreover, we study a spei sublass ofpermutation situations alled `homogeneous alternatives' permutation situations inwhih the value obtained by a player while ombining his row with the olumn ofanother player is independent of the olumn player.In sequening situations a number of jobs have to be proessed on one or moremahines, in suh a way that a ost riterion is minimized. For one-mahine sequen-ing situations where the ost inurred by a job is a linear funtion of its ompletiontime, the order minimizing total osts is suh that the jobs are proessed in a non-inreasing order with respet to their urgeny (ost per time unit divided by thelength of the job, f. Smith (1956)). Curiel, Pederzoli, and Tijs (1989) initiated thegame theoreti study of this type of operations researh games.Chapter 6, whih is based on Lohmann et al. (2010), extends the literature onsequening games. We introdue the model of sequening situations with Just-in-Time (JiT) arrival. Comparing with the standard sequening model, this model hastwo distint features. First, instead of waiting in a queue from the moment the rstjob starts, a job arrives at the fatory as soon as its predeessor is nished. Seond,we introdue a setup time: in between jobs, the mahine should be adjusted forthe next job. The setup time we introdue in our model is taken to depend on thepredeessor only, so the time between nishing a job and the start of the proessingof the next job, does not depend on the job that is proessed next. We restritourselves to those situations with JiT arrival, where two values for the setup timeand two values for the ost parameter are allowed.We disuss sequening situations with JiT arrival from two perspetives. First,from an operations researh perspetive we solve the optimization problem regardingthe joint ost of all players. Seond, we use the setting of ooperative game theoryto analyze the problem of dividing the osts of the optimal order among the players.We show that the ore of a JiT sequening game is always non-empty, and for largelasses of JiT sequening games we provide expliit expressions for both the ore
5and the nuleolus. Also, we introdue a JiT sequening spei alloation rule thatprovides a ore element.Chapter 7, whih is based on González-Díaz et al. (2011), onsiders the problemof ranking a number of alternatives on the basis of information on pairwise ompar-isons of the alternatives. The set of alternatives along with the matrix ontainingthe, possibly partial, information on the pairwise omparisons is alled a tourna-ment. Tournaments are disussed in the literature on a variety of subjets suh asstatistis, psyhology, soial hoie and voting. Whereas the literature on tourna-ments usually assumes that the result of a pairwise omparison is binary, we assumethat the result of a omparison between two alternatives is a pair of non-negative re-als adding up to one, representing the result of both alternatives in the omparison.Hene, the model is able to apture more general measures of relative strength.For this general setup, we provide a taxonomy of (the natural extensions of)ommon ranking methods for tournaments in the literature, and a new rankingmethod alled reursive Buhholz on the basis of properties. We use terminologyand interpretation from sports ompetitions for expositional purposes, our resultsare ontext free. In the proess, we provide an adaptation of the haraterization ofthe fair bets ranking method in Slutzki and Volij (2005) to our setting.

Chapter 2Preliminaries
In these preliminaries, we introdue the basi mathematial notation that is usedthroughout this dissertation. Also, we introdue ooperative games and the mainsolution onepts.
2.1 Basi mathematial notationThroughout this dissertation, N denotes a nite player set. We denote by 2N thepowerset of N , i.e., the olletion of all subsets of N . Also, N = 2N\{∅} denotesthe olletion of non-empty subsets of N . For every S ∈ N , the indiator vetor
eS ∈ RN is suh that eSi = 1 if i ∈ S and eSi = 0 if i ∈ N\S. An order σ of N isa bijetive funtion σ : {1, ..., |N |} → N , where σ(k) denotes the player at position
k ∈ {1, ..., |N |} in the order σ. The set of all orders of N is denoted with Π(N).Given σ ∈ Π(N), we will use the notation σ for the reverse order: σ(1) = σ(|N |),
σ(2) = σ(|N | − 1),..., σ(|N |) = σ(1).Given a polytope P ⊆ Rn, a vetor x ∈ P is an extreme point if there are no




x′′. For a polytope P , let ext(P ) denotethe set of extreme points, let int(P ) denote the relative interior and let dim(P )denote the dimension. For a polytope P of dimension n, a faet is an (n − 1)-dimensional fae. The Eulidean distane between two points x, y ∈ Rn is given by
d(x, y) =
√
(x1 − y1)2 + ...+ (xn − yn)2. For x ∈ Rn, the open ball with enter xand radius ε is given by Bε(x) = {y ∈ Rn | d(x, y) < ε}.7
8 Chapter 2. Preliminaries2.2 Cooperative game theoryA transferable utility (TU) game (N, v) is dened by a nite player set N and afuntion v on the set 2N of all subsets of N assigning to eah oalition S ∈ 2N avalue v(S), desribing the prot for the players in S when this oalition is formed.By onvention, v(∅) = 0. The lass of TU games with player set N is denoted by
TUN . When no onfusion an arise, we denote v for (N, v) ∈ TUN .An alloation is a vetor x ∈ RN where for every i ∈ N , xi denotes the worthalloated to player i. For the game v ∈ TUN , an alloation x ∈ RN is alled eientif∑i∈N xi = v(N).The imputation set I(v) of a game v ∈ TUN is given by all individually rationaland eient alloations, so
I(v) = {x ∈ RN |
∑
i∈N
xi = v(N), xi ≥ v({i}) for all i ∈ N}.For a game v ∈ TUN the ore C(v) (Gillies (1953)) is dened as the set of thoseeient alloations of v(N), for whih no oalition has an inentive to split o:
C(v) =
{






xi ≥ v(S) for all S ∈ N}.A game is alled balaned if its ore is non-empty (f. Bondareva (1963), Shapley(1967)). The lass of balaned games with player set N is denoted by ΓN . For agame (N, v) and oalition S ∈ 2N , the subgame (S, vS) is given by vS(T ) = v(T )for every T ∈ 2N . A game v ∈ TUN is alled totally balaned if the ore of everysubgame is non-empty.For a game v ∈ TUN the utopia vetor M(v) ∈ RN is given by:









,for all i ∈ N . For a game v ∈ TUN the ore-over CC(v) (Tijs and Lipperts (1982))is dened as the set of those eient alloations of v(N), where every player reeivesat least his minimum right and at most his utopia demand:
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CC(v) =
{
x ∈ RN |
∑
i∈N
xi = v(N), m(v) ≤ x ≤M(v)
}
,It is readily veried that C(v) ⊆ CC(v). For a game v ∈ TUN , the Weber set(Weber (1988)) is the onvex hull of all marginal vetors:
W (v) = onv{mσ(v) | σ ∈ Π(N)},where for an order σ ∈ Π(N), the marginal vetor mσ(v) ∈ RN is formed by themarginal ontributions with respet to σ:
mσσ(k)(v) = v({σ(1), σ(2), ..., σ(k)})− v({σ(1), σ(2), ..., σ(k − 1)}),for every k ∈ {1, ..., |N |}.A game v ∈ TUN is additive if for some a ∈ RN , v(S) =∑i∈S ai for all S ∈ N . Agame v ∈ TUN is alled onvex (Shapley (1971)) if






mσ(v).We dene the exess of oalition S ∈ N with respet to alloation x ∈ I(v) by
E(S, x) = v(S) −
∑
i∈S xi. The exess measures the dissatisfation of oalition Swith respet to alloation x. Let ω(x) ∈ R2|N| be the vetor of exesses of x ∈ I(v),arranged in weakly dereasing order. For x, y ∈ Rn, x is lexiographially smaller
10 Chapter 2. Preliminariesthan y, denoted by x ≤L y, if x = y or if there exists some k ∈ {1, ..., n} suh that
xi = yi for every i ∈ {1, ..., k − 1} and xk < yk.For eah game (N, v) suh that I(v) 6= ∅, the nuleolus η(v) (Shmeidler (1969)) isdened as the unique alloation x ∈ I(v) suh that ω(x) ≤L ω(y) for every y ∈ I(v).For every game v ∈ ΓN we have η(v) ∈ C(v).For a game v ∈ TUN suh that CC(v) 6= ∅, the ompromise value τ(v) (Tijs(1981)) is the unique eient ombination of the utopia vetor and the vetor ofminimum rights. For every i ∈ N :
τi(v) = aM(v) + (1− a)m(v),where a ∈ [0, 1] is suh that ∑i∈N τi(v) = v(N).We introdue a number of standard properties for solution onepts: eieny,relative invariane with respet to strategi equivalene, symmetry and dummy. Let
ψ be a solution onept dened on Σ ⊆ TUN .The solution onept ψ satises eieny on the domain Σ if∑i∈N ψi(v) = v(N)for every v ∈ Σ.Two games v ∈ TUN and w ∈ TUN are strategially equivalent (Tijs (1976))if there exist a vetor a ∈ RN and a positive real number k suh that w(S) =
kv(S)+
∑
i∈S ai for every S ∈ 2N . The solution onept ψ satises relative invarianewith respet to strategi equivalene on the domain Σ if ψ(w) = kψ(v) + a for all
v, w ∈ Σ suh that w(S) = kv(S) +∑i∈S ai for every S ∈ 2N and for some positivereal number k and vetor a ∈ RN .Two players i ∈ N and j ∈ N are symmetri in the game v ∈ TUN if v(S∪{i}) =
v(S ∪ {j}) for every S ⊆ N\{i, j}. The solution onept ψ satises symmetry onthe domain Σ if, for all v ∈ Σ, ψi(v) = ψj(v) for every i ∈ N and j ∈ N that aresymmetri in v.A player i ∈ N is a dummy in the game v ∈ TUN if v(S ∪ {i})− v(S) = v({i})for every S ⊆ N\{i}. The solution onept ψ satises the dummy property on thedomain Σ if, for all v ∈ Σ, ψi(v) = v({i}) for every i ∈ N that is a dummy playerin v.
Chapter 3The Alexia value
3.1 IntrodutionThis hapter, whih is based on Tijs et al. (2011), introdues the Alexia value, anew ore seletor dened for ooperative games with a non-empty ore. Establishedone-point solution onepts suh as the Shapley value for general TU-games and theompromise value for ompromise admissible TU-games, in general do not provide aore-element. Dened for TU-games that allow for eient and individually rationalalloations, the nuleolus provides a ore-element for all games with a non-emptyore. In this respet, the Alexia value provides an alternative to the nuleolus.The idea underlying the Alexia value is inspired by assignment problems, wherea number of objets are to be alloated among an equal number of agents. One ofthe methods used to assign objets to agents is the so-alled serial ditatorship asdisussed by e.g. Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (1998) and Bogomolnaia and Moulin(2001). Given an ordering over the players, this mehanism assigns the rst playerin the order his top hoie, the seond player is assigned his top hoie among theremaining objets and so on. Of ourse, this method disriminates between theagents, and to restore fairness the order is hosen randomly. As we are dealingwith transferable utility rather than objets, we an use the serial ditatorship toobtain an alloation for every order of players, and average these alloations. Wean put numerous restritions on the set of basi alloations to hoose from. If weuse the Weber set - the onvex hull of all marginal vetors - as this set of basialloations, this proedure would lead to the Shapley value. In this hapter wewill onentrate on the basi set of eient and oalitionally stable alloations, theore. A similar approah is also used in dening the `run-to-the-bank rule' (O'Neill11
12 Chapter 3. The Alexia value(1982)) for bankrupty situations.This hapter denes the Alexia value via so-alled lexinals. Here a lexinal isdened as a lexiographial maximum of the ore, with respet to an arbitrary orderon the players. Subsequently, to obtain the Alexia value one averages all lexinals.The Alexia value an be seen as a `run-to-the-ore rule' for games with a non-emptyore, as for every lexinal players are running to the ore aording to a ertain order.Every player then takes the maximum he an obtain within the subset of the orethat remains after the players before him have made their respetive hoies.This way, the Alexia value ombines two often applied arguments with respetto hoosing an alloation: using orderings on the players, while at the same timerespeting the fairness riterion of the ore. Hene, it ombines attrative propertiesof widely aepted alloation rules suh as the Shapley value and the nuleolus and,in fat, will oinide with these solution onepts for several lasses of games. Anappliation area of partiular interest is formed by the lass of operations researhgames. These games are used to divide ost savings stemming from operationsresearh problems with several deision makers. The before mentioned propertiesas well as its intuitive nature make the Alexia value an attrative alloation rule:using, e.g., the appliation area of ow games, we show that the Alexia value anprovide an appealing alternative to both the nuleolus and the Shapley value.Sine the Alexia value is based on the ore rather than on the game itself, itis interesting to analyze lasses of games where the ore has a nie struture. Foronvex games, those games where the marginal ontribution of a player inreases ifhe joins a larger oalition, the Alexia value and the Shapley value oinide. Also,ompromise stability turns out to be an important notion with respet to identifyingthe Alexia value. A game is alled ompromise stable (Quant et al. (2005)) if ithas a non-empty ore, and the ore oinides with the ore over. Firstly, we showthat for the lass of strongly ompromise admissible games à la Driessen (1988),whih form a spei sublass of ompromise stable games (for whih there is ahigh inentive to ooperate and form the grand oalition), the Alexia value and thenuleolus oinide. Seondly, we disuss the Alexia value of lan games, whih alsoform a sublass of ompromise stable games. Clan games (Potters et al. (1989))are games with a nonempty oalition alled the lan, of whih every member hasveto-power, and where it is more protable for the other players to unite in thenegotiations than to form smaller oalitions. For lan games, an expliit expressionfor the Alexia value is derived. For big boss games (Muto et al. (1988)), the sublass
3.2. The Alexia value 13of lan games for whih the lan onsists of one player only, the Alexia value againoinides with the nuleolus. For any game with a non-empty ore, the exatiationis dened as the unique exat game with the same ore. Hene, by denition theAlexia value of a game with a non-empty ore and of its exatiation oinide. Weuse the exatiation to show that the Alexia value of a ompromise stable gameoinides with the ompromise extension of the run-to-the-bank rule for bankruptysituations as introdued by Quant et al. (2006).Finally, we introdue the reverse Alexia value, whih averages over the lexio-graphi minima of the ore. This approah an be seen as dual to the Alexia value:whereas the Alexia assumes that every player takes his restrited maximum, thereverse Alexia assumes that every player is sent away with the minimum that hasto be alloated to him, respeting the restritions of the ore and the amount al-ready alloated to his predeessors. We show that for ompromise stable games andonvex games the Alexia value oinides with the reverse Alexia value.The outline of this hapter is as follows. Setion 3.2 introdues the Alexia valueand disusses some basi properties. Setion 3.3 ontains the results on the Alexiavalue on spei lasses of games suh as onvex games, strongly ompromise ad-missible games and big boss games. Setion 3.4 analyzes the reverse Alexia valueand we disuss other possible modiations.3.2 The Alexia valueTo dene the Alexia value, we rst introdue the notion of a lexinal. Also, for thelexinals and for the Alexia value we provide a number of basi results. We show thatevery lexinal is an extreme point of the ore, but that there an exist extreme pointsthat are not a lexinal. We disuss the Alexia value on 2-person games and stateseveral standard properties for solution onepts that are satised by the Alexiavalue.Denition 3.2.1 For (N, v) ∈ ΓN and an order σ ∈ Π(N), the lexinal λσ(v) ∈ RNis dened as the lexiographi maximum on C(v) with respet to σ, i.e.,
λσσ(k)(v) = max
{
xσ(k) | x ∈ C(v), xσ(l) = λ
σ
σ(l)(v) for all l ∈ {1, .., k − 1}},for all k ∈ {1, ..., |N |}.
14 Chapter 3. The Alexia valueA lexinal is reursively dened suh that every player gets the maximum he anobtain inside the ore under the restrition that the players before him in the or-responding order obtain their restrited maxima. It is readily heked that everylexinal is an extreme point of the ore.Theorem 3.2.2 Let (N, v) ∈ ΓN . Then for every σ ∈ Π(N), λσ(v) is an extremepoint of the ore.Proof: Let σ ∈ Π(N). By onstrution, λσ(v) ∈ C(v). Assume that σ ∈ Π(N)is suh that λσ(v) is not an extreme point of the ore. Then there exist x1, x2 ∈
C(v) with x1 6= x2 suh that λσ(v) = ax1 + (1 − a)x2 for some a ∈ (0, 1). Take
l ∈ {1, ..., |N |} suh that x1σ(k) = x2σ(k) for every k ∈ {1, ..., l − 1} and x1σ(l) 6= x2σ(l).Without loss of generality we an assume x1σ(l) > x2σ(l). This means that
max{xσ(k) | x ∈ C(v), xσ(l) = λ
σ
σ(l)(v) for all l ∈ {1, .., k − 1}} ≥ x1σ(l) > λσσ(l),whih ontradits the denition of a lexinal. Hene, λσ(v) is an extreme point of
C(v). However, for some games there exist extreme points of the ore that do not oinidewith a lexinal, whih is shown in the next example. The game we onsider is avariant of an example in Derks and Kuipers (2002).Example 3.2.3 Let (N, v) be the game with N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, v({1}) = 1
2
, v({2}) =





7 if |S| = 2,
12 if |S| = 3,
22 if S = N.For this example, we demonstrate how one an ompute the ore. In the remainder ofthis dissertation, we will omit the details of omputing the ore. Every ore-element
x ∈ C(v) satises the following system of (in)equalities:




x2 + x4 ≥ 7
x2 ≥ 0 x3 + x4 ≥ 7
x3 ≥ 0 x1 + x2 + x3 ≥ 12
x4 ≥ 0 x1 + x2 + x4 ≥ 12
x1 + x2 ≥ 7 x1 + x3 + x4 ≥ 12
x1 + x3 ≥ 7 x2 + x3 + x4 ≥ 12
x1 + x4 ≥ 7 x1 + x2 + x3 + x4 = 22
x2 + x3 ≥ 7A ore-element x ∈ C(v) is an extreme point if in the above system 4 linearlyindependent (in)equalities hold with equality. As x1 + x2 + x3 + x4 = 22 holds forevery x ∈ C(v), we have at most (14
3
)
= 364 andidate extreme points. For eahombination of three inequalities of the above system, we an hek if the equalitiesorresponding to these inequalities are linearly independent and hek if the resultingalloation is a ore element. If both onditions hold, we obtained an extreme point ofthe ore. E.g., the equalities orresponding with x2 ≥ 0, x1 ≥ 12 and x1+x2 ≥ 7 arelinearly dependent and therefore do not dene an extreme point. If the inequalities
x3 ≥ 0, x4 ≥ 0 and x2 + x4 ≥ 7 all hold with equality, we obtain the alloation









). As this alloation satises the above system of (in)equalities, xis an extreme point of the ore. Cheking all ombinations results in the following
























).Let σ ∈ Π(N). We have λσσ(1)(v) = max{xσ(1) | x ∈ C(v)} = 10. As every lexinal isan extreme point of the ore, λσ(v) is equal to a permutation of (10, 5, 5, 2). So, theextreme points given by (ii) and (iii) are not lexinals. ⊳






λσ(v).Sine every lexinal is a ore element, the average over all lexinals is also a oreelement. Hene, for every (N, v) ∈ ΓN , α(v) ∈ C(v).The Alexia value ombines attrative properties of both the nuleolus and theShapley value. First of all, just as the nuleolus, the Alexia value is a ore-seletorwhih guarantees oalitional stability. Furthermore, just as the Shapley value av-erages over the marginal vetor of every ordering, the Alexia value starts out byseleting a ore alloation for every ordering and averages over all these alloations.The following example demonstrates the Alexia value, and shows that it oinideswith the standard solution for 2-person games.Example 3.2.5 Let (N, v) ∈ ΓN with N = {1, 2}. Then v(N) ≥ v({1}) + v({2})and C(v) =onv{f 1, f 2} with f 1 = (v(N) − v({2}), v({2})), f 2 = (v({1}), v(N) −
v({1})). Clearly for the lexinals one nds λ(1,2)(v) = f 1 and λ(2,1)(v) = f 2. So, theAlexia value α(v) = 1
2













,the standard solution for the 2-person game (N, v). ⊳We show that the Alexia value satises a number of standard properties for solutiononepts.Theorem 3.2.6 The Alexia value satises eieny, relative invariane w.r.t.strategi equivalene, symmetry and dummy on ΓN .Proof:Eieny. Let (N, v) ∈ ΓN and σ ∈ Π(N). It holds that ∑i∈N λσi (v) = v(N) as∑






3.2. The Alexia value 17Relative invariane w.r.t. strategi equivalene. Let (N, v) ∈ ΓN and (N,w) ∈ ΓNbe strategi equivalent. Take an additive game (N, a) and k ∈ R++ suh that w =
kv+a. Sine x ∈ C(v) if and only if kx+a ∈ C(w), we have that λσ(w) = kλσ(v)+afor every σ ∈ Π(N) and therefore α(w) = kα(v) + a. So, the Alexia value satisesrelative invariane with respet to strategi equivalene.Symmetry. Let (N, v) ∈ ΓN , i ∈ N and j ∈ N be suh that i and j are symmetri in
(N, v). Take x ∈ C(v) and let x be suh that xh = xh for every h ∈ N\{i, j}, xi = xjand xj = xi. Then x ∈ C(v). Hene, for every σ ∈ Π(N) we have λσi (v) = λσ′j (v),where σ′(h) = σ(h) for every h ∈ N\{i, j}, σ′(i) = σ(j) and σ′(j) = σ(i). Therefore,
αi(v) = αj(v) and we obtain that the Alexia value satises symmetry.Dummy. Let (N, v) ∈ ΓN and i ∈ N be suh that i is a dummy player in (N, v).As for every x ∈ C(v) we have xi = v({i}), we obtain λσi (v) = v({i}) for every
σ ∈ Π(N). Hene, αi(v) = v({i}) so the Alexia value satises the dummy property.
The properties mentioned in the theorem above are satised by, e.g., the Shapleyvalue as well. A dierene between these solution onepts an be found in thefollowing haraterizations. A solution onept ψ dened on the domain Σ ⊆ TUNsatises balaned average ontributions on Σ if, for any (N, v) ∈ Σ with |N | ≥ 2 andany i ∈ N it holds that
1





|N | − 1
∑
j∈N\{i}
(ψj(v)− ψj(vN\{i})).The value ψi(v) − ψi(vN\{j}) an be seen as the ontribution of player j ∈ N toplayer i ∈ N , as the alloation to player i inreases by ψi(v)−ψi(vN\{j}) beause ofthe presene of player j. The property of balaned average ontributions says thatthe average ontribution of player i ∈ N to the other players equals the averageontribution of the other players to player i. Kongo et al. (2010) uses balanedaverage ontributions to haraterize the Shapley value.Theorem 3.2.7 (Kongo et al. (2010)) The Shapley value is the unique solutiononept on TUN that satises eieny and balaned average ontributions.The Alexia value an be haraterized by similar properties. Let (N, v) ∈ ΓN with
|N | ≥ 2. Dene Ai(v) = max{xi | x ∈ C(v)} as the maximum payo in the ore forplayer i ∈ N , and dene the Davis-Mashler (DM) redued game (N\{i}, v−i) by
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v−i(S) = max{v(S), v(S ∪ {i})− Ai(v)},for all S ⊆ N\{i}. Hene, if (N, v) is onvex then (N\{i}, v−i) is the subgame of vwith respet to player set N\{i}.The solution onept ψ satises the balaned average DM-ontributions on thedomain Σ ⊆ ΓN if, for all v ∈ Σ with |N | ≥ 2 and any i ∈ N ,
1


















−j)),for all i ∈ N .Proposition 3.2.9 states that the Alexia value an be omputed by averaging over |N |alloations. In eah of these alloations one player j ∈ N is assigned his maximumore payo Aj(v), and the remainder v(N) − Aj(v) is alloated aording to theAlexia value of an appropriately dened game v−j on the remaining players inN\{j}.Note that if C(v) 6= ∅ then also C(v−j) 6= ∅, so the α(v−j) is indeed dened.
3.3. The Alexia value on lasses of games 193.3 The Alexia value on lasses of gamesFor several lasses of games, the Alexia value oinides with either the Shapley valueor the nuleolus. First, we disuss the lass of onvex games, where the Shapleyvalue equals the Alexia value. Seondly, we fous on two sublasses of the lass ofompromise stable games: for strongly ompromise admissible games and big bossgames the Alexia value oinides with the nuleolus. For lan games and simpleow games we provide expliit expressions for the Alexia value. Finally, we useexatiation to show that the Alexia value equals the ompromise extension of therun-to-the-bank rule.First of all, the dierenes between the Alexia value and both the Shapley valueand the nuleolus are showed. The following example shows positive features of theAlexia value and its advantages over the nuleolus and the Shapley value in theappliation area of ow games as introdued by Kalai and Zemel (1982). We followthe slightly dierent denition of Granot and Granot (1992).To desribe a ow network f we rst need an undireted graph G = (V,E). Theset of verties V ontains two distinguished verties: the soure (So) and the Sink(Si). A ow network is further desribed by a apaity funtion: every edge e ∈ Ehas a nonnegative apaity ap(e) ∈ R+. Lastly, every edge e ∈ E is owned by aoalition of players S(e) ∈ N . From the ow network f , we obtain the ow game vfby dening the value vf (S) of oalition S ∈ 2N as the amount that S an transportfrom soure to sink, while utilizing only edges that are owned by the players in S.For simple ow networks, it is assumed that every player owns exatly one edgeand every edge has apaity 1.
So SiBA
1 24 3 5Figure 3.3.1: The simple ow network f
20 Chapter 3. The Alexia valueExample 3.3.1 In the simple ow network of Figure 3.3.1, all edges have apaity











) lies outside the ore. Next, onsider the ow network g (see Figure
So CBA D Si
1 23 54 6Figure 3.3.2: The ow network g), where all edges have apaity 1 exept edges {C,D} and {D,Si} whih haveapaity 2. This means that e.g. vg({1, 2, 5, 6}) = vg({3, 4, 5, 6}) = 1 and vg(N) = 2for the orresponding ow game vg. Consider the alloation x = (13 , 13 , 13 , 13 , 13 , 13). Thehighest exess of x is −1
3
whih is attained at oalitions {1, 2, 5, 6}, {3, 4, 5, 6} and atall one-person oalitions. The vetor of exesses of this alloation is lexiographiallysmaller than the vetor exesses of any other element of the imputation set, as forevery x ∈ I(v), xi < 13 for some i ∈ N . Hene, η(vg) = (13 , 13 , 13 , 13 , 13 , 13), while













). The nuleolus alloates vg(N) equally amongall players, although one ould argue that both the position in the graph and theapaity of the edges of player 5 and 6 are superior to those of the other players.This disrepany between the players is reeted in the Alexia value. ⊳The result in the rst part of Example 3.3.1 an be generalized. For a ow network
f , a ut is a oalition S ∈ 2N suh that no positive ow an be generated from soure
3.3. The Alexia value on lasses of games 21to sink without using at least one edge owned by S. So, S ∈ 2N is a ut in the ownetwork f if vf (N\S) = 0. By Υf we denote the set of uts in the ow network f .Dene the set of minimum uts Υfmin = {S ∈ Υf | |S| ≤ |T | for every T ∈ Υf}. ByReijnierse et al. (1996), for a simple ow network f we have C(vf ) = onv{eS | S ∈
Υfmin}. As every minimum ut vetor onsists of the same number of ones and zeros,every minimum ut vetor ours the same number of times as lexinal. Therefore,







3.3.1 Convex gamesFor the lass of onvex games, the Alexia oinides with the Shapley value.Theorem 3.3.3 Let (N, v) be onvex. Then α(v) = Φ(v).Proof: Sine (N, v) is onvex, C(v) = onv{mσ(v) | σ ∈ Π(N)} and, by Theorem3.2.2 , every lexinal is some marginal vetor. In fat, we will show that λσ(v) = mσ(v)for all σ ∈ Π(N). Let σ ∈ Π(N). By onvexity, v(N) − v(N\{i}) ≥ v(S) −
v(S\{i}) for all S ⊆ N\{i}, and hene λσσ(1)(v) = maxx∈C(v) xσ(1) = mσσ(1)(v) usingonvexity. Take k ∈ {2, ..., |N |}. Now assume that λσσ(j)(v) = mσσ(j)(v) for all
j ∈ {1, ..., k − 1}. Take S = {σ(k + 1), ..., σ(|N |)}. Then ∑k−1j=1 λσσ(j)(v) = v(N) −
v(S ∪ {σ(k)}). Sine λσ(v) ∈ C(v), it must hold that ∑i∈S λσi (v) ≥ v(S). Hene,
λσσ(k)(v) ≤ v(S∪{σ(k)})−v(S) = m
σ
σ(k)(v). But asmσ(v) ∈ C(v) we know λσσ(k)(v) =





σ(v) = Φ(v). The following theorem shows that the Alexia value is additive on the lass of onvexgames. Together with Theorem 3.3.3, this provides an alternative proof for theadditivity of the Shapley value on the lass of onvex games.Theorem 3.3.4 Let (N, v) and (N,w) be onvex games. Then α(v + w) = α(v) +
α(w).
22 Chapter 3. The Alexia valueProof: We have C(v) +C(w) = C(v+w), sine C(v) =W (v), C(w) = W (w) and
mσσ(k)(v + w) = v({σ(1), ..., σ(k)}) + w({σ(1), ..., σ(k)})
−v({σ(1), ..., σ(k − 1)})− w({σ(1), ..., σ(k − 1)})
= mσσ(k)(v) +m
σ
σ(k)(w),for every k ∈ {1, ..., |N |}. This means that α(v+w) = α(v)+α(w), sine λσ(v+w) =























mσ(j)(v) otherwise,for all k ∈ {1, . . . , |N |}. For eah ompromise admissible game (N, v) the ore overoinides with the onvex hull of all larginal vetors:
CC(v) = onv{ℓσ(v) | σ ∈ Π(N)}.A ompromise admissible game (N, v) is alled ompromise stable (Quant et al.(2005)) if the ore over equals the ore.A ompromise admissible game (N, v) is alled strongly ompromise admissible(f. Driessen (1988)) if for all S ∈ N it holds that:




Mi(v)Strongly ompromise admissible games are also alled dual simplex games or 1-onvex games. From Quant et al. (2005) it follows that every strongly ompromiseadmissible game is ompromise stable.Note that ompromise admissibility and strongly ompromise admissibility implyopposite onditions on the utopia demands. Compromise admissibility implies thatthe utopia demands are large: there exists an eient alloation suh that everyplayer obtains at most his utopia demand. Strongly ompromise admissibility onthe other hand implies that the utopia demands are small: if a oalition is assignedexatly its value, all players outside a oalition an obtain their utopia demands.In fat, Driessen (1988) shows that for every strongly ompromise admissible game
(N, v) it holds that v(N) =∑j∈N\{i}Mj(v) +mi(v) for every i ∈ N .For our result on the Alexia value of strongly ompromise admissible games, weuse the following expressions for the ore and the nuleolus of strongly ompromiseadmissible games, derived by Driessen (1988).Theorem 3.3.5 (f. Driessen (1988)) If (N, v) is strongly ompromise admissible,then(i) C(v) = onv {{M(v)eN\{i} +m(v)e{i}}i∈N},(ii) η(v) = τ(v) = |N |−1|N | M(v) + 1|N |m(v), the baryenter of C(v).For strongly ompromise admissible games, the Alexia value oinides with the nu-leolus.Theorem 3.3.6 Let (N, v) be strongly ompromise admissible. Then α(v) =
η(v) = τ(v).Proof: Let (N, v) be strongly ompromise admissible. By part (i) of Theorem3.3.5, C(v) = onv{{M(v)eN\{i} +m(v)e{i}}i∈N}. Let σ ∈ Π(N). Then λσσ(k)(v) =
Mσ(k)(v) for all k ∈ {1, ..., |N | − 1}, and λσσ(|N |)(v) = mσ(|N |)(v). Therefore,0As an alloation rule, the baryenter of the ore is known as the ore-enter. For a studyon the ore-enter, see e.g. González-Díaz and Sánhez-Rodríguez (2007) and González-Díaz andSánhez-Rodríguez (2009)










(|N |!− (|N | − 1)!)M(v) + ((|N | − 1)!)m(v)]
= η(v)
= τ(v),where the last equalities follow from Theorem 3.3.5 (ii). 3.3.3 Clan gamesClan games are introdued in Potters et al. (1989). Big boss games, whih forma sublass of lan games, are introdued in Muto et al. (1988) and are furtheronsidered in Branzei and Tijs (2001) and Tijs and Branzei (2002). For big bossgames, we show that the Alexia value oinides with the nuleolus. This does nothold for the more general lass of lan games, but we obtain an expliit expressionfor the Alexia value on this lass of games.A game (N, v) is alled a lan game if v(S) ≥ 0 for all S ∈ 2N , M(v) ≥ 0 and ifthere exists a oalition C ∈ N alled the lan suh that:(i) Clan property: v(S) = 0 for all S with C 6⊆ S.(ii) Union property: v(N)− v(S) ≥∑i∈N\S Mi(v) for eah S ∈ 2N with C ⊆ S.Note that all players in C are symmetri in (N, v) as v(S) = 0 for every S ∈ 2N ,
C 6⊆ S. A lan game (N, v) is alled a big boss game if there exists a lan C = {b}for some b ∈ N . The player b is alled the big boss.As is shown by Quant et al. (2005), lan games are ompromise stable. Howeverthey are not neessarily strongly ompromise admissible.Example 3.3.7 Consider the lan game (N, v), dened by N = {1, 2, 3} and
S {1} {2} {3} {1, 2} {1, 3} {2, 3} N
v(S) 0 0 0 5 0 0 10This game is a lan game with C = {1, 2}. Clearly, M(v) = (10, 10, 5). Thisgame is not strongly ompromise admissible, sine v(N) − v({1}) = 10 < 15 =∑
j∈N\{1}Mj(v). ⊳









Mh(v) if j = i,
0 else,for all j ∈ N .Theorem 3.3.8(i) (f. Potters et al. (1989)). Let (N, v) be a lan game with lan C ∈ N . Then













Mj(v) if i = b.
Theorem 3.3.9 Let (N, v) be a big boss game. Then α(v) = η(v).Proof: Let player b ∈ N be the big boss. By Theorem 3.3.8 (i) with C = {b}, forall σ ∈ Π(N) and every k ∈ {1, ..., |N |} suh that σ(k) 6= b it holds that
λσσ(k)(v) =
{
Mσ(k)(v) if k < σ−1(b),
0 if k > σ−1(b).Therefore, αi(v) = 1|N |!∑σ∈Π(N) λσi (v) = 1|N |!Mi(v) · |{σ ∈ Π(N)|σ−1(i) < σ−1(b)}| =
1
2
Mi(v) = ηi(v) for eah i ∈ N\{b}. By eieny of η and α it then follows that
α(v) = η(v). For lan games however, the Alexia value does not neessarily equal the nuleolus.







). The ore is given by C(v) =onv{(5, 0, 5), (0, 5, 5), (10, 0, 0), (0, 10, 0)}.This implies that α(v) = 1
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if i ∈ C.Proof: By Theorem 3.3.8 (i), for all j 6∈ C it holds that
λσj (v) =
{
Mj(v) if σ−1(j) < σ−1(i) for all i ∈ C,
0 else.Let j ∈ N\C. The number of orders where λσj (v) = Mj(v) equals |N |!|C|+1 , sine in afration 1
|C|+1
of a total of |N |! possible orders player j stands in front of all playersin the lan. This implies that αj(v) = Mj(v)|C|+1 for all j ∈ N\C. Sine the Alexia valueis eient, the remainder is divided among the lan members. As lan members aresymmetri and the Alexia value satises symmetry, every lan member obtains anequal share of the remainder. 3.3.4 Compromise stable games and exatiationTo obtain an expliit expression for the Alexia value on the lass of ompromisestable games we use exatiation. A balaned game (N, v) is alled exat (Shmei-dler (1972)) if for every oalition S ⊆ N there exists an element x ∈ C(v) suhthat ∑i∈S xi = v(S). We refrain from a more elaborate disussion on the topi ofexat games, as this is the topi of Chapter 4 of this dissertation. The exatiation




xi | x ∈ C(v)
}
,
3.3. The Alexia value on lasses of games 27for eah S ⊆ N . So, C(vE) = C(v) for every (N, v) ∈ ΓN and vE = v if andonly if (N, v) is exat. Note that if for two games (N, v) and (N,w) we have






rσ(E, d),where for all σ ∈ Π(N) and k ∈ {1, ..., |N |},







.The interpretation of rσσ(k) is as follows: the players arrive at the bank aording tothe order σ. Upon arrival, a player reeives his total laim or, if there is not enoughmoney left to satisfy his laim, the maximum amount that is available. Importantly,for every bankrupty situation (E, d) it holds that RTB(E, d) = Φ(vE,d).The ompromise extension RTB* of the RTB-rule to the lass of all ompromiseadmissible games is introdued by Quant et al. (2006). For eah ompromise ad-missible game (N, v), the ompromise extension RTB* of the RTB-rule is given by

































Mi(v) if ∑i∈N\SMi(v) +∑i∈Smi(v) < v(N).The rst ase orresponds with the pivot of λσ′(v) (the rst player in the order σ′that does not obtain his utopia demand) being a member of N\S, and the seondase orresponds with the pivot of λσ′(v) being a member of S.Consider the bankrupty problem (N,E, d) with E = v(N)−∑i∈N mi(v) and di =











,for all S ∈ 2N .Sine vE = vE,d +m(v), (N, vE) is strategially equivalent to the game (N, vE,d).(ii) Beause (N, vE) is strategially equivalent to a bankrupty game, (N, vE) isonvex and ompromise stable. Sine C(v) = C(vE), we have α(v) = α(vE). So,
3.3. The Alexia value on lasses of games 29with E = v(N)−∑i∈N mi(v) and di =Mi(v)−mi(v) for all i ∈ N , the proof of (i)implies that




= m(v) + Φ(vE,d)
= Φ(vE,d +m(v)),where the seond equality holds as RTB(E, d) and Φ(vE,d) oinide for everybankrupty situation. The last equality is obtained by additivity of Φ: Φ(v) +
Φ(w) = Φ(v + w) for every (N, v) and (N,w). Taking w = vE,d in the proof of part
(i), we have
RTB∗(v) = Φ(vE)
= α(v),where the last equality holds by Theorem 3.3.3. The previous theorem also provides an alternative proof for the fat that for two andthree person games exatness is equivalent to onvexity. For arbitrary N , onvexityimplies exatness as every marginal vetor is an element of the ore. Every exatgame (N, v) is equal to its exatiation (N, vE). Sine every balaned two or threeperson game is ompromise stable, this implies that (N, v) is strategially equivalentwith a bankrupty game. As bankrupty games are onvex, we obtain that (N, v)is onvex.On the lass of ompromise stable games, whih ontains the lass of bankruptygames, one reognizes an essential dierene between the Alexia value and the nu-leolus.To demonstrate this dierene, we rst introdue the Aumann-Mashler rule AM .Given a bankrupty situation (N,E, d), denote CEA(E, d) for the onstrained equalaward rule, given by
CEAi(E, d) = min{a, di},for every i ∈ N , where a ∈ R+ is suh that ∑i∈N min{a, di} = E.Now the Aumann-Mashler rule AM(E, d) (Aumann and Mashler (1985)) isgiven by















d) if ∑j∈N dj < 2Efor every i ∈ N .For a ompromise stable game (N, v), the Alexia value is given by:
α(v) = m(v) +RTB(v(N)−
∑
i∈N
mi(v),M(v)−m(v)),whereas Quant et al. (2005) show that
η(v) = m(v) + AM(v(N)−
∑
i∈N
mi(v),M(v)−m(v)).So, the Alexia value and the nuleolus are similar in the sense that every playerobtains his minimum right, and the framework of a bankrupty situation is used toalloate the remainder. The dierene between the Alexia value and the nuleoluslies in the treatment of this bankrupty situation: the Alexia value uses the run-to-the-bank rule whereas the nuleolus uses the Aumann-Mashler rule to obtain analloation for the related bankrupty situation.3.4 The reverse Alexia value and other modia-tionsThe denition of the Alexia value allows for modiations in a number of dier-ent diretions. Inspired by the literature on weighted Shapley values, Caprari et al.(2008) introdues two weighted Alexia values. These weighted Alexia values dier inthe way the weights are assigned to orders: for the so-alled µ-mixed lexiographivalue weights are assigned to orders diretly, whereas for the p-weighted lexio-graphi value weights are assigned to players and the p-weighted lexiographi valueis the expetation of the alloation when players are sent away aording to theirrelative weights. For every set of p-weights there exists a set of µ-weights suh thatthe p-weighted lexiographi value and the µ-mixed lexiographi value oinide.Also, the p-weighted lexiographi value is extended to the (p, S)-weighted lexio-graphi value to irumvent the ase where multiple players have zero p-weight.Caprari et al. (2008) generalizes a number of results mentioned in this hapter:for onvex games the (p, S)-weighted lexiographi value oinides with the (p, S)-weighted Shapley value (Kalai and Samet (1988)) and for big boss games, lan games
3.4. The reverse Alexia value and other modiations 31and strongly ompromise admissible games (whih are all ompromise stable), the













xσ(k) | x ∈ C(v), xσ(l) = λ
σ
σ(l)(v) for all l ∈ {1, ..., k − 1}} ,for all k ∈ {1, ..., |N |}.Numerous results on lexinals and the Alexia value disussed before in this hapteralso hold for reverse lexinals and the reverse Alexia value. Every reverse lexinal isan extreme point of the ore, but for some games there exist extreme points of theore that do not oinide with a reverse lexinal. In Example 3.2.3, (10, 5, 5, 2) is anextreme point of the ore, but it is not a reverse lexinal. Using the same reasoningsas for the Alexia value, it is obtained that the reverse Alexia value satises theproperties of eieny, relative invariane with respet to strategi equivalene,symmetry and dummy. As Example 3.4.4 shows that the Alexia value and thereverse Alexia value need not oinide, it follows that the reverse Alexia value doesnot satisfy balaned average DM-ontributions.It turns out that for ompromise stable games, the Alexia value and the reverseAlexia value oinide.Theorem 3.4.2 Let (N, v) be ompromise stable. Then α(v) = α(v).Proof: As (N, v) is ompromise stable, C(v) = CC(v) 6= ∅. We showed that
















xσ(1) | x ∈ CC(v)
}



















ℓσi (v),where the rst equality follows from the denition of the ore-over: ∑i∈S xi ≥∑
i∈Smi(v) and ∑i∈N\S xi ≤ ∑i∈N\S Mi(v). So, if λσσ(l)(v) = ℓσσ(l)(v) for l ∈











ℓσ(v) = α(v),whih onludes the proof. Note that the lass of ompromise stable games inludes strongly ompromise ad-missible games and lan games. Hene, most results derived in setion 3 not onlyhold for the Alexia value, but for the reverse Alexia value as well. For onvex games,the reverse Alexia value oinides with the Alexia value.Theorem 3.4.3 Let (N, v) be onvex. Then α(v) = α(v).Proof: Let σ ∈ Π(N). By indution on the position k ∈ {1, ..., |N |}, we prove that
λ
σ









xσ(1) | x ∈ W (v)
}













mσσ(l)(v) = v({σ(1), ..., σ(k − 1)}).Let S = {σ(1), ..., σ(k)}. By denition of the ore, min{∑i∈S xi | x ∈ C(v)} ≥
v(S). Therefore, λσσ(k)(v) ≥ v(S)− v(S\{σ(k)}) = mσσ(k)(v). However, by onvexity











15 if S = {1}
0 if |S| = 1, S 6= {1} or |S| = 3,
8 if S = |2|









), while α(v) = (15, 5, 5, 5) sine (18, 4, 4, 4) is not a reverse lexinal,and the other extreme points of the ore equal a reverse lexinal for 8 orders eah. ⊳Basially, the Alexia value is a run-to-the-ore solution. Obviously one an modifythe set the players run to. One ould replae the ore by any other set of solutions





, 0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 1, 1, 1)}. Let us onsider the A-M bargaining setbased Alexia value, whih is the average of all lexiographi maxima of the A-Mbargaining set. So, instead of onsidering ore alloations, we onsider only alloa-tions in the A-M bargaining set. It is readily heked that for a fration 2
5














) for an A-M bargaining set based Alexia value. ⊳
Chapter 4Minimal exat balanedness
4.1 IntrodutionThis hapter, whih is based on Lohmann et al. (2011), studies the theoretialstruture and properties of the lass of exat balaned olletions. A olletionof oalitions is balaned if one an nd positive weights for all oalitions in theolletion suh that every player is present in oalitions with total weight exatlyequal to one. A game is balaned if for all suh olletions and all suh weights, theweighted sum of the values of the oalitions does not exeed the value of the grandoalition. An interpretation is that the players an distribute one unit of workingtime among all oalitions in a way that for every oalition all members are ativefor an amount of time equal to the oalition's weight, and in doing so the playersannot reate more value than by working one unit of time in the grand oalition.Bondareva (1963) and Shapley (1967) showed independently that balanedness isequivalent with non-emptiness of the ore.Exatness turns out to be equivalent with exat balanedness as introdued inCsóka et al. (2011). Exat balanedness is similar to the notion of balanedness,but we allow one of the weights to be negative. Classes of games that are exatare, e.g., onvex games, risk alloation games with no aggregate unertainty (Csókaet al. (2009)), onvex multi-hoie games (Branzei et al. (2009)) and multi-issuealloation games (Calleja et al. (2005)).To verify that the ore of a game is non-empty, not all balaned olletions areneeded. A balaned olletion of oalitions is minimal, if there does not exist a propersubset that is also balaned. As it turns out, only minimal balaned olletionshave to be onsidered to ensure non-emptiness of the ore. This greatly redues the35
36 Chapter 4. Minimal exat balanednessnumber of onstraints to be heked for non-emptiness of the ore. Furthermore,the lass of minimal balaned olletions is suh that there exists no sublass of thelass of minimal balaned olletions that ensures balanedness of the game.Regarding exat balanedness, many exat balaned olletions are redundantwhen verifying the exatness of a game. This hapter provides a analysis of thelass of minimal exat balaned olletions: those exat balaned olletions thatdo not ontain a proper subset that is also exat balaned. We refrain from theomputation aspets and fous on the theoretial struture of the lass of minimalexat balaned olletions. We show that only minimal exat balaned olletions areessential to obtain exatness. However, it is not possible to use the same approahas with minimal balaned olletions. This is due to the fat that while the set ofbalaned weight vetors is a onvex set in whih the extreme points are the weightvetors orresponding with minimal balaned olletions, the set of exat balanedweight vetors is not a onvex set. This requires a new approah for the proofs.A main result shows that the lass of minimal exat balaned olletions an bepartitioned into three types. The rst type onsists of all minimal balaned olle-tions. The seond type, the lass of minimal negative balaned olletions, onsistsof those olletions that an be obtained from a minimal balaned olletion by re-plaing one oalition, with a weight stritly smaller than one, by its omplement.We show that for every minimal negative balaned olletion there exists exatlyone suh ombination of a minimal balaned olletion and a oalition with a weightstritly smaller than one. The last type, the lass of minimal subbalaned olle-tions, is formed by all minimal balaned olletions for every proper subset of theplayer set, to whih two oalitions are added: the oalition formed by all players ofthe subset, and the oalition formed by all players of the original player set.The lass of minimal exat balaned olletions ensures exatness of the game,but the lass an be redued even further. We show that only the lass of minimalsubbalaned olletions and the lass of minimal negative balaned olletions areneeded to guarantee exatness. So, the lass of minimal balaned olletions isredundant in this respet.With respet to the uniqueness of the weights, it is well known that the lass ofminimal balaned olletions oinides with the set of balaned olletions for whihthe set of balaned weight vetors onsists of one point. This result an be obtainedpartly for minimal exat balaned olletions. If the exat balaned weight vetor isunique for a ertain exat balaned olletion, then this olletion is minimal exat
4.2. Balanedness 37balaned. The other way around however does not hold. For two types, minimalbalaned and minimal negative balaned olletions, the orresponding weight vetoris unique. For every minimal subbalaned olletion however, there exists more thanone exat balaned weight vetor. However, all weight vetors are related to eahother by a linear transformation, and indue the same onstraint on the game.The hapter is organized as follows: the subsequent setion introdues (minimal)balanedness and reviews the main results regarding balaned olletions. Setion4.3 ontains the denitions of several notions regarding exat balanedness, andinludes the results on the uniqueness of the weights. Setion 4.4 shows that the lassof minimal exat balaned olletions an be partitioned into three easily identiabletypes. Setion 4.5 states that minimal exat balaned olletions are suient toensure exatness of the game, and shows the redundany of the minimal balanedolletions in this respet.4.2 BalanednessFirst, we introdue balanedness and presents the main results on minimal balanedolletions and balanedness. To hek for non-emptiness of the ore of a game
(N, v), one an use the notion of balanedness.Denition 4.2.1 Let B ⊆ N ,B 6= {N}. A weight vetor β ∈ RN is alled balanedon B if βS > 0 for all S ∈ B, βS = 0 for all S 6∈ B and ∑S∈B βSeS = eN . We denote
Λ+(B) for the set of all balaned weight vetors on B. The olletion B is alledbalaned if Λ+(B) 6= ∅. Denote BN for the set of all balaned olletions on playerset N , and Λ+ = ∪B∈BNΛ+(B).In the remainder, we will typially use B and C to denote balaned olletions, anduse β and γ to denote their respetive weight vetors.Example 4.2.2 Let N = {1, 2}. The olletions {{1}} and {{2}} are not balaned,sine one of the players is not present in the olletion. By denition {{1, 2}} is notbalaned. The olletion {{1}, {1, 2}} is not balaned. This follows as a balanedweight vetor β annot satisfy the equations β{1,2} = 1 and β{1} + β{1,2} = 1 simul-taneously, sine β{1} > 0. A similar reasoning holds for the olletion {{2}, {1, 2}}.The two remaining olletions are B = {{1}, {2}} and C = {{1}, {2}, {1, 2}},
38 Chapter 4. Minimal exat balanednesswhih are both balaned. Take β ∈ Λ+ suh that β{1} = β{2} = 1 and βS = 0for S ∈ N\{{1}, {2}}, and take γ ∈ Λ+ suh that γ{1,2} = 1 and γS = 0 for
S ∈ N\{{1, 2}}. We have Λ+(B) = {β} while Λ+(C) = {aβ+(1−a)γ | a ∈ (0, 1)}.
⊳Now, for a vetor β ∈ RN , we dene the set
V (β) = {v ∈ TUN | ∑
S∈N
βSv(S) ≤ v(N)}of transferable utility games with player set N for whih the weighted sum of thevalues of the oalitions with respet to β is less than or equal to the worth of thegrand oalition. Also, we dene V +(B) = ∩β∈Λ+(B)V (β) and V + = ∩B∈BNV +(B).So, V +(B) is the set of games with player set N that satisfy the onstraints imposedby all balaned weight vetors for olletion B, and V + is the set of games withplayer set N that satisfy the onstraints imposed by all balaned weight vetors.Consider some B ∈ BN . Note that v ∈ V (β) for some β ∈ Λ+(B) does not implythat v ∈ V +(B). This is illustrated by the following example.Example 4.2.3 Consider the three person game v ∈ TUN given by
S {1} {2} {3} {1, 2} {1, 3} {2, 3} N




, β{1,2} = β{1,3} = 14 , β{2,3} = 34 , γ{1} = 14 , γ{1,2} = γ{1,3} = 38 , γ{2,3} = 58 and






























v({2, 3}) = 9 > v(N).So, v ∈ V (β) but v 6∈ V (γ). This implies that v 6∈ V +(B). ⊳We all a game v ∈ TUN balaned if v ∈ V +.
4.2. Balanedness 39Theorem 4.2.4 (Bondareva (1963), Shapley (1967)) Let v ∈ TUN . Then C(v) 6= ∅if and only if v ∈ V +.It is well known that not all balaned olletions are neessary to guarantee that agame is balaned. Minimal balaned olletions sue to haraterize the lass ofgames with a non-empty ore.Denition 4.2.5 A olletion B ∈ BN is alled minimal balaned if there does notexist a C ( B suh that C ∈ BN . The lass of minimal balaned olletions on playerset N is denoted by BNmin.Note that in Example 4.2.2, only the olletion {{1}, {2}} is minimal balaned.We dene V +min = ∩B∈BNminV +(B) as the lass of games that satisfy the onstraintsoriginating from minimal balaned olletions.Theorem 4.2.6 (Bondareva (1963), Shapley (1967)) Let v ∈ TUN . Then C(v) 6= ∅if and only if v ∈ V +min, i.e. V + = V +min.The following theorem shows an additional advantage of minimal balaned olle-tions. Not only do we need just the minimal balaned olletions to haraterizethe non-emptiness of the ore, but also for every minimal balaned olletion thereexists only one balaned vetor of weights. For the theorem, we provide the proofby Peleg and Sudhölter (2003) as we will use a similar tehnique later on to proveresults on minimal exat balaned olletions.Theorem 4.2.7 (Bondareva (1963), Shapley (1967)) A olletion B ∈ BN is mini-mal balaned if and only if |Λ+(B)| = 1.Proof: Let B ∈ BN . Take β ∈ Λ+(B).First we show that a balaned olletion that is not minimal orresponds to morethan one balaned weight vetor. If C ( B is a balaned olletion with weights
γ ∈ Λ+(C), then it is readily veried that aγ + (1 − a)β ∈ Λ+(B) for a ∈ [0, 1), sothe weight vetor for B is not unique.Seond, we show that every olletion with more than one balaned weight vetor isnot minimal. Assume that there exists another weight vetor α ∈ Λ(B), α 6= β. Asthere exists a oalition S ∈ B suh that βS > αS, we obtain that a = min{ αSβS−αS |
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βS > αS} is well dened. Let γS = (1 + a)αS − aβS for all S ∈ B. Then C = {S ∈
B | γS > 0} is a proper subolletion of B with γ ∈ Λ+(C). So, C ∈ BN and B is notminimal. The following theorem states that we annot haraterize the set of balaned gamesby a subset of the minimal balaned olletions.Theorem 4.2.8 (Bondareva (1963), Shapley (1967)) Let B ∈ BNmin. Then thereexists a game v ∈ TUN suh that v ∈ V +(C) for all olletions C ∈ BNmin\{B} and
v 6∈ V +(B).4.3 Exat balanednessGames with a non-empty ore an be haraterized using balaned olletions. Asimilar haraterization exists for exat games. Exat games form a sublass of thelass of games with a non-empty ore.Denition 4.3.1 A game v ∈ TUN is exat if for every oalition S ∈ N thereexists an x ∈ C(v) suh that ∑i∈S xi = v(S).Shmeidler (1972) and Csóka et al. (2011) provide haraterizations of exat games,using onepts related to balanedness. Here we use the haraterization alledexat balanedness as dened by Csóka et al. (2011), exept that in line with thedenition of balanedness, we exlude the trivial olletion {N}.Denition 4.3.2 For a olletion E ⊆ N , E 6= {N}, a vetor of weights λ ∈ RN isalled exat balaned if there exists a T ∈ E suh that λS > 0 for all S ∈ E\{T},
λT 6= 0, λS = 0 for all S 6∈ E , and ∑S∈E λSeS = eN . We denote Λ(E) for the setof all exat balaned vetors on E . A olletion E ⊆ N is alled exat balaned if
Λ(E) 6= ∅. Denote EN for the set of all exat balaned olletions on player set N ,and Λ = ∪E∈ENΛ(E).In the remainder, we will typially use E and D to denote exat balaned olletions,and use λ and δ to denote their respetive weight vetors.
4.3. Exat balanedness 41Note the disrepany with the denition of balaned vetors. For exat balanedweight vetors, we allow for one negative weight. It is readily heked that Λ+(E) ⊆
Λ(E) for every E ⊆ N , and therefore BN ⊆ EN . In ontrast with Λ+, Λ in generalis not a onvex set.Example 4.3.3 Let N = {1, 2, 3}. Take λ, δ ∈ RN suh that λ{1,2} = λ{1,3} = 1,
λ{1} = −1 and δ{1,2} = δ{2,3} = 1, δ{2} = −1. Clearly, λ and δ are exat balanedweight vetors. However, the onvex ombination 1
2
(λ+ δ) is not an exat balanedweight vetor, as it has two negative omponents. This means that Λ is not a onvexset. ⊳Dene, similar to the denitions of V +(B) and V +, V (E) = ∩λ∈Λ(E)V (λ) for all
E ∈ EN and V = ∩E∈ENV (E). Note that V (λ) was already dened for all λ ∈ RN asthe lass of games that satisfy the onstraint imposed by weight vetor λ. So, V (E)is the set of all games that satisfy the onstraints imposed by the exat balanedweight vetors of the olletion E and V is the lass of exat balaned games.Theorem 4.3.4 (Csóka et al. (2011)) A game v ∈ TUN is exat if and only if
v ∈ V .So, just as balanedness is equivalent with non-emptiness of the ore, we have thatexat balanedness is equivalent with the existene of a ore element for every oali-tion, where this oalition gets preisely its own value in the game. Similar to thedenition of minimal balaned olletions, we dene minimal exat balaned olle-tions.Denition 4.3.5 A olletion E ∈ EN is minimal exat balaned if there exists no
D ( E suh that D ∈ EN . We denote ENmin for the lass of minimal exat balanedolletions.For two-player games, the lass of minimal exat balaned olletions oinides withthe lass of minimal balaned olletions.Example 4.3.6 Regarding exat balanedness, a similar reasoning as in Exam-ple 4.2.2 an be used to show that only {{1}, {2}} and {{1}, {2}, {1, 2}} are ex-at balaned for two-person games. So, EN = BN and ENmin = BNmin. We have
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{1}, {2}, {3} {1}, {2}, {3}
{1, 2}, {3} {1, 2}, {3}
{1, 3}, {2} {1, 3}, {2}
{2, 3}, {1} {2, 3}, {1}
{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3} {1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}
{1}, {1, 2}, {1, 3}
{2}, {1, 2}, {2, 3}
{3}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}
{1}, {2}, {1, 2}, N
{1}, {3}, {1, 3}, N
{2}, {3}, {2, 3}, NTable 4.3.1: Minimal balaned and minimal exat balaned olletions for N =
{1, 2, 3}. ⊳If the size of the player set inreases, the number of olletions in the dierent lassesgrows onsiderably. Table 4.3.2 shows the number of olletions in all lasses for upto four players. These olletions are generated using the results of Setion 4.4. Ap-pendix 4.A ontains all minimal exat balaned olletions and the orrespondingweight vetors for three- and four-player games. Here, the minimal exat balanedolletions are partitioned in three lasses that will be introdued in Setion 4.4:minimal balaned olletions, minimal negative balaned olletions and minimalsubbalaned olletions. As is stated in Theorem 4.2.7, the lass of minimal balan-ed olletions oinides with the set of balaned olletions with a unique weightvetor. For minimal exat balaned olletions, a somewhat weaker statement holds:the lass of minimal exat balaned olletions not ontaining the grand oalitionoinides with the set of exat balaned olletions with a unique weight vetor.
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|N | 3 4
|BN | 42 18878
|BNmin| 5 41
|EN | 63 27014
|ENmin| 11 165Table 4.3.2: Number of olletions in the dierent lasses.Theorem 4.3.7 Let E ∈ EN . Then |Λ(E)| = 1 if and only if both E ∈ ENmin and
N 6∈ E .Proof: To prove the `only if' part of the theorem, let E ⊆ N be suh that
Λ(E) = {λ} for some λ ∈ RN . First suppose E 6∈ ENmin. We show that wean onstrut a seond weight vetor in Λ(E). As E 6∈ ENmin, there exists anexat balaned subolletion D ( E . Take µ ∈ Λ(D) and dene the funtion
f : [0, 1] → RN by f(b) = (1 − b)λ + bµ. As f is ontinuous, there exists an








S = eN , we obtain that f(ε) ∈ Λ(E)while f(ε) 6= λ, a ontradition.Seondly, suppose E ∈ ENmin and N ∈ E . It is readily heked that λN ≤ 1, and if
λN < 1 we obtain that the olletion A = E\{N} is exat balaned with weightvetor µS = λS1−λN for every S ∈ A whih ontradits E ∈ ENmin. Hene, λN = 1. As∑
S∈E\{N} λSe
S = 0, we have that ∑S∈E\{N} 2λSeS = 0. Dene the weight vetor µby µS = 2λS for all S ∈ E\{N}, µN = 1 and µS = 0 otherwise. It is readily hekedthat µ ∈ Λ(E) with µ 6= λ, a ontradition.We prove the `if' part of the theorem by showing that we an onstrut an exatbalaned subolletion of E if the weight vetor is not unique. Take E ∈ ENmin with
N 6∈ E . Suppose that there exist two weight vetors λ, µ ∈ Λ(E) suh that λ 6= µ.If both λ ∈ Λ+(E) and µ ∈ Λ+(E), we have by Theorem 4.2.7 that E 6∈ BNmin. Hene,there exists an exat balaned subolletion of E in this ase.Next assume E ∈ BNmin, λ ∈ Λ+(E) and µ 6∈ Λ+(E). Let U ∈ E be suh that µU < 0,and take a = min{λS
µS
| S ∈ E\{U}} and β = 1

















S ≤ eN ,
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t balanednesswhere the strit inequality uses that µU < 0 < λU . Note that βS = 11−a(λS−aµS) ≥ 0for all S ∈ E , with equality for at least one oalition. If we take B = {S ∈









= eN , so B ∈ BN whih ontradits E ∈ BNmin.Finally, let λ 6∈ Λ+(E) and µ 6∈ Λ+(E). This means that there exist oalitions T ∈ Eand U ∈ E suh that λT < 0 and µU < 0.Assume T = U . Take a = min{λS
µS





D = {S ∈ E | δS 6= 0}. It is readily veried that δS ≥ 0 for all S ∈ D\{T} and∑
S∈D δSe
S = eN . This shows that D ∈ EN and by onstrution D ( E , whihontradits E ∈ ENmin.Now assume T 6= U . Take a = µT
µT−λT
. It is readily heked that 0 < a < 1. Take
δ = aλ+(1−a)µ and D = {S ∈ E | δS 6= 0}. We have δS > 0 for every S ∈ D\{T, U}and δT = 0. Sine ∑S∈D δSeS = ∑S∈E aλSeS +∑S∈E(1 − a)µSeS = eN this showsthat D ∈ EN whih ontradits E ∈ ENmin. As Example 4.3.8 shows, there exist minimal exat balaned olletions with morethan one exat balaned weight vetor. By Theorem 4.3.7 suh a olletion mustontain the set N .Example 4.3.8 Take N = {1, 2, 3}. The olletion E = {{1}, {2}, {1, 2}, N} isminimal exat balaned, but there exists more than one weight vetor: dene λ by
λ{1} = λ{2} = 1, λ{1,2} = −1 and λN = 1 and µ by µ{1} = µ{2} = 2, µ{1,2} = −2 and
µN = 1. It is readily heked that λ ∈ Λ(E) and µ ∈ Λ(E). ⊳If a minimal exat balaned olletion does ontain the grand oalition, then thereexists more than one exat balaned weight vetor, but these weight vetors arerelated in a speial way and indue the same onstraint on the game. Furthermore,if for an exat balaned olletion all weight vetors indue the same onstraint onthe game, then the olletion is minimal exat balaned.Theorem 4.3.9 Let E ∈ EN . Then both E ∈ ENmin and N ∈ E if and only if forevery λ ∈ Λ(E) and µ ∈ Λ(E) there exists a salar a > 0 suh that
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µS = aλS for all S ∈ E\{N},
µN = λN = 1.Proof: For the `only if' part of the proof, assume E ∈ ENmin and N ∈ E . Let
λ ∈ Λ(E). It is readily heked that λN ≤ 1, and if λN < 1 we obtain that theolletion C = E\{N} is exat balaned with weight vetor γS = λS1−λN for every
S ∈ C and γS = 0 otherwise. Hene, λN = 1.Take T ∈ E suh that λT < 0. Suh a T ∈ E exists, as N ∈ E and therefore




eS = eT , and therefore E\{N, T} ∈ BT . If there exists a minimalbalaned olletion B ∈ BTmin suh that B ( E\{T,N}, it is readily heked that
B ∪ {T,N} is an exat balaned olletion, whih ontradits our assumption of
E ∈ ENmin. Hene, E\{N, T} ∈ BTmin. Sine E\{N, T} ∈ BTmin, by Theorem 4.2.7 thereis a unique balaned vetor of weights β of E\{N, T}. Note that



















S.This implies that ∑S∈E\{N,T}(λTβS + λS)eS = 0. If λTβS 6= λS for some S ∈
E\{N, T} we have γ ∈ BTmin where we dene for small ε > 0, γS = βS+ε(λTβS+λS)for every S ∈ E\{N, T} and γS = 0 otherwise. So, λTβS + λS = 0 and therefore
λS = −λTβS for every S ∈ E\{N, T}. Now take µ ∈ Λ(E) and take a = µTλT . Sine
µT < 0 and λT < 0, a > 0. We have µT = aλT by denition, and µS = −µTβS =
−aλTβS = λS for every S ∈ E\{N, T}.For the `if' part of the proof, assume that for every λ ∈ Λ(E) and µ ∈ Λ(E),
λN = µN = 1 and there exists an a > 0 suh that µS = aλS for every S ∈ E\{N}.Clearly we have N ∈ E . Suppose E 6∈ ENmin. As E is not minimal, there exists a
D ( E suh that D ∈ ENmin. Let λ ∈ Λ(E) and δ ∈ Λ(D). Dene µ = (1− b)λ + bδ,where b > 0 is suiently small, suh that the sign of δS equals the sign of µS forevery S ∈ E . Clearly, µ ∈ Λ(E). Take T ∈ E\D and U ∈ D, U 6= N . Suh a
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U exists, as {N} is not a minimal exat balaned olletion by denition. Sine
µT = (1− b)λT and µU = (1− b)λU + bδU 6= (1− b)λU , there does not exist a salar
a > 0 suh that µT = aλT and µU = aλU , whih is a ontradition. Hene, E ∈ ENmin.As we showed before that N ∈ E , this ompletes the proof. For minimal balaned olletions, the orresponding weight vetor is unique. Sim-ilarly, we have shown that for minimal exat balaned olletions either the or-responding weight vetor is unique or all orresponding weight vetors indue thesame onstraint on the game. This way, for every minimal exat balaned olletionwe an use one standardized weight vetor . In the remainder, for every minimalbalaned olletion B we denote βB for the unique balaned weight vetor. Moregeneral, for every E ∈ ENmin with N 6∈ E , we denote λE for the unique exat balan-ed weight vetor. For E ∈ ENmin with N ∈ E , λE denotes the standardized exatbalaned weight vetor suh that min{λES | S ∈ E} = −1. Notie that for notationalonveniene, for B ∈ BNmin the standardized weight vetor is both denoted by βB and
λB.4.4 Partitioning the lass of minimal exat balanedolletionsIn this setion we study the struture of the lass of minimal exat balaned ol-letions. It turns out that this set an be deomposed in three parts, all related tobalaned olletions. The rst part onsists of all minimal balaned olletions.Theorem 4.4.1 BNmin ⊆ ENmin.Proof: Let B ∈ BNmin. It is lear that every minimal balaned olletion is alsoexat balaned. It remains to show that it is also minimal exat balaned. Assumethere exists an exat balaned olletion E ( B and take λ ∈ Λ(E). We will showthat this results in a ontradition with B ∈ BNmin.Sine B ∈ BNmin we know that there exists a T ∈ E suh that λT < 0 as B doesnot have a proper subset that is balaned. Take a = min{βBS
λS
| S ∈ E\{T}} and
γ = 1
1−a
(βB − aλ). Note that 0 < a < 1 sine βBS > 0 and λS > 0 for all S ∈ E\{T},and a ≥ 1 would imply that













































eN = eN ,so C ∈ BN , ontraditing B ∈ BNmin. The seond part of the partition of ENmin onsists of so-alled negative balaned olle-tions. The set of all negative balaned olletions is denoted by BNmin. The negativebalaned olletions an be obtained, by replaing one oalition in a minimal balan-ed olletion by its omplement. However, this is only allowed for the oalitionswith weight stritly smaller than 1. We have
B
N
min = {(B\{S}) ∪ {N\S} | B ∈ B
N
min, S ∈ B : β
B
S < 1}.Example 4.4.2 Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, and onsider the minimal balaned olletion
B = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}, {4}}. For the weight vetor βB it holds that βB{1,2} = 12 .This means that E = (B\{{1, 2}})∪ ({{3, 4}}) = {{3, 4}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}, {4}} ∈ BNmin.It is readily heked that E ∈ EN , sine e{1,3}+e{2,3}+2e{4}−e{3,4} = eN . As βB{4} = 1,we annot replae the oalition {4} by its omplement to obtain an element of BNmin.
⊳The exat balaned weight vetor of a negative balaned olletion an be derivedfrom the balaned weight vetor of the orresponding balaned olletion.Theorem 4.4.3 Let E ∈ BNmin. Let B ∈ BNmin and U ∈ B be suh that E =
(B\{U}) ∪ {N\U} and βBU < 1. Let λS = βBS1−βB
U
for all S ∈ B\{U}, λN\U = − βBU1−βB
Uand λS = 0 for S ∈ N\E . Then λ ∈ Λ(E).
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t balanednessProof: As B ∈ BNmin and βBU < 1, we know N\U 6∈ B. As 0 < βBU < 1, we obtainthat λS = βBS1−βB
U
> 0 for all S ∈ E\{U} and λN\U = − βBU1−βB
U

















































 = 1.So, indeed λ ∈ Λ(E). By denition of BNmin and the observation that N 6∈ B for every B ∈ BNmin, we have
N 6∈ E for every E ∈ BNmin. Hene, for this seond part of the partition we an fouson olletions without the grand oalition. Consider suh a olletion whih is notminimal balaned. Then it is minimal exat balaned if and only if it is negativebalaned.Theorem 4.4.4(i) BNmin ⊆ ENmin\BNmin.(ii) Let E ∈ ENmin\BNmin and N 6∈ E . Then E ∈ BNmin.Proof:(i) Let E ∈ BNmin. Let B ∈ BNmin and U ∈ B be suh that E = (B\{U})∪ {N\U} and
βBU < 1. Let λS = βBS1−βB
U
for all S ∈ B\{U}, λN\U = − βBU1−βB
U
and λS = 0 for S ∈ N\E .From Theorem 4.4.3, it follows that λ ∈ Λ(E) and therefore E ∈ EN .We prove that E ∈ ENmin. Assume on the ontrary that there exists a subset D ( E ,with D ∈ ENmin. By minimality of B, it must hold that N\U ∈ D as otherwise D ( Bwhih would ontradit Theorem 4.4.1.We distinguish two ases:(1) Assume λDS > 0 for all S ∈ D\{N\U}. We know λDN\U < 1, sine λDN\U = 1would mean that D\{N\U} is a balaned olletion on U whih ontraditsminimality of B as we an omit U from B. Given that λDN\U < 1, we an
4.4. Partitioning the lass of minimal exat balaned olletions 49reverse the proedure for onstruting E : take A = (D\{N\U}) ∪ ({U}) andtake αS = λDS1−λD
N\U
for all S ∈ D\{N\U} and αU = − λDN\U1−λD
N\U



















= 1,So, α ∈ Λ(A) and therefore A ∈ EN . As A ( B this ontradits our assump-tion of B ∈ ENmin.(2) Assume λDT < 0 for some T ∈ D\{N\U}, whih means that D ∈ ENmin\BNminand λDN\U > 0. Take c = −λDN\UλE
N\U
, and take T ∈ D suh that λDT < 0. Weonstrut the weight vetor γ with γS = c1+cλES + 11+cλDS for all S ∈ E and
γS = 0 if S ∈ N\E . Furthermore, take C = {S ∈ E | γS 6= 0}. By denition of
γ, we obtain γN\U = 0 and γS > 0 for all S ∈ C\{T}. So, C ( B and γ ∈ Λ(C).Therefore B 6∈ ENmin, a ontradition with Theorem 4.4.1.So, we have E ∈ ENmin. From Theorem 4.3.7 it follows that Λ(E) = {λ}. Sine λN\U ,
E ∈ ENmin\B
N
min.(ii) Let E ∈ ENmin\BNmin and N 6∈ E . We will identify B ∈ BNmin and the oalition
T ∈ B suh that βBT < 1 and E = (B\{T}) ∪ {N\T}. Take T ∈ E suh that
λET < 0. Take B = (E\{T}) ∪ {N\T} and dene βS = λES1−λE
T


























= 1,So, B ∈ BN . It remains to show that B is minimal. Here we need the onditionthat N 6∈ E , sine there is no minimal balaned olletion that ontains N . If B isnot minimal, then there exists a B′ ∈ BNmin suh that B′ ( B. More preisely, asevery balaned olletion is the union of minimal balaned olletions there exists a
B′ ∈ BNmin suh that B′ ( B and N\T ∈ B′.First suppose there exists a B′ ( B withN\T ∈ B′ and β ′ ∈ Λ+(B′) suh that β ′N\T <











S = eN and therefore ∑S∈D βCSeS = eN − βCN\T eN\T = eT . Take δS = βCSfor every S ∈ D and δT = −1, and we have (1 − a)λE + aδ ∈ Λ(E) for a ∈ (0, 1).This ontradits the minimality of E , sine by Theorem 4.3.7 |Λ(E)| = 1.Hene, B ∈ BNmin, E = B\{N\T} ∪ {T} and βBN\T < 1, so E ∈ BNmin. By denition, the grand oalition is not ontained in any negative balaned olle-tion. Hene, by Theorem 4.4.4 and 4.3.7, for every negative balaned olletion theexat balaned weight vetor is unique. Let E ∈ BNmin, take B ∈ BNmin and U ∈ Bsuh that E = (B\{U}) ∪ {N\U}. By Theorem 4.4.3, the negative weight is plaedon N\U . Sine the exat balaned weight vetor is unique, this implies that forevery E ∈ BNmin there is a unique olletion B ∈ BNmin and a unique oalition U ∈ Bsuh that E = (B\{U}) ∪ {N\U}.The third part of the partition onsists of the minimal subbalaned olletions.These olletions onsist of all minimal balaned olletions of the proper subsets ofthe player set with at least two players, to whih the oalition formed by all playersof the subset and the oalition formed by all players of the original player set areadded.For every M ( N suh that |M | ≥ 2, dene
B̃Nmin(M) = {B ∪ {M,N} | B ∈ B
M
min},
4.4. Partitioning the lass of minimal exat balaned olletions 51Also, dene
B̃Nmin = ∪M(N,|M |≥2B̃
N
min(M),as the set of all minimal subbalaned olletions.Theorem 4.4.5 Let E ∈ B̃Nmin. Let M ( N and B ∈ BMmin be suh that E =
(B ∪ {M,N}). Let λS = βBS for all S ∈ B, λM = −1, λN = 1 and λS = 0 for all
S ∈ N\E . Then λ ∈ Λ(E).Proof: It is readily heked that ∑S∈E λSeS = ∑S∈B βBS eS − eM + eN = eN and
λS > 0 for all S ∈ E\{M}. Hene, λ ∈ Λ(E). Theorem 4.4.6(i) B̃Nmin ⊆ ENmin\BNmin,(ii) Let E ∈ ENmin\BNmin and N ∈ E . Then E ∈ B̃Nmin.Proof:(i) Let E ∈ B̃Nmin. Let M ( N and B ∈ BMmin be suh that E = (B\{M,N}). Let
λS = β
B
S for all S ∈ B, λM = −1, λN = 1 and λS = 0 for all S ∈ N\E . Theorem4.4.5 shows that λ ∈ Λ(E), so E ∈ EN .Suppose E 6∈ ENmin. Take D ( E suh that D ∈ ENmin. We have N ∈ D sinethe players in N\M are not present in any other oalition in E . This also impliesthat λDN = 1. As {N} 6∈ EN we have ∑S∈D\{N} λDS = 0. This means that thereexists a T ∈ D\{N} suh that λDT < 0 and S ⊆ T for all S ∈ D\{N}. We obtain
D\{N, T} ∈ BT .First, suppose T = M . Then D ( E gives D\{N,M} ( B whih ontradits
B ∈ BMmin.Seond, suppose T 6=M . As M 6∈ D, D\{N} ( B. Dene the weight vetor δ suhthat δS = λDS for all S ∈ D\{N} and δS = 0 otherwise. Now, for small ε > 0 wehave ελD + βB ∈ Λ+(B) whih ontradits B ∈ BMmin by Theorem 4.2.7.(ii) By Theorem 4.3.9 we have λEN = 1. Take T ∈ E suh that λET = −1.
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|N | 3 4 5
|ENmin| 11 165 8572
|BNmin| 5 41 1474
|B
N
min| 3 98 6833
|B̃Nmin| 3 26 265Table 4.4.1: Number of olletions in the three parts of the partitionWe have ∑S∈E\{N} λSeS = 0 whih yields ∑S∈E\{N,T} λSeS = eT , and therefore
E\{N, T} ∈ BT . If there exists a minimal balaned olletion B ∈ BTmin suh that
B ( E\{T,N}, it is readily heked that B ∪ {T,N} is an exat balaned olle-tion, whih ontradits our assumption of E ∈ ENmin. Hene, E\{N, T} ∈ BTmin and
E ∈ B̃Nmin. So, we established that B̃Nmin, BNmin, and BNmin are ontained in ENmin. By denition,
N 6∈ E for every E ∈ BNmin and N ∈ E for every E ∈ B̃Nmin. For E ∈ ENmin\BNmin, if
N 6∈ E then E ∈ BNmin, and if N ∈ E then E ∈ B̃Nmin. Hene, we obtain the followingorollary from Theorem 4.4.1, Theorem 4.4.4 and Theorem 4.4.6.Corollary 4.4.7 The three sets B̃Nmin, BNmin, and BNmin form a partition of ENmin.The number of olletions in the dierent parts of the partition are shown in Ta-ble 4.4.1. Appendix 4.A ontains the minimal balaned, minimal subbalaned andminimal negative balaned olletions for three and four players. To generate theseolletions we used the results by Peleg (1965), whih provides an eient and om-prehensive algorithm for obtaining all minimal balaned olletions. As we derivedan expliit relation between minimal balaned olletions on the one hand and mini-mal negative balaned olletions and minimal subbalaned olletions on the otherhand (f. Theorem 4.4.4 and Theorem 4.4.6), these olletions an be onstrutedfrom the minimal balaned olletions together with their respetive weight vetors(f. Theorem 4.4.3 and Theorem 4.4.5).4.5 Suient onditions for exatnessAs mentioned before, the lass of minimal balaned olletions is useful as one doesnot need other balaned olletions to hek whether a game is balaned. The lassof minimal exat balaned weights exhibits the same feature: we show that we only
4.5. Suient onditions for exatness 53need the minimal exat balaned olletions to hek whether a game is exat. Toprove this, we rst need the following lemma.Lemma 4.5.1 Let U ∈ N , A ⊆ {S ∈ N | S ( U} and α ∈ RN+ suh that∑
S∈A αSe
S = eU , αS > 0 for every S ∈ A and αS = 0 for every S ∈ 2U\(A∪{U}).Let v ∈ ∩E∈B̃Nmin(U)V (E). Then ∑S∈A αSv(S) ≤ v(U).Proof: Take (U, vU) suh that vU(S) = v(S) for every S ∈ 2U , and take αU ∈ R2Usuh that αUS = αS for every S ∈ 2U . Sine∑S∈A αUS eS = eU , we have A ∈ BU with








U(S) ≤ vU(U).Note that ∑S∈A αUS vU(S) ≤ vU(U) diretly implies ∑S∈A αSv(S) ≤ v(U). Weshow that for every i ∈ {1, ..., m}, ∑S∈Ai αiSvU(S) ≤ vU(U) follows from v ∈
∩E∈B̃Nmin(U)
V (E).Take i ∈ {1, ..., m} and Ci = Ai ∪ {U,N}. By denition, we have Ci ∈ B̃Nmin(U) with
λCiS = α
i











λCiS v(S) + v(U)− v(N)
≤ v(N) + v(U)− v(N)
= vU(U),where the inequality follows from v ∈ ∩E∈B̃Nmin(U)V (E). Hene, for every i ∈
{1, ..., m}, ∑S∈Ai αiSvU(S) ≤ vU(U) and therefore ∑S∈A αSv(S) ≤ v(U). Theorem 4.5.2 Let v ∈ V (E) for all E ∈ ENmin. Then v ∈ V .
54 Chapter 4. Minimal exat balanednessProof: In fat, we prove the following statement. Let D ∈ EN\ENmin, and assume
∩E∈ENminV (E) ⊆ V (A) for every A ( D. Then ∩E∈ENminV (E) ⊆ V (D). Clearly, thisholds for every D ∈ EN\ENmin with |D| = 0. By indution on |D| we then obtain
∩E∈ENminV (E) = ∩E∈ENV (E) = V .To show that ∩E∈ENminV (E) ⊆ V (D), we show ∩E∈ENminV (E) ⊆ V (δ) for every δ ∈
Λ(D). Let δ ∈ Λ(D).First, assume δ ∈ Λ+(D). Then Theorem 4.4.1 and Theorem 4.2.6 imply that
v ∈ V (δ).Seond, assume that δ 6∈ Λ+(D). Take U ∈ D suh that δU < 0.If U = N , then dene C = D\{N} and γS = δS1−δN for all S ∈ C and γS = 0 for all
S ∈ N\C. We have γ ∈ Λ+(C) and C ∈ BN . Note that v ∈ V (δ) is diretly impliedby v ∈ V (γ). Hene, in the remainder we will assume that U 6= N .Sine D 6∈ ENmin, we an take A ∈ ENmin suh that A ( D.If A ∈ ENmin\BNmin, then take T ∈ A suh that λAT < 0. If A ∈ BNmin, dene T = ∅.Dene a = min{ δS
λA
S
| S ∈ A\{T, U}}. We rst show that a ≤ 1.Suppose on the ontrary that a > 1. As δS > λAS for every S ∈ D\{U}, we have for












λAS = 1,a ontradition.We disriminate between two ases:





























for all S ∈ D\{U}, and κS = 0 for all S ∈ N\(D\{U}). Take
































U − eN + λAUe
U)
= eU .Hene, K ⊆ {S ∈ N | S ( U}, ∑S∈K κSeS = eU , κS > 0 for every S ∈ A and

























≤ (λAU − δU)(v(U)− v(U)) + v(N)
= v(N),where the inequality follows from Lemma 4.5.1 and v ∈ V (λA). Hene,
(∩E∈B̃Nmin(U)
V (E))∩V (A) ⊆ V (δ). Sine B̃Nmin(U) ⊆ ENmin and A ∈ ENmin, we annow onlude that ∩E∈ENminV (E) ⊆ V (δ).
56 Chapter 4. Minimal exat balanedness




























= eN .It is now easily seen that V (κ) ∩ V (λA) ⊆ V (δ), as
∑
S∈D






λAS v(S) ≤ v(N).Hene, V (K) ∩ V (A) ⊆ V (δ). Sine K ⊆ D and A ∈ ENmin, by indution wean now onlude that ∩E∈ENminV (E) ⊆ V (δ).
As Theorem 4.2.8 states, the set of balaned games an not be haraterized by asubset of the minimal balaned olletions. However, the set of exat games anbe haraterized by a subset of the minimal exat balaned olletions, as thereexist minimal exat balaned olletions that are redundant. The following exampleillustrates this.Example 4.5.3 Consider the minimal exat balaned olletions B =
{{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}} with weight vetor βB suh that βB{1,2} = βB{1,3} = βB{2,3} = 12 ,





λE . ⊳The question arises whih minimal exat balaned olletions we an disard. Itturns out that for |N | ≥ 3, ∩E∈ENmin\BNminV (E) ⊆ V . So, we an omit all the minimalbalaned onditions. To show this, we rst introdue a lemma to onstrut partiularmembers of ENmin.
4.5. Suient onditions for exatness 57Lemma 4.5.4 Let |N | ≥ 3 and take S ∈ N and T ∈ N suh that S ∩ T = ∅.(i) If S ∪ T = N , |T | ≥ 2 and i ∈ T , then {S ∪ {i}, T, {i}} ∈ ENmin\BNmin.(ii) If S ∪ T 6= N , then {S, T, S ∪ T,N} ∈ ENmin\BNmin.Proof:(i) The olletion {S∪{i}, T, N\{i}} is minimal balaned with weight vetor λ suhthat λS∪{i} = λT = λN\{i} = 12 . By denition of BNmin, we have {S ∪ {i}, T, {i}} ∈
B
N





N = 1 and λAS∪{i} = −1 and D = {S ∪ {i}, T, {i}} with λDS∪{i} =
λDT = 1 and λD{i} = −1. By Lemma 4.5.4, A ∈ ENmin\BNmin and D ∈ ENmin\BNmin. Now
V (A) ∩ V (D) ⊆ V (B) as
∑
U∈B
βBUv(U) = v(S) + v(T )
= (v({i}) + v(S)− v(S ∪ {i}) + v(N))









≤ v(N),where the inequality follows from v ∈ V (A) and v ∈ V (D).
58 Chapter 4. Minimal exat balanednessWe show that for every partition B with |B| ≥ 3 there exists a partition C suhthat |C| < |B| and ∩E∈ENmin\BNminV (E) ∩ V (C) ⊆ V (B). This sues to show that
∩E∈ENmin\BNminV (E) ⊆ V (B) for every partition B ∈ BNmin.Assume that B is a partition of the player setN , with |B| ≥ 3. Take S ∈ B and T ∈ Bwith S 6= T . Dene A = {S, T, S ∪ T,N} with λAS = λAT = λAN = 1 and λAS∪T = −1.By Lemma 4.5.4 we have A ∈ ENmin\BNmin. Dene D = (B\{S, T}) ∪ {S ∪ T} and










βBUv(U) + v(S ∪ T )









≤ v(N),where the inequality follows from v ∈ V (A) and v ∈ V (D).Seond, onsider the ase where B is not a partition. Take T ∈ B suh that βBT < 1.As B is not a partition, suh a oalition exists and N\T 6∈ B. Dene C = {T,N\T}and D = (B\{T}) ∪ {N\T} with δS = βBS1−βB
T
for all S ∈ B\{T} and δN\T = − βBT1−βB
T






















+ βBT (v(T ) + v(N\T ))







≤ v(N),where the inequality follows from v ∈ V (C) and v ∈ V (D). So ∩E∈ENmin\BNminV (E) ⊆
∩B∈BNminV (B).
4.5. Suient onditions for exatness 59Therefore, ∩E∈ENmin\BNminV (E) = ∩E∈ENminV (E) = ∩E∈ENV (E) = V . So, v ∈ V if andonly if v ∈ v(E) for all E ∈ ENmin\BNmin. We have shown that the lass of minimal balaned olletions is redundant to verifythat a game is exat. However, as the following example demonstrates, there existsan even smaller sublass of the lass of minimal exat balaned olletions that stillensures exatness of the game.Example 4.5.6 Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4}. Consider the minimal exat balaned ol-letions A = {{2}, {1, 4}, {1, 2, 4}, N}, D = {{1, 2, 4}, {1, 2, 3}, {1, 2}} and E =
{{2}, {1, 2}, {1, 4}, {1, 2, 3}}. From
v({2}) + v({1, 4})− v({1, 2, 4}) + v(N) ≤ v(N),and
v({1, 2, 4) + v({1, 2, 3})− v({1, 2}) ≤ v(N),we have that
v({2}) + v({1, 4}) + v({1, 2, 3})− v({1, 2}) ≤ v(N).This implies that V (A) ∩ V (D) ⊆ V (E), so E is redundant. ⊳Further researh on the topi ould possibly establish a haraterization of a sublassof minimal exat balaned olletions where no olletion an be left out while stillguaranteing exatness.
60 Chapter 4. Minimal exat balanedness4.A Minimal exat balaned olletions4.A.1 N = {1, 2, 3}Minimal balanedColletions Weights{1} {2} {3} 1 1 1{3} {1,2} 1 1{2} {1,3} 1 1{1} {2,3} 1 1{1,2} {1,3} {2,3} 1/2 1/2 1/2Minimal negative balanedColletions Weights{1} {1,2} {1,3} -1 1 1{2} {1,2} {2,3} -1 1 1{3} {1,3} {2,3} -1 1 1Minimal subbalanedColletions Standardized weights{1} {2} {1,2} {1,2,3} 1 1 -1 1{1} {3} {1,3} {1,2,3} 1 1 -1 1{2} {3} {2,3} {1,2,3} 1 1 -1 1
4.A. Minimal exat balaned olletions 614.A.2 N = {1, 2, 3, 4}Minimal balanedColletions Weights{1} {2,3,4} 1 1{2} {1,3,4} 1 1{3} {1,2,4} 1 1{4} {1,2,3} 1 1{1,2} {3,4} 1 1{1,3} {2,4} 1 1{1,4} {2,3} 1 1{1} {2} {3,4} 1 1 1{1} {3} {2,4} 1 1 1{1} {4} {2,3} 1 1 1{2} {3} {1,4} 1 1 1{2} {4} {1,3} 1 1 1{3} {4} {1,2} 1 1 1{1,2} {1,3,4} {2,3,4} 1/2 1/2 1/2{1,3} {1,2,4} {2,3,4} 1/2 1/2 1/2{1,4} {1,2,3} {2,3,4} 1/2 1/2 1/2{2,3} {1,2,4} {1,3,4} 1/2 1/2 1/2{2,4} {1,2,3} {1,3,4} 1/2 1/2 1/2{3,4} {1,2,3} {1,2,4} 1/2 1/2 1/2{1} {2} {3} {4} 1 1 1 1{1} {2,3} {2,4} {3,4} 1 1/2 1/2 1/2{1} {2,3} {2,4} {1,3,4} 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2{1} {2,3} {3,4} {1,2,4} 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2{1} {2,4} {3,4} {1,2,3} 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2{2} {1,3} {1,4} {3,4} 1 1/2 1/2 1/2{2} {1,3} {1,4} {2,3,4} 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2{2} {1,3} {3,4} {1,2,4} 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2{2} {1,4} {3,4} {1,2,3} 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2{3} {1,2} {1,4} {2,4} 1 1/2 1/2 1/2
62 Chapter 4. Minimal exat balanednessMinimal balaned (ontinued)Colletions Weights{3} {1,2} {1,4} {2,3,4} 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2{3} {1,2} {2,4} {1,3,4} 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2{3} {1,4} {2,4} {1,2,3} 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2{4} {1,2} {1,3} {2,3} 1 1/2 1/2 1/2{4} {1,2} {1,3} {2,3,4} 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2{4} {1,2} {2,3} {1,3,4} 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2{4} {1,3} {2,3} {1,2,4} 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2{1,2} {1,3} {1,4} {2,3,4} 1/3 1/3 1/3 2/3{1,2} {2,3} {2,4} {1,3,4} 1/3 1/3 1/3 2/3{1,3} {2,3} {3,4} {1,2,4} 1/3 1/3 1/3 2/3{1,4} {2,4} {3,4} {1,2,3} 1/3 1/3 1/3 2/3{1,2,3} {1,2,4} {1,3,4} {2,3,4} 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3Minimal negative balanedColletions Weights{1} {1,2} {1,3,4} -1 1 1{1} {1,3} {1,2,4} -1 1 1{1} {1,4} {1,2,3} -1 1 1{2} {1,2} {2,3,4} -1 1 1{2} {2,3} {1,2,4} -1 1 1{2} {2,4} {1,2,3} -1 1 1{3} {1,3} {2,3,4} -1 1 1{3} {2,3} {1,3,4} -1 1 1{3} {3,4} {1,2,3} -1 1 1{4} {1,4} {2,3,4} -1 1 1{4} {2,4} {1,3,4} -1 1 1{4} {3,4} {1,2,4} -1 1 1{1,2} {1,2,3} {1,2,4} -1 1 1{1,3} {1,2,3} {1,3,4} -1 1 1{1,4} {1,2,4} {1,3,4} -1 1 1{2,3} {1,2,3} {2,3,4} -1 1 1{2,4} {1,2,4} {2,3,4} -1 1 1{3,4} {1,3,4} {2,3,4} -1 1 1{1} {2} {1,3} {1,4} -1 1 1 1{1} {2} {2,3} {2,4} 1 -1 1 1{1} {3} {1,2} {1,4} -1 1 1 1{1} {3} {2,3} {3,4} 1 -1 1 1{1} {4} {1,2} {1,3} -1 1 1 1{1} {4} {2,4} {3,4} 1 -1 1 1{1} {1,2} {1,3} {1,4} -2 1 1 1{1} {1,2} {2,3} {2,4} 2 -1 1 1{1} {1,2} {2,3} {1,2,4} 1 -1 1 1{1} {1,2} {2,4} {1,2,3} 1 -1 1 1{1} {1,3} {2,3} {3,4} 2 -1 1 1{1} {1,3} {2,3} {1,3,4} 1 -1 1 1
4.A. Minimal exat balaned olletions 63Minimal negative balaned (ontinued)Colletions Weights{1} {1,3} {3,4} {1,2,3} 1 -1 1 1{1} {1,4} {2,4} {3,4} 2 -1 1 1{1} {1,4} {2,4} {1,3,4} 1 -1 1 1{1} {1,4} {3,4} {1,2,4} 1 -1 1 1{1} {1,2,3} {1,2,4} {1,3,4} - 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2{2} {3} {1,2} {2,4} -1 1 1 1{2} {3} {1,3} {3,4} 1 -1 1 1{2} {4} {1,2} {2,3} -1 1 1 1{2} {4} {1,4} {3,4} 1 -1 1 1{2} {1,2} {1,3} {1,4} 2 -1 1 1{2} {1,2} {1,3} {1,2,4} 1 -1 1 1{2} {1,2} {1,4} {1,2,3} 1 -1 1 1{2} {1,2} {2,3} {2,4} -2 1 1 1{2} {1,3} {2,3} {3,4} 2 1 -1 1{2} {1,3} {2,3} {2,3,4} 1 1 -1 1{2} {1,4} {2,4} {3,4} 2 1 -1 1{2} {1,4} {2,4} {2,3,4} 1 1 -1 1{2} {2,3} {3,4} {1,2,3} 1 -1 1 1{2} {2,4} {3,4} {1,2,4} 1 -1 1 1{2} {1,2,3} {1,2,4} {2,3,4} - 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2{3} {4} {1,3} {2,3} -1 1 1 1{3} {4} {1,4} {2,4} 1 -1 1 1{3} {1,2} {1,3} {1,4} 2 1 -1 1{3} {1,2} {1,3} {1,3,4} 1 1 -1 1{3} {1,2} {2,3} {2,4} 2 1 -1 1{3} {1,2} {2,3} {2,3,4} 1 1 -1 1{3} {1,3} {1,4} {1,2,3} 1 -1 1 1{3} {1,3} {2,3} {3,4} -2 1 1 1{3} {1,4} {2,4} {3,4} 2 1 1 -1{3} {1,4} {3,4} {2,3,4} 1 1 -1 1{3} {2,3} {2,4} {1,2,3} 1 -1 1 1{3} {2,4} {3,4} {1,3,4} 1 1 -1 1
64 Chapter 4. Minimal exat balanednessMinimal negative balaned (ontinued)Colletions Weights{3} {1,2,3} {1,3,4} {2,3,4} - 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2{4} {1,2} {1,3} {1,4} 2 1 1 -1{4} {1,2} {1,4} {1,3,4} 1 1 -1 1{4} {1,2} {2,3} {2,4} 2 1 1 -1{4} {1,2} {2,4} {2,3,4} 1 1 -1 1{4} {1,3} {1,4} {1,2,4} 1 1 -1 1{4} {1,3} {2,3} {3,4} 2 1 1 -1{4} {1,3} {3,4} {2,3,4} 1 1 -1 1{4} {1,4} {2,4} {3,4} -2 1 1 1{4} {2,3} {2,4} {1,2,4} 1 1 -1 1{4} {2,3} {3,4} {1,3,4} 1 1 -1 1{4} {1,2,4} {1,3,4} {2,3,4} - 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2{1,2} {1,3} {2,3} {1,2,4} - 1/2 1/2 1/2 1{1,2} {1,3} {2,3} {1,3,4} 1/2 - 1/2 1/2 1{1,2} {1,3} {2,3} {2,3,4} 1/2 1/2 - 1/2 1{1,2} {1,3} {1,2,3} {2,3,4} 1 1 -1 1{1,2} {1,4} {2,4} {1,2,3} - 1/2 1/2 1/2 1{1,2} {1,4} {2,4} {1,3,4} 1/2 - 1/2 1/2 1{1,2} {1,4} {2,4} {2,3,4} 1/2 1/2 - 1/2 1{1,2} {1,4} {1,2,4} {2,3,4} 1 1 -1 1{1,2} {2,3} {1,2,3} {1,3,4} 1 1 -1 1{1,2} {2,4} {1,2,4} {1,3,4} 1 1 -1 1{1,3} {1,4} {3,4} {1,2,3} - 1/2 1/2 1/2 1{1,3} {1,4} {3,4} {1,2,4} 1/2 - 1/2 1/2 1{1,3} {1,4} {3,4} {2,3,4} 1/2 1/2 - 1/2 1{1,3} {1,4} {1,3,4} {2,3,4} 1 1 -1 1{1,3} {2,3} {1,2,3} {1,2,4} 1 1 -1 1{1,3} {3,4} {1,2,4} {1,3,4} 1 1 1 -1{1,4} {2,4} {1,2,3} {1,2,4} 1 1 1 -1{1,4} {3,4} {1,2,3} {1,3,4} 1 1 1 -1{2,3} {2,4} {3,4} {1,2,3} - 1/2 1/2 1/2 1{2,3} {2,4} {3,4} {1,2,4} 1/2 - 1/2 1/2 1
4.A. Minimal exat balaned olletions 65Minimal negative balaned (ontinued)Colletions Weights{2,3} {2,4} {3,4} {1,3,4} 1/2 1/2 - 1/2 1{2,3} {2,4} {1,3,4} {2,3,4} 1 1 1 -1{2,3} {3,4} {1,2,4} {2,3,4} 1 1 1 -1{2,4} {3,4} {1,2,3} {2,3,4} 1 1 1 -1Minimal subbalanedColletions Standardized weights{1} {2} {1,2} {1,2,3,4} 1 1 -1 1{1} {3} {1,3} {1,2,3,4} 1 1 -1 1{1} {4} {1,4} {1,2,3,4} 1 1 -1 1{1} {2,3} {1,2,3} {1,2,3,4} 1 1 -1 1{1} {2,4} {1,2,4} {1,2,3,4} 1 1 -1 1{1} {3,4} {1,3,4} {1,2,3,4} 1 1 -1 1{2} {3} {2,3} {1,2,3,4} 1 1 -1 1{2} {4} {2,4} {1,2,3,4} 1 1 -1 1{2} {1,3} {1,2,3} {1,2,3,4} 1 1 -1 1{2} {1,4} {1,2,4} {1,2,3,4} 1 1 -1 1{2} {3,4} {2,3,4} {1,2,3,4} 1 1 -1 1{3} {4} {3,4} {1,2,3,4} 1 1 -1 1{3} {1,2} {1,2,3} {1,2,3,4} 1 1 -1 1{3} {1,4} {1,3,4} {1,2,3,4} 1 1 -1 1{3} {2,4} {2,3,4} {1,2,3,4} 1 1 -1 1{4} {1,2} {1,2,4} {1,2,3,4} 1 1 -1 1{4} {1,3} {1,3,4} {1,2,3,4} 1 1 -1 1{4} {2,3} {2,3,4} {1,2,3,4} 1 1 -1 1{1} {2} {3} {1,2,3} {1,2,3,4} 1 1 1 -1 1{1} {2} {4} {1,2,4} {1,2,3,4} 1 1 1 -1 1{1} {3} {4} {1,3,4} {1,2,3,4} 1 1 1 -1 1{2} {3} {4} {2,3,4} {1,2,3,4} 1 1 1 -1 1{1,2} {1,3} {2,3} {1,2,3} {1,2,3,4} 1/2 1/2 1/2 -1 1{1,2} {1,4} {2,4} {1,2,4} {1,2,3,4} 1/2 1/2 1/2 -1 1{1,4} {1,3} {3,4} {1,3,4} {1,2,3,4} 1/2 1/2 1/2 -1 1{2,4} {3,4} {2,3} {2,3,4} {1,2,3,4} 1/2 1/2 1/2 -1 1

Chapter 5Mathing situations: onnetingassignment and permutation
5.1 IntrodutionThis hapter, whih is based on Tejada et al. (2011), disusses a general frameworkfor games derived from a non-negative, square matrix in whih every entry representsthe value obtained from ombining the orresponding row and olumn. We assumethat every row and every olumn is assoiated with a player, where every playeris assoiated to at most one row and at most one olumn. The instanes arisingfrom this framework will be alled mathing situations. These mathing situationsprovide a generalization of two models known from the literature. First, in thespeial ase that every player is assoiated with exatly one row or one olumn only,the model boils down to the assignment problem (f. Shapley and Shubik (1972)).The assignment problem is e.g. used to model a two-sided market of heterogeneousgoods, where every player assoiated with a row demands one good and every playerassoiated with a olumn oers one good. Seond, if every player is assoiatedwith exatly one olumn and exatly one row, the model represents a permutationproblem (f. Tijs et al. (1984)). This model is used to model a situation whereevery player owns a mahine and a job, and osts an be redued by proessingone's job on the mahine of another player. For every mathing situation with thesame underlying matrix, the optimization problem is the same: whih assignmentof rows to olumns results in the maximum total value.We analyze mathing situations from a game theoreti perspetive. Assignmentgames, the ooperative games originating from assignment problems, have beenstudied extensively (see, e.g., Núñez and Rafels (2002) and Martínez-Albéniz et al.67
68 Chapter 5. Mathing situations: onneting assignment and permutation(2011)). The relation between assignment games and permutation games was stud-ied by Curiel and Tijs (1986) and Quint (1996). As they show, every assignmentgame an also be obtained from a permutation situation with a dierent underlyingmatrix. For mathing games, the games obtained from mathing situations, we showthat the ore is non-empty. In doing so we generalize the mentioned results fromCuriel and Tijs (1986) and Quint (1996) to our setting.After that, this hapter onsists of two parts. First, we analyze the relationbetween mathing situations based on the same underlying matrix, but with a dif-ferent player set. Seond, we provide an addition to the literature on permutationsituations. We fous on the struture of matries leading to the same ore of thepermutation game, and the struture of the ore in a spei sublass of the lassof permutation situations.To provide more detail, in the rst part we assoiate to every assignment situationa number of mathing situations with the same underlying matrix up to a reorderingof the rows and olumns. Tijs et al. (1984) and Quint (1996) showed that if theassoiated mathing situation is a permutation situation, the ore of the permutationgame oinides with a translation of the ore of the assignment game. We generalizeone part of this result to obtain that the ore of an assoiated mathing game is asubset of a translation of the ore of the assignment game. For every assignmentsituation and any assoiated mathing situation, we show how all extreme points ofthe ore of the mathing game an be viewed as extreme points of the ore of theassignment game. In general not all extreme points of the ore of the assignmentgame are overed in this way, but for every assignment situation there exists anassoiated permutation situation suh that all extreme points of the ore of theassignment game are overed.We introdue the lass of mathing situations alled Böhm-Bawerk mathing si-tuations. This is a generalization of the lass of Böhm-Bawerk assignment situations(Böhm-Bawerk (1891)), that onsists of those assignment situations where the goodsare homogeneous, and the value of ombining a row and a olumn is given by thevalue of a transation between the player assoiated with the row (the buyer) and theplayer assoiated with the olumn (the seller). Böhm-Bawerk mathing situationsare interesting from a mathematial point of view, as all extreme points of the oreof a Böhm-Bawerk assignment game are overed by extreme points of the ore ofthe permutation game, for any assoiated permutation situation. Also, we provide
5.1. Introdution 69an expression for the nuleolus of Böhm-Bawerk permutation games and show thatthe nuleolus of the permutation game an be obtained from the nuleolus of theassoiated Böhm-Bawerk assignment game.In the seond part attention is shifted to permutation games only. We studythe struture of the set of all matries that lead to permutations games with thesame ore. For assignment games, the struture of this set was studied by Martínez-Albéniz et al. (2011). Also, they show that within this set there exists a uniquematrix for whih no entry an be raised without hanging the ore. For permutationgames, there an be more than one suh matrix. Interestingly, we show that for smallinstanes every suh matrix leads to an exat game whereas for assignment gamesthis is not guaranteed.Moreover, we study a spei sublass of permutation situations alled `homo-geneous alternatives' permutation situations. For `homogeneous alternatives' per-mutation situations, every player onsiders the objets of the other players to behomogeneous but we allow for a dierent valuation of his own objet. Hene, thevalue obtained by a player while ombining his row with the olumn of any anotherplayer is independent of the olumn player, but this value an dier from the valueobtained from mathing his own row with his own olumn. For this lass of permu-tation situations we again fous on the ore and nuleolus. For all `homogeneousalternatives' permutation situations we provide expliit expressions for both the oreand the nuleolus.This hapter is organized as follows. Setion 2 introdues mathing situationsand games, and reviews known results on (the relation between) assignment gamesand permutation games. Also, we show that mathing games have a non-empty ore.In setion 3 we formalize the relation between assignment situations and assoiatedmathing situations, we onsider the relation between the extreme points of theore of the assignment game and the extreme points of the ore of an assoiatedpermutation game. Also, we onsider the lass of Böhm-Bawerk mathing situations.More speially, we analyze both the extreme points of the ore and the nuleolusfor Böhm-Bawerk permutation games and onsider the preservation of both theextreme points of the ore and the nuleolus in the translation from Böhm-Bawerkassignment games to Böhm-Bawerk permutation games. In the last setion, onpermutation situations, we study the set of permutation situations leading to the





1), (5.1)is maximized. Alternatively, we denote (i, j) ∈ µT 1T 2 if j = µT 1T 2(i). Shapley andShubik (1972) shows that nding a bijetion that maximizes (5.1) boils down tosolving a linear program. This paper onsiders mathing situations from a gametheoreti perspetive: we analyze the issue of dividing total benets among theplayers.Dene N = N1 ∪N2 and take S ⊆ N . We dene S1 = N1 ∩S and S2 = N2 ∩S.For every S ⊆ N we denote the set of feasible mathings by
M(S1, S2) = {µT 1T 2 : T
1 → T 2 | T 1 ⊆ S1, T 2 ⊆ S2, µT 1T 2 is a bijetion}.So, for µT 1T 2 ∈M(S1, S2) the rows of players in S1\T 1 are not mathed to a olumnand the olumns of players in S2\T 2 are not mathed to a row. The set of optimalmathings for S1 and S2 is given by
M∗A(S










R1R2(i)for every µR1R2 ∈M(S1, S2)}.
5.2. A unifying model 71Note that for every A ∈ M+N1×N2 , by non-negativity of A, there always exists a
µ∗T 1T 2 ∈ M
∗
A(S
1, S2) suh that |T 1| = |T 2| = min{|S1|, |S2|}. In partiular, if
|S1| = |S2| there exists a µ∗S1S2 ∈M∗A(S1, S2).Let (N1, N2, A) be a mathing situation. Then the assoiated mathing game











)The optimal mathing µ∗N1N2 ∈ M∗A(N1, N2) is suh that µ∗N1N2(1) = 2 and
µ∗N1N2(2) = 3, resulting in v(N) = 5. The mathing game (N1 ∪N2, vA) is given by
S {1} {2} {3} {1, 2} {1, 3} {2, 3} {1, 2, 3}
vA(S) 0 2 0 2 2 4 5Sine N1 ∩N2 = {2}, player 2 is the only player that an reate a positive value onhis own. ⊳Two speial lasses of mathing situations have been analyzed in the literaturebefore. In fat, regarding the player set of these speial ases, they form the `extreme'ases: for assignment situations N1 and N2 are disjoint, whereas for permutationsituations N1 oinides with N2.Denition 5.2.2 (f. Shapley and Shubik (1972)) Let (N1, N2, A) be a mathingsituation. Then (N1, N2, A) is alled an assignment situation if N1 ∩N2 = ∅.Denition 5.2.3 (f. Tijs et al. (1984)) Let (N1, N2, A) be a mathing situation.Then (N1, N2, A) is alled a permutation situation if N1 = N2.















(i), for all i ∈ T 1,
ui + vj ≥ aij , for all i ∈ N1, j ∈ N2\{µ∗T 1T 2(i)},
ui = 0, for every i ∈ N1\T 1,
vj = 0, for every j ∈ N2\T 2  .In partiular, C(vA) 6= ∅.For every assignment situation, there exist two speial ore elements. Let
(N1, N2, A) be an assignment situation, and let µ∗T 1,T 2 ∈ M∗A(N1, N2). For i ∈ N1,dene ūi = vA(N) − vA(N\{i}) and for j ∈ N2 dene v̄j = vA(N) − vA(N\{j}).Also dene
ui =
{





(i) if i ∈ T 1,for every i ∈ N1 and
vj =
{





(j) if j ∈ T 2,for every j ∈ N2.Theorem 5.2.5 (Leonard (1983), Demange (1982)) Let (N1, N2, A) be an assign-ment situation, and let µ∗T 1,T 2 ∈ M∗A(N1, N2). Then both (u, v̄) ∈ C(vA) and
(ū, v) ∈ C(vA) while




+ | u ≤ u ≤ ū, v ≤ v ≤ v̄}.For permutation games, it is known that the ore is non-empty.Theorem 5.2.6 (Tijs et al. (1984)) Let (N1, N2, A) be a permutation situation.Then C(vA) 6= ∅.
5.2. A unifying model 73In fat, as every subgame of a permutation game is again a permutation game,every permutation game is totally balaned. Tijs et al. (1984) shows that any totallybalaned game with at most three players is a permutation game. The followingtheorem, whih is a generalization of a theorem by Curiel and Tijs (1986), showsthat every mathing game is a permutation game dened by a dierent matrix fromthe original.Theorem 5.2.7 Let (N1, N2, A) be a mathing situation and let (N1 ∪ N2, N1 ∪
N2, B) be the permutation situation where B ∈ M+N1∪N2×N1∪N2 is suh that forevery i, j ∈ N1 ∪N2
bij =
{
aij if i ∈ N1 and j ∈ N2
0 if i ∈ N2\N1 or j ∈ N1\N2.Then vA(S) = vB(S) for all S ∈ 2N1∪N2 .Proof: Let N = N1 ∪N2 and take S ∈ 2N .First, we show that vB(S) ≤ vA(S). Take µ∗SS ∈ M∗B(S, S). Note that suh a µ∗SSindeed exists. Take T 1 = {i ∈ S1 | µ∗SS(i) ∈ S2} and T 2 = µ∗SS(T 1), and dene
µT 1T 2 ∈M(S
















≤ vA(S)where the seond equality follows from biµ∗
SS
(i) = 0 for every i ∈ S\T 1.Seond, we show that vA(S) ≤ vB(S). Take µ∗T 1T 2 ∈ M∗A(S1, S2), and dene µSS ∈












biµSS(i) ≤ vB(S)where the seond equality follows by onstrution of B and the observation that
µ∗T 1T 2(i) ∈ T
2 for every i ∈ T 1. Hene, vA(S) = vB(S) for every S ∈ 2N . The previous theorem and Theorem 5.2.6 result in the following orollary:Corollary 5.2.8 Let (N1, N2, A) be a mathing situation. Then C(vA) 6= ∅.
74 Chapter 5. Mathing situations: onneting assignment and permutation5.3 Assignment versus permutationIn this setion we formalize the relation between assignment situations and math-ing situations with the same underlying matrix up to a reordering of the rows andolumns. We extend the results on this relation in two ways. First, we generalize aresult by Tijs et al. (1984) and Quint (1996), and show that the ore of a mathinggame is a subset of a translation of the ore of the orresponding assignment game.Seond, we take a look at the preservation of spei points of the ore in the transla-tion from an assignment situation to assoiated permutation situations. In general,the extreme points of the ore of the permutation game form a subset of the trans-lated extreme points of the ore of the assignment game and for every assignmentgame there exists a permutation game based on the same data, for whih the reversestatement also holds. When we onsider Böhm-Bawerk assignment situations, weeven show that the translated extreme points of the ore of the assignment gameoinide with the extreme points of the ore of any assoiated permutation game.Also, the nuleolus is preserved in the translation from a Böhm-Bawerk assignmentsituation to any assoiated permutation situation.5.3.1 Assignment games versus permutation gamesFor nite player sets N and N ′ suh that |N | = |N ′|, we denote Π(N,N ′) for theset of bijetions σ : N → N ′.Denition 5.3.1 Let (N1, N2, A) be an assignment situation, and let N̄1 and N̄2be suh that |N̄1| = |N1| and |N̄2| = |N2|. Let σ1 ∈ Π(N̄1, N1) and σ2 ∈ Π(N̄2, N2).Then the assoiated mathing situation (N̄1, N̄2, Ā) is given by āij = aσ1(i)σ2(j) forevery i, j ∈ N .So, for an assignment situation (N1, N2, A), the matrix A and the matrix Ā un-derlying the assoiated mathing situation (N̄1, N̄2, Ā) are equal as an |N1| × |N2|matrix up to a permutation and relabeling of the rows and olumns.Denition 5.3.2 Let N1 ∩ N2 = ∅, let N̄1 and N̄2 be suh that |N1| = |N̄1| and








+ is dened by
5.3. Assignment versus permutation 75
mσ
1σ2




uσ1(i) if i ∈ N̄1\N̄2
vσ2(i) if i ∈ N̄2\N̄1










)The alloation ((0, 1), (1, 3)) ∈ C(vA) for the assignment game orresponds with thealloation mσ1σ2((0, 1), (1, 3)) = (0, 2, 3) for the mathing game (N̄1, N̄2, Ā). Sine
C(vĀ) = onv{(0, 2, 3), (0, 3, 2), (1, 2, 2), (1, 3, 1)}, we have that (0, 2, 3) ∈ C(vĀ). ⊳Tijs et al. (1984) and Quint (1996) studied the relation between the ore of anassignment game and the ore of an assoiated permutation game. For an assignmentgame, suh an assoiated permutation game only exists if the underlying assignmentsituation is square, i.e., |N1| = |N2|. For an assignment situation (N1, N2, A) andan assoiated permutation situation (N̄1, N̄2, Ā), the translation of the ore of theassignment game (N1 ∪ N2, vA) oinides with the ore of the permutation game
(N̄1 ∪ N̄2, vĀ).
76 Chapter 5. Mathing situations: onneting assignment and permutationTheorem 5.3.4 (Tijs et al. (1984), Quint (1996)) Let (N1, N2, A) be a squareassignment situation, and let N̄ be suh that |N̄ | = |N1|. Let σ1 ∈ Π(N̄ , N1) and
σ2 ∈ Π(N̄, N2). Then for the assoiated permutation situation (N̄ , N̄ , Ā), we have
mσ
1σ2(C(vA)) = C(vĀ).The above result shows that the ore is preserved in the translation from the as-signment situation (N1, N2, A) to the permutation situation (N̄ , N̄ , Ā). This raisesthe question whether spei points in the ore are preserved by this translation.First, we onsider the relation between the extreme points of the ore of the assign-ment game (N, vA) and the extreme points of the ore of the assoiated mathinggame (N, vĀ). It turns out that the extreme points of the ore of the mathing gameform a subset of the translated extreme points of the ore of the assignment game.It is important to note that the theorem holds for any assoiated mathing game,not only if the assoiated mathing game is a permutation game.Theorem 5.3.5 Let (N1, N2, A) be an assignment situation, let N̄1 and N̄2 be suhthat |N̄1| = |N1| and |N̄2| = |N2|. Let σ1 ∈ Π(N̄1, N1) and σ2 ∈ Π(N̄2, N2). Thenext (C(vĀ)) ⊆ mσ1σ2(ext(C(vA))).Proof: Let y ∈ ext {C(vĀ)} and let P 1 = C(vA), whih is a polytope. Let also
S1 = {x ∈ P 1 | mσ
1σ2(x) = y}. By Theorem 5.3.4, S1 is nonempty.If P 1 is a singleton, the result in the theorem trivially holds. Hene, we assume thatdim(P 1) > 0. We show that there is a nite hain P 1 ⊃ P 2 ⊃ .... ⊃ P t, suh that
P 2 is a faet of P 1, P 3 is a faet of P 2 et., and Sk = {x ∈ P k | mσ1σ2(x) = y} 6= ∅for all k ∈ {1, ..., t} and dim(P t) = 0. This nishes the proof, as the only elementof x ∈ P t is an extreme point of C(vĀ) and mσ1σ2(x) = y.It sues to show that S1 annot be ontained in the relative interior of P 1, int(P 1):this implies that there must be one faet of P 1, let us say P 2, suh that S2 :=
S1 ∩ P 2 = (mσ
1σ2)−1(y) ∩ P 2 6= ∅. Sine P 2 is a faet of P 1, ext {P 2} ⊂ ext {P 1}and dim(P 2) < dim(P 1). If dim(P 2) = 0, i.e., P 2 = {p}, the proof is omplete sine
y = mσ
1σ2(p) and p ∈ ext {C(vA)}. Otherwise, i.e., dim(P 2) > 0, repeating theargument for S1 * int(P 1) proves that S2 * int(P 2) whih implies that there existsa faet P 3 of P 2 suh that S3 = S2 ∩ P 3 = (mσ1σ2)−1(y) ∩ P 3 6= ∅. Iterating thesearguments a nite number of times, there must be a faet P t = {p} of P t−1, for some
t > 2, suh that St := St−1 ∩ P t = (mσ1σ2)−1(y) ∩ P t 6= ∅ and dim(P t) = 0. That
5.3. Assignment versus permutation 77is, y = mσ1σ2(p) and p ∈ ext {C(vA)}, sine ext(P t) ⊂ ext(P t−1) ⊂ ... ⊂ ext(P 1) =ext(C(vA)).So, we show via ontradition that S1 6⊆ int(P 1). Suppose S1 ⊆ int(P 1) and let p1be any extreme point of P 1. On the one hand, sine mσ1σ2 is a ontinuous funtion,
S1 is a ompat set. Hene, there is x1 ∈ S1 that is the losest point to p1 withinthe set S1 with respet to the Eulidean distane, i.e., d(p1, x) ≥ d(p1, x1) = δ > 0for any x ∈ S1. On the other hand, sine x1 ∈ int(P 1), there is ε > 0 suh that
Bε(x










1σ2(x′′),where, by (5.3.4),mσ1σ2(x′) ∈ C(vĀ) andmσ1σ2(x′′) ∈ C(vĀ). Sine y ∈ ext {C(vĀ)},this implies that mσ1σ2(x′) = mσ1σ2(x′′) = y and hene x′ ∈ S1 whih ontradits
x′ ∈ Bδ(p
1). Therefore our supposition was inorret, i.e., it must be the ase that






,Total prot is optimized by µ∗N1N2 ∈ M∗A(N1, N2) suh that µ∗N1N2(1) = 4 and
µ∗N1N2(2) = 3.The assignment game (N1 ∪N2, vA) is given by
S {1} {2} {3} {4} {1, 2} {1, 3} {1, 4} {2, 3} {2, 4} {3, 4}
vA(S) 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 0 0
S {1, 2, 3} {1, 2, 4} {1, 3, 4} {2, 3, 4} {1, 2, 3, 4}
vA(S) 2 2 2 2 4E.g., for oalition {1, 2, 4} the optimal mapping µ∗{1}{4} ∈ M∗A({1, 2}, {4}) is suhthat µ∗{1}{4}(1) = 4 and player 2 is not mathed. Using Theorem 5.2.4, we have
C(vA) = onv{(0, 0, 2, 2), (0, 1, 1, 2), (1, 2, 0, 1), (2, 0, 2, 0), (2, 2, 0, 0)}.
78 Chapter 5. Mathing situations: onneting assignment and permutationLet N̄ = {1, 2}, and let σ1 ∈ Π(N̄1, N1) and σ2 ∈ Π(N̄2, N2) be suh that






.For the assoiated permutation game (N̄, vĀ) we obtain:
S {1} {2} {1, 2}
vĀ(S) 1 0 4and the ore is given by C(vĀ) = onv{(1, 3), (4, 0)}. Sine (0, 0, 2, 2) ∈ ext(C(vA))but m((0, 0, 2, 2)) = (2, 2) 6∈ ext(C(vĀ)), we an onlude that ext {C(vĀ)} 6⊇
mσ
1σ2(ext(C(vA))). ⊳Nevertheless, with every square assignment situation we an assoiate a permutationsituation suh that the reverse inlusion holds.Theorem 5.3.7 Let (N1, N2, A) be an assignment situation suh that |N1| = |N2|,and let N̄ be suh that |N̄ | = |N1|. Then there exist σ1 ∈ Π(N̄ , N1) and σ2 ∈
Π(N̄, N2) suh that for the assoiated permutation situation (N̄ , N̄ , Ā) it holds that
mσ
1σ2(ext(C(vA))) = ext(C(vĀ)).Proof: Let µ∗N1N2 ∈ M∗A(N1, N2). Let σ1 ∈ Π(N̄, N1), and let σ2 ∈ Π(N̄ , N2)be suh that σ2(i) = µ∗N1N2(σ1(i)) for every i ∈ N . By Theorem 5.3.5 we haveext(C(vĀ)) ⊆ mσ1σ2(ext(C(vA))).It remains to show that mσ1σ2(ext(C(vA))) ⊆ ext(C(vĀ)). It is readily hekedthat vĀ is an additive game and ext(C(vĀ)) = C(vĀ) = (āii)i∈N . Let
(u, v) ∈ ext(C(vA)). By Theorem 5.2.4 we have ui + vj = aij for all (i, j) ∈
µ∗N1N2 . Hene, for every i ∈ N , mσ1σ2i (u, v) = uσ1(i) + vσ2(i) = aσ1(i)σ2(i) =
āii. Therefore, mσ1σ2(u, v) ∈ ext(C(vĀ)) so mσ1σ2(ext(C(vA))) ⊆ ext(C(vĀ)).

5.3. Assignment versus permutation 795.3.2 Böhm-Bawerk mathingAssignment situations an be used to model a two-sided market of heterogeneousgoods. The Böhm-Bawerk horse market situation (Böhm-Bawerk (1891)) is a spe-i assignment situation where the goods traded for money are homogeneous. Ina Böhm-Bawerk assignment situation every player is haraterized by a single non-negative number: eah buyer i ∈ N1 values a unit of the good at wi ≥ 0, whereaseah seller j ∈ N2 values her own good at cj ≥ 0. The prot that an be reahedthrough a transation between buyer i and seller j is max {0, wi − cj}. The followingdenition generalizes Böhm-Bawerk assignment situations.Denition 5.3.8 Let N1, N2 be two player sets, and let w ∈ RN1+ and c ∈ RN2+ .Then the Böhm-Bawerk mathing situation (N1, N2, Aw,c) is given by aw,cij =




(j) if wi > wj.




i ∈ N1 | aw,ciµ∗
T1T2
(i) > 0
}∣∣∣ ,where µ∗T 1T 2 ∈ M∗Aw,c(N1, N2) is suh that it satises the onditions of Theorem5.3.9. Given the Böhm-Bawerk permutation game assoiated to Aw,c, rw,c is themaximum number of mathings that an be arried out simultaneously, giving astritly positive benet. To avoid the null game we assume rw,c > 0.For the vetors w ∈ RN1 and c ∈ RN2 , we dene w̃ ∈ RN1 as the vetor thatorders the elements of w suh that w̃1 ≥ w̃2 ≥ ... ≥ w̃n and c̃ ∈ RN2 as the vetorthat orders the elements of c suh that c̃1 ≤ c̃2 ≤ ... ≤ c̃n. Hene, w̃k denotes the
kth largest omponent of w, and c̃k denotes the kth smallest omponent of c. Fornotational onveniene, we take w̃k = −∞ if k > n and c̃k = ∞ if k > n.For the Böhm-Bawerk mathing situation (N1, N2, Aw,c), we say that an agent
i ∈ N1 is buyer-ative if wi ≥ w̃rw,c . We denote HB ∈ 2N1∪N2 for the set of buyer-ative agents, and denote HBS = HB ∩ S for every S ∈ 2N1∪N2 . We all an agent
i ∈ N2 seller-ative if ci ≤ c̃rw,c . We denote HS ∈ 2N1∪N2 for the set of seller-ativeagents, and denote HSS = HS ∩ S for every S ∈ 2N1∪N2 . A player i ∈ N1 ∩ N2 isalled ative if he is both buyer-ative and seller-ative, and is alled inative if heis neither buyer-ative nor seller-ative. As the player i ∈ N suh that wi = w̃rw,c(as well as the player i ∈ N suh that ci = c̃rw,c) need not be unique, the number ofative buyers an dier from the number of ative sellers.Dene for the Böhm-Bawerk assignment situation (N1, N2, Aw,c), p, p̄ ∈ R+ suhthat
p = max {w̃rw,c+1, c̃rw,c} ,
p̄ = min {w̃rw,c , c̃rw,c+1} .The values for p and p̄ are suh that the number of transations suh that all sellersand all buyers involved in a transation ahieve a non-negative value, is maximized.Given an optimal mathing µ∗T 1T 2 ∈ M∗Aw,c(N1, N2), a prie p ∈ [p, p̄] and player
i ∈ T 1, if the value wi − cµ∗
T1T2
(i) from a transation between the mathed players i
5.3. Assignment versus permutation 81and µ∗T 1T 2(i) is non-negative, then both the value wi − p that the buyer i ahievesfrom buying the good and the value p − cµ∗
T1T2
(i) that the seller µ∗T 1T 2(i) ahievesfrom selling the good are non-negative.For Böhm-Bawerk assignment games, the reverse inlusion of Theorem 5.2.5 alsoholds: the ore is a line segment dened by (u, v̄) and (ū, v). Moreover, we anprovide expressions for u, ū, v and v̄ in terms of w and c.Theorem 5.3.10 (Shapley and Shubik (1972), Moulin (1996)) Let (N1, N2, Aw,c)be a Böhm-Bawerk assignment situation. Then C(vAw,c) = onv{(u, v̄), (ū, v)} with,for every i ∈ N1,
ui =
{
wi − p̄ if i ∈ HB
0 if i ∈ N1\HB and ūi = {wi − p if i ∈ HB0 if i ∈ N1\HB.And, for every i ∈ N2,
vi =
{
p− ci if i ∈ HS
0 if i ∈ N2\HS and v̄i = {p̄− ci if i ∈ HS0 if i ∈ N2\HS.Using Theorem 5.3.4 and Theorem 5.3.10, it is straightforward to express theore of a Böhm-Bawerk permutation game in terms of the valuations of the players.Theorem 5.3.11 Let (N,N,Aw,c) be a Böhm-Bawerk permutation game. Then





wi − ci if i ∈ HB ∩HS
wi − p if i ∈ HB\HS
p− ci if i ∈ HS\HB
0 if i ∈ N\(HB ∪HS),for every p ∈ [p, p̄] and every i ∈ N .Proof: The expression follows diretly from Theorem 5.3.4 and Theorem 5.3.10.
Observe that an ative agent does not benet from ooperation, sine he reeiveshis stand alone value at any ore alloation, but only agents that are either buyer-ative or seller-ative (and not both) do. As it should be expeted the interests of
82 Chapter 5. Mathing situations: onneting assignment and permutationall agents that are only buyer-ative are totally aligned and opposed to the interestsof all agents that are only seller-ative, and vie versa.Now, we turn to the preservation of distint points of the ore. First of all, weonsider the extreme points of the ore.Theorem 5.3.12 Let (N1, N2, Aw,c) be a square Böhm-Bawerk assignment sit-uation, let N̄ be suh that |N̄ | = |N1|. Then for any σ1 ∈ Π(N̄, N1) and
σ2 ∈ Π(N̄ , N2), it holds for permutation situation (N̄ , N̄ , Aw,c) that ext {C(vAw,c)} =
mσ







(u, v̄).We provide an expliit expression for the nuleolus of a Böhm-Bawerk permuta-tion game.Theorem 5.3.14 Let (N,N,Aw,c) be a Böhm-Bawerk permutation situation. Then










5.3. Assignment versus permutation 83Proof: First, if w̃rw,c = w̃rw,c+1, p̄ = min{w̃rw,c+1, c̃rw,c+1} = w̃rw,c+1 and p =
max{w̃rw,c , c̃rw,c} = w̃rw,c . Hene, p̄ = p. Therefore, the ore C(vAw,c) is a singletonand the statement follows. If c̃rw,c = c̃rw,c+1, a similar argument shows that C(vAw,c)is a singleton. So, we assume w̃rw,c > w̃rw,c+1 and c̃rw,c < c̃rw,c+1. This means that




(k+1) for every k ∈ {1, ..., |S|−1}. Note that for every S ∈ 2N , thereexists a µ∗SS ∈M∗Aw,c(S, S) suh that µ∗SS(σBS (k)) = σSS (k) for every k ∈ {1, ..., |S|}.Take p ∈ [p, p̄]. First, we show that E(S, y(p)) = 0 if |HSS | = |HBS |. So, let S ∈ 2Nbe suh that |HSS | = |HBS |. We have

































= 0.So, for every oalition S ∈ 2N with |HSS | = |HBS | the exess E(S, y(p)) is independentof p.Now, we provide upper bounds for the exess of oalitions S ∈ 2N suh that |HBS | 6=
|HSS | and show that these upper bounds are attained by some oalition.
• |HBS | > |H
S
S |. We obtain the following expression for the exess E(S, y(p)):
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≤ max{p− c̃rw,c+1, p− w̃rw,c},
where the fourth equality follows from the fat that σBS (t) ∈ HBS and
σSS (t) ∈ H
S
S for every t ∈ {1, ..., |HSS |}. The inequality follows from the obser-vation that, for every t ∈ {|HSS | + 1, ..., |HBS |}, max{p − cσSS (t), p − wσBS (t)} ≤
max{p − c̃rw,c+1, p − w̃rw,c} ≤ 0 as c̃rw,c+1 ≤ cσS
S
(t), w̃rw,c ≤ wσB
S
(t) and
p ≤ p̄ = min{w̃rw,c , c̃rw,c+1}.We show that there atually exists a oalition S ∈ 2N suh that E(S, y(p)) =
max{p − c̃rw,c+1, p − w̃rw,c}. Take i ∈ N suh that wi = w̃rw,c and j ∈ Nsuh that cj = c̃rw,c+1. Obviously i ∈ HB and j 6∈ HS. If i = j, then learly
E({i}, y(p)) = max{w̃rw,c−c̃rw,c+1, 0}−(w̃rw,c−p) = max{p−c̃rw,c+1, p−w̃rw,c}.If i 6= j, we distinguish the following ases:(A) i ∈ HS and j ∈ HB. Consider S = {i, j}. We have σBS (1) = j, σBS (2) = i,
σSS (1) = i, σSS (2) = j, so
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E(S, y(p)) = (w̃rw,c − c̃rw,c+1)−max{wj − ci, 0}
−(w̃rw,c − ci)− (wj − p)
= max{p− c̃rw,c+1, p− w̃rw,c}.(B) i ∈ HS and j 6∈ HB. Let h ∈ HB\HS, and take S = {h, i, j}. Now
σBS (1) = h, σBS (2) = i, σBS (3) = j, σSS(1) = i, σSS (2) = j, σSS (3) = h, so
E(S, y(p)) = (wh − ci) + max{w̃rw,c − c̃rw,c+1, 0}
−(wh − p)− (w̃rw,c − ci)
= max{p− c̃rw,c+1, p− w̃rw,c}.(C) i 6∈ HS and j ∈ HB. Similar to (B), let h ∈ HS\HB, and take S =
{h, i, j}. Now σBS (1) = j, σBS (2) = i, σBS (3) = h, σSS (1) = h, σSS(2) = i,
σSS(3) = j, so
E(S, y(p)) = (wj − ch) + max{w̃rw,c − c̃rw,c+1, 0}
−(w̃rw,c − p)− (wj − p)− (p− ch)
= max{p− c̃rw,c+1, p− w̃rw,c}.(D) i 6∈ HS and j 6∈ HB. Consider S = {i, j}. We have σBS (1) = i, σBS (2) = j,
σSS(1) = j, σSS (2) = i, so
E(S, y(p)) = max{w̃rw,c − c̃rw,c+1, 0} − (w̃rw,c − p)
= max{p− c̃rw,c+1, p− w̃rw,c}.So, for every oalition S ∈ 2N suh that |HBS | > |HSS |,
E(S, y(p)) ≤ max{p− c̃rw,c+1, p− w̃rw,c},with equality for at least one suh S.
• |HSS | > |H
B
S |. We obtain the following expression for the exess E(S, y(p)):
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(t) − p, wσB
S
(t) − p})
≤ max{w̃rw,c+1 − p, c̃rw,c − p},where the fourth equality follows from the fat that σBS (t) ∈ HBS and
σSS (t) ∈ H
S
S for every t ∈ {1, ..., |HBS |}. The inequality follows from the obser-vation that, for every t ∈ {|HBS | + 1, ..., |HSS |}, max{wσBS (t) − p, cσSS (t) − p} ≤
max{w̃rw,c+1 − p, c̃rw,c − p} ≤ 0 as c̃rw,c ≥ cσS
S
(t), w̃rw,c+1 ≥ wσB
S
(t) and
p ≥ p = max{w̃rw,c+1, c̃rw,c}.We show that there atually exists a oalition S ∈ 2N suh that E(S, y(p)) =
max{w̃rw,c+1 − p, c̃rw,c − p}. Take i ∈ N suh that wi = w̃rw,c+1 and j ∈ Nsuh that cj = c̃rw,c . Obviously i 6∈ HB and j ∈ HS. If i = j, then learly
E({i}, y(p)) = max{w̃rw,c+1− c̃rw,c , 0}−(p− c̃rw,c) = max{w̃rw,c+1−p, c̃rw,c−p}.If i 6= j, we distinguish the following ases:(A) i ∈ HS and j ∈ HB. Consider S = {i, j}. We have σBS (1) = j, σBS (2) = i,
σSS (1) = i, σSS (2) = j, so
E(S, y(p)) = (wj − ci) + max{w̃rw,c+1 − c̃rw,c , 0} − (p− ci)− (wj − c̃rw,c)
= max{w̃rw,c+1 − p, c̃rw,c − p}.
5.3. Assignment versus permutation 87(B) i ∈ HS and j 6∈ HB. Let h ∈ HB\HS, and take S = {h, i, j}. Now
σBS (1) = h, σBS (2) = i, σBS (3) = j, σSS(1) = i, σSS (2) = j, σSS (3) = h, so
E(S, y(p)) = (wh − ci) + max{w̃rw,c+1 − c̃rw,c , 0}
−(wh − p)− (p− ci)− (p− c̃rw,c)
= max{w̃rw,c+1 − p, c̃rw,c − p}.(C) i 6∈ HS and j ∈ HB. Similar to (B), let h ∈ HS\HB, and take S =
{h, i, j}. Now σBS (1) = j, σBS (2) = i, σBS (3) = h, σSS (1) = h, σSS(2) = i,
σSS(3) = j, so
E(S, y(p)) = (wj − ch) + max{w̃rw,c+1 − c̃rw,c , 0} − (wi − c̃rw,c)− (p− ch)
= max{w̃rw,c+1 − p, c̃rw,c − p}.(D) i 6∈ HS and j 6∈ HB. Consider S = {i, j}. We have σBS (1) = i, σBS (2) = j,
σSS(1) = j, σSS (2) = i, so
E(S, y(p)) = max{w̃rw,c − c̃rw,c+1, 0} − (p− c̃rw,c+1)
= max{w̃rw,c+1 − p, c̃rw,c − p}.So, for every oalition S ∈ 2N suh that |HSS | > |HBS |,
E(S, y(p)) ≤ max{w̃rw,c+1 − p, c̃rw,c − p},with equality for at least one suh S.Take S1, S2 ∈ 2N suh that, for every p ∈ [p, p̄], E(S1, y(p)) = max{p− c̃rw,c+1, p−
w̃rw,c} and E(S2, y(p)) = max{w̃rw,c+1 − p, c̃rw,c − p}. Irrespetive of the hoie of







{E(S, y(p))} = max{E(S1, y(p)), E(S2, y(p))}.Sine
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E(S1, y(p)) + E(S2, y(p)) = max{p− c̃rw,c+1, p− w̃rw,c}
+max{w̃rw,c+1 − p, c̃rw,c − p}
= max{w̃rw,c+1, c̃rw,c} −min{c̃rw,c+1, w̃rw,c}
= p− p̄,is onstant, the exess vetor of y(p) is lexiographially minimized if E(S1, y(p)) =
E(S2, y(p)). Hene, for the nuleolus η(vAw,c) it must hold that




(p− p̄).So, we obtain












(p̄+ p).Hene, η(vAw,c) = y(12(p̄+ p)). The next orollary now follows from Theorem 5.3.13 and 5.3.14.Corollary 5.3.15 Let (N1, N2, Aw,c) be a square Böhm-Bawerk assignment situa-tion, let N̄ be suh that |N̄ | = |N1| and take σ1 ∈ Π(N̄, N1), σ2 ∈ Π(N̄, N2). Thenfor the Böhm-Bawerk permutation situation (N̄, N̄ , Aw,c) it holds that η(vAw,c) =
mσ
1σ2(η(vAw,c).To obtain the results of Theorem 5.3.14 and Corollary 5.3.15, we suggest as anotherproof approah to use the results by Solymosi et al. (2005) on yli permutationsituations and the pair-nuleolus and the proof that Núñez and Rafels (2005) providefor Theorem 5.3.13.5.4 Permutation situations and gamesIn the last part of this hapter, our main fous is on permutation situations. Weanalyze the set of undominated matries for permutation situations: given a per-mutation situation, the set of undominated matries is formed by those matries
5.4. Permutation situations and games 89leading to the same permutation game for whih we annot raise any entry of thematrix without hanging the ore. Martínez-Albéniz et al. (2011) haraterized theset of undominated matries for assignment situations. Before we present our resultson the set of undominated matries for permutation situations, we will briey repeattheir results. Seond, we disuss a sublass of the lass of permutation situations.For these permutation situations, we haraterize optimal mathings and provideexpliit expressions for both the ore and the nuleolus.5.4.1 The ore and exatnessFirst, we introdue two sets of matries.Denition 5.4.1 Let (N1, N2, A) be a mathing situation. Then the set of matriesgenerating C(vA) is given by G(A) = {B ∈ M+N1×N2 | C(vA) = C(vB)}.For A,B ∈ M+N1×N2 , we denote A ≥ B if aij ≥ bij for every i ∈ N1, j ∈ N2.Denition 5.4.2 Let (N1, N2, A) be a mathing situation. Then the set of un-dominated matries generating C(vA) is given by U(A) = {B ∈ G(A) | ∄C ∈





) and B(α, β) : ( 1 21 1 α
2 β 1
)
,for every α, β ∈ R+. We have C(vA) = {(1, 1)}. For a balaned 2-person game
(N, v) it holds that
C(v) = onv{(v({1}), v({1, 2})− v({1})), (v({1, 2})− v({2}), v({2}))}.So, for every game (N, v) suh that C(v) = C(vA) it must hold that v({1}) =
v({2}) = 1 and v({1, 2}) = 2. Hene,
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G(A) = {B(α, β) | α + β ≤ 2 and α, β ≥ 0}and
U(A) = {B(α, β) | α + β = 2 and α, β ≥ 0}.
⊳For every assignment situation (N1, N2, A), Martínez-Albéniz et al. (2011) har-aterize both G(A) and U(A). In fat, they show that G(A) onsists of a niteunion of onvex sets. In ase that the optimal mathing for the grand oalition isunique, G(A) onsists of one onvex set. Also, they show that U(A) is a singleton,and the unique element of U(A) is the unique matrix in G(A) that orresponds witha buyer-seller exat assignment game. Here, an assignment game (N1 ∪ N2, vA) isalled buyer-seller exat (Núñez and Rafels (2002)) if for every i ∈ N1, j ∈ N2, thereexists a (u, v) ∈ C(vA) suh that ui + vj = vA({i, j})).Note that there does not need to exist a matrix B ∈ G(A) suh that (N1∪N2, vB)is exat, as the following example demonstrates.Example 5.4.4 (Núñez and Rafels (2002)) Consider the assignment situation





1 5 8 3
2 7 9 6
3 2 3 0

.The ore of the assignment game (N, vA) is given by C(vA) = {((3, 5, 0), (2, 5, 1)),
((5, 6, 1), (1, 3, 0)), ((3, 6, 0), (2, 5, 0)), ((4, 6, 1), (1, 4, 0)), ((5, 6, 0), (2, 3, 0)), ((4, 5, 0),
(2, 4, 1))}. It is readily heked that (N, vA) is buyer-seller exat, hene, U(A) =
{A}. As every exat assignment game is buyer-seller exat, this also means thatif there exists a matrix B ∈ G(A) suh that (N1 ∪ N2, vB) is exat, it must holdthat B = A. However, vA({1}) = 0 but min(u,v)∈C(vA) u1 = 3. Hene, (N, vA) is notexat. ⊳For every permutation situation (N,N,A) with |N | ≤ 3 however, we an showthat not only there exists a matrix B ∈ U(A) suh that (N, vB) is exat, but thisholds for every matrix B ∈ U(A).
5.4. Permutation situations and games 91For every permutation situation (N,N,A) and every i, j ∈ N , dene
SijA =
{
S ∈ 2N | vA(S) = min
y∈C(vA)
y(S), and µ∗SS(i) = j for some µ∗SS ∈M∗A(S, S)} .So, if S ∈ SijA , then raising the entry aij would raise vA(S) and hange the ore of
(N, vA).Theorem 5.4.5 Let (N,N,A) be a permutation situation, with n ≤ 3. Then
(N, vB) is an exat game for all B ∈ U(A).Proof: The ases where n = 1 and n = 2 are trivial, as for n < 3 every balanedgame is exat. Hene, let n = 3 and suppose that (N, vB) is not exat for some
B ∈ U(A), i.e., there is U ( N suh that vB(U) < minx∈C(vB) x(U). We distinguishtwo ases.Case 1: |U | = 1.Dene Br ∈ M+N1×N2 by
brij = bij for all i ∈ N, j ∈ N\{i},
brii = minx∈C(vB) xi for all i ∈ N.Observe that Br ≥ B, as bii ≤ vB({i}) for every i ∈ N with at least one stritinequality.We show that C(vBr) = C(vB), whih ontradits B ∈ U(A). First we show
C(vBr) ⊆ C(vB). Trivially,





















x(N) = vB(N) ≤ vBr(N).
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onneting assignment and permutationThus vBr(N) = vB(N), whih, together with (5.2), implies that C(vBr) ⊆ C(vB).Next we show C(vB) ⊆ C(vBr). Let x ∈ C(vB). By onstrution ofBr, xi ≥ vBr({i})for every i ∈ N . Take i ∈ N , j ∈ N\{i}, take S = {i, j} and µSS ∈ M∗Br(S, S). If





jj ≤ xi + xj .If µSS(i) = j and µSS(j) = i then by onstrution of Br,
vBr(S) = bij + bji = vB(S) ≤ xi + xj ,as x ∈ C(vB). Therefore, C(vBr) = C(vB) = C(vA). In onlusion, Br ∈ U(A),
Br ≥ B and Br 6= B, whih is a ontradition with B ∈ U(A).Case 2: |U | = 2.Take i, j ∈ N suh that U = {i, j} and let k ∈ N\{i, j}. By assumption,
vB(U) = max{bii + bjj , bij + bji} < min
x∈C(vB)
xi + xj . (5.3)Sine B ∈ U(A), we annot inrease bij and bji without hanging the ore of theorresponding permutation game. Hene, there exists an Sij ∈ SijB . Sine vB(U) <
minx∈C(vB)(xi + xj) and n = 3, we neessarily have S(i,j) = {i, j, k}. Note that
vB(N) = bij + bji + bkk would imply that xk = bkk for all x ∈ C(vB). This implies
vB(U) = xi + xj = minz∈C(vB) z(U), whih ontradits (5.3). Therefore
vB(N) = bij + bjk + bki = x(N), (5.4)for all x ∈ C(vB).Analogously, with Sji ∈ Sij we obtain
vB(N) = bji + bik + bkj = x(N), (5.5)for all x ∈ C(vB). From (5.4) and (5.5), for all x ∈ C(vB),
2vB(N) = (bij + bjk + bki) + (bji + bik + bkj)
= (bij + bji) + (bik + bki) + (bjk + bkj)
≤ vB ({i, j}) + vB ({i, k}) + vB ({j, k})
< 2x(N)
= 2vB(N),





1 1 3 0
2 0 2 3
3 3 0 0

 and B :  1 2 31 1 0 32 3 2 0
3 0 3 0

.These matries both lead to the following permutation game
S {1} {2} {3} {1, 2} {1, 3} {2, 3} {1, 2, 3}
vA(S) 1 2 0 3 3 3 9with C(v) = onv{(1, 2, 6), (1, 6, 2), (3, 6, 0), (6, 2, 1), (6, 3, 0)}. Note that (N, vA)is exat, so we annot raise the value of any oalition without hanging the ore.Any matrix C ∈ G(A) must satisfy the following inequalities:
c11 ≤ 1 c12 + c21 ≤ 3
c22 ≤ 2 c13 + c31 ≤ 3
c33 ≤ 0 c23 + c32 ≤ 3As vA(N) = 9, these onditions imply that no entry of C is larger than 3, and that
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onneting assignment and permutationno entry on the diagonal an be used in an optimal mathing for N . Hene, either
c12 = c23 = c31 = 3 (and therefore c21 = c32 = c13 = 0) or c13 = c32 = c21 = 3(and therefore c31 = c23 = c12 = 0). Also, to ensure that (1, 2, 6) ∈ ext(C(vC)) and
(1 + a, 2− a, 6) 6∈ C(vC) for every a ∈ [−1, 0) ∪ (0, 2], it must hold that c11 = 1 and
c22 = 2. Together, this shows that G(A) = G(B) = {A,B}. Also, for both A and B,every entry is used in an optimal mathing for some oalition S ∈ N : e.g., the entry
a(1,3) is used in the optimal mathing for oalition {1, 3}. Hene, the matries Aand B are undominated: U(A) = U(B) = {A,B}. Note that B = A⊤. In fat it iseasily seen that if a matrix is undominated, then also its transpose is undominated.
⊳5.4.2 `Homogeneous alternatives' permutationNow, we analyze a sublass of the lass of permutation situations. In this lass ofpermutation situations, every player onsiders the objets of the other players tobe homogeneous. So, a player either prefers the status quo or prefers any otherobjet to his own. This an be represented by two vetors α, β ∈ RN+ suh that αirepresents the valuation of player i ∈ N of his own objet, and βi represents thevaluation of player i ∈ N of the other objets.Denition 5.4.7 Let α, β ∈ RN+ . Then the `homogeneous alternatives' (HA) per-mutation situation (N,N,Aαβ) is given by
a(i,j) =
{
αi if i = j,
βi if i 6= j, (5.6)for every i, j ∈ N .To be able to provide expressions for the ore of the permutation game, we rstharaterize the optimal mathings. To this end, we rst introdue some notation.Let (N,N,Aαβ) be a HA-permutation situation. We dene two sets: I = {i ∈ N |
βi < αi} and C = {i ∈ N | βi ≥ αi}. The set I represents the `individuals': thoseplayers that stritly prefer to keep their own objet. The set C on the other handrepresents the `ooperators', being the players that would prot from swithingobjets with another player. For these sets, we take β̄ = min{βk | k ∈ C} and
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ᾱ = min{αi | i ∈ I}. We dene two speial permutations: µ0NN ∈ M(N,N) is suhthat for every i ∈ N , µ0NN(i) = i. Furthermore, for i ∈ N , j ∈ N\{i}, we dene
µ
(i,j)
NN ∈ M(N,N) suh that µ(i,j)NN (i) = j, µ(i,j)NN (j) = i and µ(i,j)NN (k) = k for every
k ∈ N\{i, j}. So, µ0NN is the permutation that assigns everyone his own objet, and
µ
(i,j)
NN is the permutation where only player i and j swith objets. Also, let I∗ ⊆ Ibe given by I∗ = {i∗ ∈ I | αi∗ − βi∗ ≤ αi − βi for every i ∈ I}. So, I∗ ontains thoseplayers of I that are most willing to swith objets. Lastly, for every S ∈ 2N , let





{αi − βi} if S 6= ∅
0 if S = ∅Theorem 5.4.8 Let (N,N,Aαβ) be a HA-permutation situation suh that |C| 6= 1.Then µNN ∈ M∗Aαβ(N,N) if and only if µNN(i) = i for every i ∈ I and µNN(k) ∈
C\{k} for all k ∈ C suh that βk − αk > 0.Proof: Let µNN ∈M(N,N) be suh that µNN(i) = i for every i ∈ I and µNN(k) ∈
C\{k} for all k ∈ C suh that βk − αk > 0. As |C| 6= 1, suh a µNN exists. Wehave for every i ∈ N , a(i,µNN (i)) ≥ a(i,j) for every j ∈ N . Hene, ∑i∈N a(i,µNN (i)) ≥∑
i∈N a(i,µ′NN (i)) for every µ′NN ∈M(N,N). Hene, µNN ∈ M∗Aαβ(N,N).For every µ′NN ∈ M(N,N) that does not satisfy the onditions in the theorem, itholds that a(i,µ′
NN
(i)) < a(i,µNN (i)) for some i ∈ N , and a(j,µ′NN (j)) ≤ a(j,µNN (j)) for all





{µ0NN} if dI > βk − αk,
{µ0NN} ∪ {µ
(i∗,k)
NN }i∗∈I∗ if dI = βk − αk,
{µ(i
∗,k)
NN }i∗∈I∗ if dI < βk − αk,where k ∈ C.Proof: Let µNN ∈M(N,N). We have∑i∈N aiµNN (i) ≤∑i∈N\{k} αi+max{αk, βk−
dI}, with equality if and only if a(i∗,µNN (i∗)) + a(k,µNN (k)) = max{αk + αi∗ , βk + βi∗},where i∗ ∈ I∗. This implies the stated expression for M∗Aαβ(N,N). 
96 Chapter 5. Mat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onneting assignment and permutationNow, we will provide expliit expressions for the ore of the HA-permutationgame. Restriting ourselves here to HA-matries adds a lot of struture. In severalases, the ore is a singleton.Theorem 5.4.10 Let (N,N,Aαβ) be an HA-permutation situation suh that either
|C| ≥ 3 or |C| = 0. Then C(vA) = {x} where
xi =
{
αi if i ∈ I,
βi if i ∈ C,for every i ∈ N .Proof: If |C| = 0 thenM∗Aαβ(N,N) = {µ0NN} and therefore vA({i})+vA(N\{i}) =
vA(N) for every i ∈ N . This implies that C(vA) = {x} where xi = vA({i}) = αi forevery i ∈ N .If |C| ≥ 3, then for i ∈ I it holds that vA({i}) + vA(N\{i}) = vA(N), so xi = αifor every i ∈ I. Take k ∈ C and divide C\{k} into two arbitrary non-emptysets C1 and C2. As |C| ≥ 3, this is possible. Sine vA(C) = x(C) = ∑k∈C βkfor every x ∈ C(vA) we obtain via x(C) + xk ≥ vA(C1 ∪ {k}) + vA(C2 ∪ {k}) =∑
l∈C1 βl + βk +
∑
l∈C2 βl + βk =
∑
l∈C βl + βk that xk = βk for every k ∈ C. Hene,
C(vA) = {x} where xi = αi for every i ∈ I and xk = βk for every k ∈ C. In the ase where |C| = 2, the ore of the permutation game is a segment. Still,for every player in I the alloation is equal aross all elements of the ore, but theplayers in C an share the prot from exhanging their objets in more than oneway.Theorem 5.4.11 Let (N,N,Aαβ) be an HA-permutation situation suh that |C| =





αl if l ∈ I,
max{αk, βk − dI} if l = k,
βk + βl −max{αk, βk − dI} if l ∈ C\{k}.Proof: Assume |I| = 0. It is readily heked that the standard expression forthe ore of a 2-person game redues to the provided expression for the ore. Nowassume |I| > 0.
5.4. Permutation situations and games 97First, we show that C(vA) ⊆ onv{ck ∈ RN | k ∈ C}. Let µ∗N,N ∈ M∗Aαβ(N,N) andlet x ∈ C(vA). Sine µ∗N,N(i) = i for all i ∈ I, we obtain that vA({i})+vA(N\{i}) =
v(N), and therefore xi = vA({i}). Let C = {l, k}. We have µ∗N,N(l) = k and
µ∗N,N(k) = l. So, xl + xk = βl + βk. Via vA(i, k) = max{αi + αk, βi + βk} we obtain
xk ≥ max{αk, βi+βk−αi} for every k ∈ C and i ∈ I. Hene, xk ≥ max{αk, βk−dI}.So, C(vA) ⊆ onv{ck ∈ RN | k ∈ C}.On the other hand, it is easily veried that onv{ck ∈ RN | k ∈ C} ⊆ C(vA). Hene,
C(vA) = onv{ck ∈ RN | k ∈ C}. If |C| = 1, there are two distint situations. In the rst ase, it is not optimal fora player in I to exhange objets with the player in C, so the ore is a singleton. Theseond ase is in fat similar to Theorem 5.4.11, where the player in I∗ exhangeshis objet with the player in C instead of - the now non-existent - seond player in
C.Theorem 5.4.12 Let (N,N,Aαβ) be an HA-permutation situation suh that |C| =
1 and |I| > 0. If |I∗| > 1, or dI ≥ βk − αk for k ∈ C, then C(vA) = {y} where
yi =
{
αi if i ∈ I, or i ∈ C and dI ≥ βi − αi




(N,N). Hene, for every i ∈ N we have vA({i}) + vA(N\{i}) = vA(N)and therefore xi = vA({i}) = yi for every i ∈ N . Hene, C(vA) ⊆ {y}. As the oreof a permutation game is non-empty, it follows that C(vA) = {y}.Now take dI < βk−αk and I∗ > 1, let x ∈ C(vA). The impliation of |I∗| > 1 is that
(N\{i})∩I∗ 6= ∅ for every i ∈ I. This means that vA(N\{i}) =∑j∈N\{i} αj−dI+βkfor every i ∈ I. Therefore, for every i ∈ I it holds vA({i}) + vA(N\{i}) = vA(N)and xi = vA({i}) = yi for every i ∈ N . This means xk = βk − dI = yk. Hene,
C(vA) ⊆ {y}. As the ore of a permutation game is non-empty, it follows that
C(vA) = {y}. Theorem 5.4.13 Let (N,N,Aαβ) be an HA-permutation situation suh that |C| =
1, |I| > 0, |I∗| = 1 and dI < βk − αk for k ∈ C. Then x ∈ C(vA) if and only if
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xi = αi for all i ∈ I\I∗, xi∗ ∈ [αi∗ , βk + βi∗ −max{αk, βk −min{αi − βi | i ∈ I\I∗}}]and xk = βi + βk − xi∗ for i∗ ∈ I∗ and k ∈ C.Proof: For the `if'-part, it is readily heked that ∑i∈S xi ≥ vA(S) for every
S ⊆ N .For the `only if'-part, assume x ∈ C(vA). Take i∗ ∈ I∗ and k ∈ C. We have that
µNN(i) = i, and therefore xi = αi for every i ∈ I\I∗. As xk ≥ vA({i, k}) − xi =
max{αi + αk, βi + βk} − αi = max{αk, βi + βk − αi} for every i ∈ I\I∗, we obtainvia xi∗ ≥ αi∗ and xi∗ + xk = vA({i∗, k}) = βk + βi∗ that xi∗ ∈ [αi, βk + βi −
max{αl,maxj∈I\DI βj − αj + βk}]. The following theorem shows that for every HA-permutation game, the nuleolusoinides with the baryenter of the ore.Theorem 5.4.14 Let (N, vA) be a HA-permutation game. Then η(vA) is thebaryenter of the ore.Proof: For those ases where C(vA) is a singleton, it is trivial that η(vA) equalsthe baryenter of the ore. Also, if |N | = 2 the baryenter of the ore and η(vA)oinide. So, assume |N | > 2. Now two ases where the ore is not a singletonremain:
• |C| = 2. As |N | > 2, |I| > 0. Let x ∈ C(vA). First, we determine whihoalitions are relevant for determining the nuleolus. For every oalition S ∈
2N suh that either C ∩ S = C or C ∩ S = ∅, we have E(S, x) = 0. Now take
k, l ∈ C, k 6= l and S ⊆ I. We have E({k}, x) = αk − xk, and E(S ∪ {k}) =
max{αk, βk − dS} − xk. Hene,
E({k}, x) ≤ E({S ∪ {k}, x})
≤ E({i∗, k}, x)
= max{αk, βk − dI} − xk,where i∗ ∈ I∗. Similarly, we obtain E({l}, x) ≤ E(S ∪{l}, x) ≤ E({i∗, l}, x) =
max{αl, βl−dI}−xl. Hene, the highest exess that is not onstant aross allore elements is attained for either oalition {i∗, k} or oalition {i∗, l}. Sine
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E({i∗, k}, x) + E({i∗, l}, x) = max{αk, βk − dI}
+max{αl, βl − dI}
−(βk + βl),is independent of x, the exess vetor of x is lexiographially minimized if
E({i∗, k}, x) = E({i∗, l}, x). Hene,





(max{αk, βk − dI}
+max{αl, βl − dI} − (βk + βl)) ,whih gives:
ηk(vA) = vA({i
∗, k})− ηi∗(vA)− E({i
∗, k}, η(vA))




(max{αk, βk − dI}




(max{αk, βk − dI}
+ (βk + βl)−max{αl, βl − dI})and ηl(v) = (βk + βl) − ηk(v). By Theorem 5.4.11 we have that this is thebaryenter of the ore.
• |C| = 1, |I| > 0 and |I∗| = 1. As |N | > 2, |I| > 1. Let x ∈ C(vA) and let i∗ ∈
I∗ and k ∈ C. First, we determine whih oalitions are relevant for determiningthe nuleolus. For every oalition S ∈ 2N suh that either {i∗, k} ∩ S = S or
{i∗, k} ∩ S = ∅, we have E(S, x) = 0. Now take S ⊆ N\{i∗, k}, S 6= ∅.We have E({i∗}, x) = E(S ∪ {i∗}, x) = αi∗ − xi∗ , E({k}, x) = αk − xk, and
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E(S ∪ {k}) = max{αk, βk − dS} − xk. Hene,
E({k}, x) ≤ E({S ∪ {k}, x})
≤ E({̄i, k}, x)
= max{αk, βk − dI\{i∗}} − xk,where ī ∈ {i ∈ I\{i∗} | αi − βi ≤ αj − βj for every j ∈ I\{i∗}}. Hene,the highest exess that is not onstant aross all ore elements is attained foreither oalition {i∗} or oalition {̄i, k}.Sine xi∗ + xk = βi∗ + βk,
E({̄i, k}, x) + E({i∗}, x) = max{αk, βk − (αī − βī)}+ αi∗ − (βk + βi∗)is independent of x. Therefore the exess vetor of x is lexiographiallyminimized if E({i∗}, x) = E({̄i, k}, x), so E({̄i}, η(v)) = E({i∗, k}, η(v)) =
1
2










(αi∗ + (βk + βi∗)−max{αk, βk − αī + βī}) ,and ηk(v) = (βk + βl − ηi∗(v)). By Theorem 5.4.13 we have that this is thebaryenter of the ore. 
Chapter 6Sequening situations withJust-in-Time arrival, and relatedgames
6.1 IntrodutionSequening theory deals with a variety of problems sharing several harateristis: anumber of jobs have to be proessed on one or more mahines, in suh a way that aost riterion is minimized. From one sequening problem to another the way theseharateristis are dened an dier and additional onstraints an be added: themahines an be parallel or serial, there an be onditions on the order in whih thejobs should be proessed and dierent ost riteria an be used. Appliations of thetheory of sequening situations are numerous and diverse: from manufaturing andmaintenane to sheduling patients in an operating room.The starting point of the game theoreti analysis of sequening situations is thepaper by Curiel, Pederzoli, and Tijs (1989). In their one-mahine model, only one joban be proessed at a time. The proessing time is deterministi for every job, andevery job has a ertain onstant ost per time unit it spends in the system. A job is inthe system from the moment the mahine starts proessing the rst job until the jobitself is proessed by the mahine. An order that minimizes total ost, proesses thejobs in a dereasing order with respet to their urgeny (ost per time unit dividedby the length of the job, f. Smith (1956)). A proedure is introdued that, givenan initial order, uses neighbor swithes to obtain the optimal order and onstruts astable ost alloation in the proess. Sine Curiel et al. (1989) several related lassesof sequening problems are disussed, inluding ready times, due dates, multiple101
102 Chapter 6. Sequening situations with Just-in-Time arrival, and related gamesmahines and numerous ost riteria (see e.g., Curiel, Hamers, and Klijn (2002),Borm, Fiestras-Janeiro, Hamers, Sanhez, and Voorneveld (2002), Calleja, Borm,Hamers, Klijn, and Slikker (2002) and Slikker (2005) for game-theoreti disussions).From an operations researh point of view, lasses of sequening problems wherebetween jobs one needs time to set-up the mahine are disussed extensively in theliterature. Dierent types of set-up time are onsidered to math the appliationunder onsideration, suh as sequening airraft landings (Psaraftis (1980)) and steelpipe manufaturing (Ahn and Hyun (1990)). In Gupta (1988) the mean ow timeis minimized in sequening situations with swithing times between jobs dependingon the lass of both jobs. The hange-over model by Van der Veen et al. (1998)on the other hand minimizes the makespan in a setting whih uses set-up times aswell as after-proessing times to dene the swithing time. Çiftçi (2009) disussesa sequening model where a predeessor-independent swithing time ours if twosubsequent jobs belong to dierent lasses of jobs. Here, the fous is on the game-theoreti aspet of ost-sharing, based on the presene of an initial queue.Similar to Gupta (1988) and Van der Veen, Woeginger, and Zhang (1998), weinorporate a set-up time in the model that is to be exeuted by the job to beproessed next. We onsider a basi setting of this set-up time - one an think ofleaning up a mahine, adjusting a mahine to the new jobs or something simple aserasing the blakboard before one an start the leture - suh that it only dependson the state in whih the system is left behind by the predeessor.A key feature of the sequening situations disussed in this hapter, whih isbased on Lohmann et al. (2010), is the Just-in-Time (JiT) arrival of the jobs: a jobjust arrives at the fatory as soon as its predeessor is nished. Hene, we leave thesetting of the sequening literature desribed above, where every job is waiting in aqueue from the moment the rst job starts. The owner of the job has to exeute theset-up himself. So, given the job that is proessed before, the time it takes before anext job an start proessing is xed. The time a job spends in the fatory is formedby this predeessor dependent set-up time and the length of the job itself. This way,the ost inurred by a job depends on the set-up time, its own proessing time andhis individual ost per time unit. As the osts inurred during the proessing of thejob itself is onstant aross all possible orders of jobs, we do not inorporate theseosts into our analysis. For sequening without set-ups, JiT arrival of the jobs wouldimply that the time a job spends in the system equals the proessing time of the jobitself. Of ourse, this problem is trivial as in this ase every order of jobs results in
6.1. Introdution 103the same osts.Verdaasdonk (2007) initiated the study on this subjet. The model disussed inthis paper an also be modeled in terms of the traveling salesman problem (see e.g.Lawler et al. (1985)). Our spei osts struture makes that the matrix underlyingthe traveling salesman problem orresponding with a sequening situation with JiTarrival in general is not ontained in any well-studied matrix lass for the travelingsalesman problem suh as the lass of Monge matries or Van der Veen matries(see, e.g., Burkard et al. (1998)). This means that, to the best of our knowledge, forthis spei sublass of traveling salesman problems no eient algorithm is knownin the literature. So, to obtain a manageable optimization problem we fous inthe urrent hapter on those sequening situations with JiT arrival and predeessordependent set-up times, where there are two dierent values for the set-up time andtwo dierent values for the osts per time unit.The topi will be treated from two perspetives. The rst part onerns theoperations researh perspetive. For eah sequening situation with JiT arrival (or,for short, JiT sequening situation) we provide suient onditions to hek if anorder minimizes joint osts, and provide an algorithm to obtain suh an optimalorder. The seond part, onerning the game theoreti perspetive, involves thealloation of the minimal joint osts. For this, we dene an objetive and onsistentway to determine ost savings for eah oalition of jobs. In partiular, we assumethat the players are part of a larger system with players in the system before andafter the grand oalition, so that for the grand oalition onsistent with the worst-ase approah for suboalitions, the system is left behind with high set-up timedue.A rst fous point in the game theoreti approah is the ore. We show thatevery JiT sequening game has a nonempty ore. Furthermore, we provide expliitexpressions for the ore of a large lass of JiT sequening games. In partiular, weformulate onditions suh that the ore of the JiT sequening game is a singleton.Also, similarities between a speial lass of assignment games alled Böhm-Bawerkhorse market games (see e.g., Böhm-Bawerk (1891), Núñez and Rafels (2005) andChapter 5 in this dissertation), and ertain JiT sequening games are pointed out. Itis well known that the ore of a Böhm-Bawerk horse market game is a line segment(Shapley and Shubik (1972)), where one extreme point is `buyer'-optimal and theother extreme point is `seller'-optimal. Under mild onditions, the ore of a JiTsequening game is a line segment, where we an identify two subsets of the player
104 Chapter 6. Sequening situations with Just-in-Time arrival, and related gamesset, ating as the `buyers' and the `sellers'.A seond fous point is the nuleolus. As the nuleolus is a ore-seletor, forthose JiT sequening games where the ore is a singleton the nuleolus oinideswith the ore. If the ore is a line segment, we provide an expliit expression ofthe nuleolus in terms of the underlying JiT sequening situation. As the generalexpression for the nuleolus heavily depends on the exat parameters, we provide amore basi and less volatile alloation rule alled the large instane based alloationrule that oinides with the nuleolus for large lasses of JiT sequening games andis also ontained in the ore for every JiT sequening game.This hapter is organized as follows: in the subsequent setion, we formally in-trodue the JiT sequening model. Also, we provide optimality onditions regardingthe proessing order, and give an algorithm to nd an optimal order. Setion 6.3ontains the game theoreti analysis and fousses on haraterizing the ore and thenuleolus for JiT sequening games.6.2 JiT sequening situationsA JiT sequening situation is dened by a tuple Ψ = (N,α, s, s0). Here, N denotesthe nonempty nite player set. It is assumed that every player owns exatly one job.As there is a one-to-one orrespondene between players and jobs, we will use thewords player and job interhangeably throughout this hapter. The vetor α ∈ RN+is suh that for player i ∈ N , the osts of spending t time units in the system isgiven by αit. The set-up times are denoted by the vetor s ∈ RN+ , where for i ∈ N ,
si is the set-up time needed after the job of player i is proessed and before themahine an proess another job. The time needed before the mahine an proessthe rst job is denoted by s0. The order σ ∈ Π(N) desribes the order of proessingof the jobs. For notational onveniene, we set σ(0) = 0 and therefore sσ(0) = s0 forall σ ∈ Π(N).In JiT sequening situations, it is assumed that a player enters the system at themoment the player starts to prepare the mahine for his job and leaves the system assoon as his job is nished. This situation is shown in Figure 6.2.1. This diers fromstandard sequening problems as depited in Figure 6.2.2, where a player enters thesystem already as the rst job in the order starts proessing and leaves after hisown job is nished. Also, we inlude set-up times. The time a job spends in thesystem onsists of a set-up time depending on the job that is proessed before him
6.2. JiT sequening situations 105Mahine Set-up Job 1 Set-up Job 2 Set-up Job 3Time in system job 3Figure 6.2.1: Time in system for JiT sequeningMahine job 1 job 2 job 3Time in system job 3Figure 6.2.2: Time in system for standard sequeningand his own proessing time. The osts arising from this last part is onstant overall orders. Hene, we just fous on the osts arising from set-up. So, for an order
σ ∈ Π(N) the orresponding osts γi(σ) for player i ∈ N are given by
γi(σ) = αisσ(σ−1(i)−1).For a oalition S ∈ 2N , we set γS(σ) = ∑i∈S γi(σ). We all an order σ∗ ∈ Π(N)optimal for N if γN(σ∗) = min{γN(σ) | σ ∈ Π(N)}.In this hapter we restrit ourselves to the analysis of JiT sequening situationswith two dierent values for the set-up times and two dierent values for the ostper time unit. We denote by JiT 2,2 the lass of all JiT sequening situations satis-fying this restrition. So, for every (N,α, s, s0) ∈ JiT 2,2, there exist αH , αL ∈ R+,
αH > αL suh that for all i ∈ N it holds that either αi = αH or αi = αL. Withrespet to the set-up times, we assume there exist sh, sl ∈ R+, sh > sl, suh thatfor all i ∈ N ∪ {0} it holds that either si = sh or si = sl. We partition the set ofplayers aording to their harateristis as provided in Table 6.2.1, into sets NHh ,
NHl , NLh and NLl . Note that the supersript refers to the ost per time unit, andthe subsript refers to the set-up time. Also, throughout the hapter upperase Hand L refer to ost per time unit and lowerase h and l to set-up time. We denote
NH = NHh ∪N
H
l , and dene NL, Nh and Nl in a similar way. For a subset S ∈ 2Nwe use a similar notation: SHh = S ∩NHh , SH = S ∩NH , et.Example 6.2.1 Consider the JiT sequening problem Ψ = (N,α, s, s0), where
N = {1, 2, 3}, α = (α1, α2, α3) = (4, 1, 1), s = (s1, s2, s3) = (3, 3, 1) and s0 = 3.










L slTable 6.2.1: Partition of the player setIt is readily heked that NHh = {1}, NHl = ∅, NLh = {2} and NLl = {3}. The order
σ ∈ Π(N) suh that σ(1) = 3, σ(2) = 2 and σ(3) = 1, as shown in Figure 6.2.3,gives γ1(σ) = s2α1 = 12, γ2(σ) = s3α2 = 1, and γ3(σ) = s0α3 = 3, so γN(σ) = 16.However, the order σ′ ∈ Π(N) suh that σ′(1) = 2, σ′(2) = 3 and σ′(3) = 1 gives
γN(σ
′) = 10. ⊳
3 1 , 1 1 , 3 4 , 33 2 1
s0
α3,s3 α2,s2 α1,s1 3 1 , 3 1 , 1 4 , 32 3 1s0 α2,s2 α3,s3 α1,s1Figure 6.2.3: The orders σ and σ′ for the JiT sequening situation of Example 6.2.1.Naturally, an interesting question is how we an identify whether an order is optimalor not. Also, if we an nd suient onditions for this, ould we use these onditionsto onstrut an optimal order? As it turns out, we an indeed nd suh onditionsand use these to obtain an algorithm that onstruts an optimal order for everysequening situation in JiT 2,2.First we fous on the suient onditions. For this, we introdue the followingadditional notation. Given a JiT sequening situation (N,α, s, s0) ∈ JiT 2,2 and anorder σ ∈ Π(N), dene the following lasses of neighboring pairs:
MhH(σ) = {(i, j) ∈ (N ∪ {0})×N | si = s
h, αj = α
H , σ−1(i) = σ−1(j)− 1},
M lL(σ) = {(i, j) ∈ (N ∪ {0})×N | si = s
l, αj = α
L, σ−1(i) = σ−1(j)− 1},
MhL(σ) = {(i, j) ∈ (N ∪ {0})×N | si = s
h, αj = α
L, σ−1(i) = σ−1(j)− 1},and
M lH(σ) = {(i, j) ∈ (N ∪ {0})×N | si = s
l, αj = α
H , σ−1(i) = σ−1(j)− 1}.
6.2. JiT sequening situations 107Note that the rst supersript indiates the set-up time and the seond supersriptindiates the ost level. For every σ ∈ Π(N), we have the following equalities:
|MhH(σ)|+ |M lH(σ)| = |NH |, (6.1)and
|M lL(σ)|+ |MhL(σ)| = |NL|. (6.2)If s0 = sh, we have for every order σ ∈ Π(N) that
|M lH(σ)|+ |M lL(σ)| = |Nl| − 1[sσ(|N|)=sl], (6.3)and
|MhH(σ)|+ |MhL(σ)| = |Nh|+ 1[sσ(|N|)=sl], (6.4)sine 1[sσ(|N|)=sl] = 1 − 1[sσ(|N|)=sh], s0 = sh and the set-up time of the last player inthe order does not inur osts for a player in N . If s0 = sl, we have
|M lH(σ)|+ |M lL(σ)| = |Nl|+ 1[sσ(|N|)=sh], (6.5)and
|MhH(σ)|+ |MhL(σ)| = |Nh| − 1[sσ(|N|)=sh], (6.6)for every order σ ∈ Π(N). Again, note that 1[sσ(|N|)=sh] = 1 − 1[sσ(|N|)=sl]. Thefollowing theorem states suient onditions for an order to be optimal. In general,an order satisfying these suient onditions need not exist. However, Proposition6.2.5 shows that only in the spei ase where NHh ∪ NLl = ∅ suh an order doesnot exists.Theorem 6.2.2 Let (N,α, s, s0) ∈ JiT 2,2 and let σ ∈ Π(N). If sσ(|N |) = maxi∈N siand either |MhH(σ)| = 0 or |M lL(σ)| = 0, then σ is optimal.















h − sl)αL ≤ γN(σ),so σ′ is optimal.Now assume there exists an order σ′′ ∈ Π(N) suh that |M lL(σ′′)| = 0 and
|MhH(σ′′)| > 0, and take suh a σ′′ ∈ Π(N). Then either |NLl | = 0, whih meansthat N = NHl and every order is optimal, or |NLl | = 1 with σ′(1) ∈ NLl . In the lastase γN(σ′′) =∑i∈N slαi+(s0− sl)αL ≤ γN(σ) for all σ ∈ Π(N), and σ′′ is optimal.Now onsider the ase where maxi∈N si = sh. Take an arbitrary σ ∈ Π(N). Take
B,D ∈ N suh that B = |MhH(σ)| and D = |M lL(σ)|. Note that by Equation (6.2)and (6.4) we have
B −D = |MhH(σ)| − |M lL(σ)| = |Nh| − |N
L|+ 1[sσ(|N|)=sl].By (6.3) and (6.4) it holds that
γN(σ) = |M
hH(σ)|shαH + |M lH(σ)|slαH + |MhL(σ)|shαL + |M lL(σ)|slαL
= BshαH + (|Nl| − 1[sσ(|N|)=sl] −D)slαH
+ (|Nh|+ 1[sσ(|N|)=sl] − B)shαL +DslαL
≥ (B −min{B,D})shαH + (|Nl| − 1[sσ(|N|)=sl] −D +min{B,D})slαH
+ (|Nh|+ 1[sσ(|N|)=sl] − B +min{B,D})shαL + (D −min{B,D})slαL
= max{0, |Nh| − |N
L|+ 1[sσ(|N|)=sl]}shαH
+ min{|Nl| − 1[sσ(|N|)=sl], |NH |}slαH
+ min{|NL|, |Nh|+ 1[sσ(|N|)=sl]}shαL
+ max{|NL| − |Nh| − 1[sσ(|N|)=sl], 0}slαL




hαL +max{|NL| − |Nh|, 0}s
lαL,
6.2. JiT sequening situations 109where the rst inequality follows from the observation that (sh − sl)(αH − αL) > 0.If |Nh|− |NL| ≥ 0, and therefore |Nl|− |NH | ≤ 0, then the seond inequality followsfrom (sh − sl)αH > 0. If |Nh| − |NL| < 0, then the seond inequality follows from




slαi.So, every order is optimal.Now onsider the ase where maxi∈N si = sh. Take an arbitrary σ ∈ Π(N). Take
B,D ∈ N suh that B = |MhH(σ)| and D = |M lL(σ)|. Note that by Equation (6.2)and (6.6) we have
B −D = |MhH(σ)| − |M lL(σ)| = |Nh| − |N
L| − 1[sσ(|N|)=sh].By (6.5) and (6.6) it holds that
γN(σ) = |M
hH(σ)|shαH + |M lH(σ)|slαH + |MhL(σ)|shαL + |M lL(σ)|slαL
= BshαH + (|Nl|+ 1[sσ(|N|)=sh] −D)slαH
+ (|Nh| − 1[sσ(|N|)=sh] −B)shαL +DslαL
≥ (B −min{B,D})shαH + (|Nl|+ 1[sσ(|N|)=sh] −D +min{B,D})slαH
+ (|Nh| − 1[sσ(|N|)=sh] −B +min{B,D})shαL + (D −min{B,D})slαL
= max{0, |Nh| − |N
L| − 1[sσ(|N|)=sh]}shαH
+ min{|Nl|+ 1[sσ(|N|)=sh], |NH |}slαH
+ min{|NL|, |Nh| − 1[sσ(|N|)=sh]}shαL
+ max{|NL| − |Nh|+ 1[sσ(|N|)=sh], 0}slαL
≥ max{0, |Nh| − |N
L| − 1}shαH +min{|Nl|+ 1, |N
H|}slαH
+ min{|NL|, |Nh| − 1}s
hαL +max{|NL| − |Nh|+ 1, 0}s
lαL,where the rst inequality follows from the observation that (sh − sl)(αH − αL) > 0.
110 Chapter 6. Sequening situations with Just-in-Time arrival, and related gamesIf |Nh| − |NL| ≤ 0, then the seond inequality follows from (sl − sh)αL < 0. If
|Nh| − |NL| > 0, then the seond inequality follows from (sl − sh)αH < 0. The rstinequality holds with equality if either B = 0 or D = 0, and the seond inequalityholds with equality if sσ(|N |) = sh.Hene for both values of σ0 every order σ ∈ Π(N) with sσ(|N |) = sh and either
|MhH(σ)| = 0 or |M lL(σ)| = 0 is optimal. The optimality onditions in Theorem 6.2.2 onsist of two parts: the rst onditionstates that it is optimal to plae a player with highest set-up time possible at thelast position. The seond ondition means that it is optimal to plae players withlow osts behind players with high set-up time and players with high osts behindplayers with low set-up time. These onditions are used in the following algorithm.The rst ondition is expliitly taken are of in step 2, the seond ondition is dealtwith in step 3. Step 4 deals with these optimality onditions more impliitly, whihis demonstrated in Example 6.2.3.Algorithm 1Input: a sequening situation (N,α, s, s0) ∈ JiT 2,2.Output: an order σ̃ ∈ Π(N).Step 1. Initialize p = 1 and C11 = N .Step 2. Dene
C2p =
{
C1p\Nh if |C1p ∩Nh| = 1 and p 6= |N |;






L if sσ̃(p−1) = sh and C2p ∩NL 6= ∅;
C2p ∩N
H if sσ̃(p−1) = sl and C2p ∩NH 6= ∅;
C2p else.Step 4. Dene
C4p =
{
C3p ∩Nl if C3p ∩Nl 6= ∅;
C3p else.Step 5. Choose a job i ∈ C4p and dene σ̃(p) = i.Step 6. If p = |N |, stop.
6.2. JiT sequening situations 111If p < |N |, set p = p+1 and, subsequently, set C1p = C1p−1\{σ̃(p−1)}. Next,return to step 2.The notation σ̃ is used for an order provided by the algorithm. The algorithm gen-erates this order by lling up all positions in the order from front to bak. Forevery position, the set of andidate players is narrowed down in a few steps. In thealgorithm, C4p ⊆ C3p ⊆ C2p ⊆ C1p ∈ 2N are the sets of andidate players for the pthposition in this order.Roughly speaking, the algorithm puts the jobs in an alternating sequene, thatis in a way that high set-up time meets low ost of spending a unit of time in thesystem and vie versa. Hereby it takes into aount that a job with high set-up timeshould be left over for the last position in the sequene.Example 6.2.3 Consider the JiT sequening situation Ψ = (N,α, s, s0), where wehave α = (2, 2, 1, 1), s = (3, 1, 3, 1) and s0 = 3. We have NHh = {1}, NHl = {2},
NLh = {3}, and NLl = {4}. As |Nh| = 2, we have C21 = C11 = N (see Table 6.2.2).In step 3 we obtain C31 = {3, 4} as s0 = sh. Step 4 further narrows down the set ofandidate players for the rst position, as C41 = {4}. Therefore, we obtain σ̃(1) = 4.Now that player 4 is plaed, we have C22 = C12 = {1, 2, 3}. In step 3 of iteration 2,we obtain C32 = {1, 2} and in step 4 we obtain C42 = {2} so σ̃(2) = 2. In the thirditeration, C23 = C13 = {1, 3} and C43 = C33 = {1} so σ̃(3) = 1 and σ̃(4) = 3. It is
p 1 2 3 4
C1p N {1, 2, 3} {1, 3} {3}
C2p N {1, 2, 3} {1, 3} {3}
C3p {3, 4} {1, 2} {1} {3}
C4p {4} {2} {1} {3}
σ̃(p) 4 2 1 3Table 6.2.2: Sets of andidate players in Example 6.2.3easily seen that a player with high set-up time is plaed last. Furthermore, playerswith high osts are plaed behind players with low set-up time and the other wayaround (see Figure 6.2.4). We obtain γN(σ̃) = 10 whih is indeed optimal. Also,note the importane of step 4 of the algorithm: if we would plae an arbitrary playerin C32 at position 2, we ould have ended up with the order σ′ suh that σ′(1) = 4,
σ′(2) = 1, σ′(3) = 2, σ′(4) = 3, with γN(σ′) = 12. ⊳
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3 1 , 1 2 , 1 2 , 3 1 , 34 2 1 3
s0
α4,s4 α2,s2 α1,s1 α3,s3Figure 6.2.4: Order σ̃ provided by Algorithm 1 in Example 6.2.3Now we are ready to prove that Algorithm 1 provides an optimal order, for everysequening situation (N,α, s, s0) ∈ JiT 2,2.Theorem 6.2.4 Let Ψ = (N,α, s, s0) ∈ JiT 2,2. Then Algorithm 1 provides anoptimal order σ̃ for N .Proof: Let σ̃ ∈ Π(N) be an order provided by Algorithm 1. In Step 2 of thealgorithm, it is made sure that there is always a player with the highest availableset-up time left to plae at the last position. Hene, sσ̃(|N |) = sh, unless NHh ∪NLh = ∅whih implies that there is in fat only one value for si and sσ̃(|N |) = sl = maxi∈N si.We prove that either optimality of σ̃ follows diretly from Theorem 6.2.2, i.e.,
|MhH(σ̃)| = 0 or |M lL(σ̃)| = 0, or NHh ∪ NLl = ∅. For the latter ase we showthat σ̃ is optimal as well.Assume that optimality of σ̃ does not follow diretly from Theorem 6.2.2, i.e.,
|MhH(σ̃)| > 0 and |M lL(σ̃)| > 0. Then there exist p, r ∈ {0, ..., |N | − 1} suhthat (σ̃(p), σ̃(p+ 1)) ∈MhH(σ̃) and (σ̃(r), σ̃(r + 1)) ∈M lL(σ̃).Assume r < p. Aording to the algorithm, job σ̃(r + 1) is only plaed behind job
σ̃(r) if there is no job j with αj = αH left that is not yet plaed, or there is only onejob j with αj = αH left, but this job has to be reserved for the last spot beauseit is the only remaining job with high set-up time. In the rst ase, we have aontradition, sine job σ̃(p+1) is not yet plaed. The seond ase also results in aontradition, sine both sσ̃(p) = sh and sσ̃(|N |) = sh.Now assume p < r. Aording to the algorithm, job σ̃(p + 1) is only plaed behindjob σ̃(p) if there is no job j with αj = αL left that is not yet plaed, or there isonly one job j with αj = αL left, but this job has to be reserved for the last spotbeause it is the only remaining job with high set-up time. In the rst ase, we havea ontradition, sine job σ̃(r + 1) is not yet plaed.The seond ase an only hold if r + 1 = |N |. For all jobs i ∈ {σ̃(p + 1), ..., σ̃(r)}it then must hold that si = sl, otherwise job σ̃(r + 1) would have been plaed at
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ing games 113position p + 1. Furthermore, αi = αH otherwise job i would have been plaed atposition p+1 as this would avoid the ombination of sh and αH . So, we obtain that
i ∈ NHl for all i ∈ {σ̃(p + 1), ..., σ̃(r)}. Sine the algorithm rst plaes the jobs in
NHl before plaing the jobs in NHh , and σ̃(|N |) 6∈ NHh , we obtain that NHh = ∅ andtherefore σ̃(p) ∈ NLh . Furthermore, if there existed a job i ∈ NLl then the algorithmwould plae every job in NHl diretly behind this job. But sine σ̃(p) 6∈ NLl thisimplies that NLl = ∅. Hene, the seond ase only allows players in NHl and NLh ,so NHh ∪ NLl = ∅. If s0 = sl, then the algorithm rst plaes all players in NHl andthen all players in NLh , whih ontradits σ̃(s) ∈ NLh . So, s0 = sh and the solutionprovided by the algorithm for this situation (rst all players in NLh but one, then allplayers in NHl and nally the last player in NLh ) is learly optimal. The proof of Theorem 6.2.4 implies the following.Proposition 6.2.5 If NHh ∪ NLl 6= ∅, then every order provided by Algorithm 1satises the suient onditions of Theorem 6.2.2.6.3 JiT sequening gamesIn the previous setion we addressed the problem of nding an optimal order for
JiT 2,2 sequening situations. An additional question is how the total osts of suhan optimal order should be alloated among the players. To answer this question, wewill use the framework of TU-games. For the grand oalition we employ a worst aseapproah and onsider the players in N to be part of a larger system with playersin the system before and after the players in N . The worst ase approah omprisesthat we assume that the system is left behind with high set-up time by the playersoutside the grand oalition. We provide a game theoreti analysis of those instanesof JiT 2,2 where s0 = sh, denoted by JiT 2,2h . We assume that by ooperating, everyoalition S ∈ N an form any order σ ∈ Π(S) at the rst |S| spots in the sequene.Thus we employ a pessimisti view for both the grand oalition and for suboalitions,in the sense that the set-up time for the rst player in the order σ equals s0 = sh.This setup allows us to measure the value of every oalition onsistently over alloalitions, and independent of the players outside the oalition.Let Ψ = (N,α, s, s0) be a JiT sequening situation. We will dene the osts foroalition S ∈ N as the osts of an optimal order in the JiT sequening problem
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S {1} {2} {3} {4} {1, 2} {1, 3} {1, 4} {2, 3}
vΨ(S) 0 0 0 0 4 0 4 2
S {2, 4} {3, 4} {1, 2, 3} {1, 2, 4} {1, 3, 4} {2, 3, 4} N
vΨ(S) 4 2 4 8 4 6 8Table 6.3.1: JiT sequening game (N, vΨ) of Example 6.3.1
(S, α′, s′, s′0), where α′ ∈ RS and s′ ∈ RS∪{0} are suh that α′i = αi for all i ∈ S, and








S),for all S ∈ N . Clearly, vΨ({i}) = 0 for every i ∈ N .Example 6.3.1 Reonsider the JiT sequening situation of Example 6.2.3, where
α = (2, 2, 1, 1), s = (3, 1, 3, 1) and s0 = 3. It is seen that γ1(σ∗{1}) = γ2(σ∗{2}) = 6and γ3(σ∗{3}) = γ4(σ∗{4}) = 3. Take S = {1, 2, 4}. The optimal order σ∗S is suh that
σ∗S(1) = 4, σ∗S(2) = 2, and σ∗S(3) = 1, whih results in total osts γS(σ∗S) = 7. Hene,we have vΨ(S) = (6 + 6 + 3)− 7 = 8. The JiT sequening game (N, vΨ) is given byTable 6.3.1. Note that (N, vΨ) is not onvex, sine
vΨ({3, 4})− vΨ({4}) = 2 > 0 = vΨ(N)− vΨ({1, 2, 4}).
⊳For Ψ = (N,α, s, s0) ∈ JiT 2,2h we an expliitly express the value of eah oalition interms of the number of players in the dierent player lasses in the JiT sequeningsituation.Lemma 6.3.2 Let Ψ = (N,α, s, s0) ∈ JiT 2,2h . Then








h − sl)αH if SHh 6= ∅ and |SHh | ≥ |SLl |;
|SHh |(s
h − sl)(αH − αL) + |SHl |(s




h − sl)αH + |SLl |(s
h − sl)αL if SHh = ∅, SLl 6= ∅and SLh 6= ∅;
|SHl |(s
h − sl)αH + (|SLl | − 1)(s
h − sl)αL if SHh = ∅, SLl 6= ∅and SLh = ∅;
(|SHl | − 1)(s
h − sl)αH + (sh − sl)αL if SHh = ∅, SLl = ∅, SHl 6= ∅and SLh 6= ∅;
(|SHl | − 1)(s
h − sl)αH if SHh = ∅, SLl = ∅and SLh = ∅;










hαH + (|SLh |+ |S
L
l |)s




SHh 6= ∅ we have by Proposition 6.2.5 that either |MhH(σ̃S)| = 0 or |M lL(σ̃S)| = 0.It must hold that |M lL(σ̃S)| = 0, sine |SHh | ≥ |SLl | together with (6.1) and (6.3)implies that |MhH(σ̃S)| ≥ |M lL(σ̃S)|. So, we have
γS(σ̃S) = |M
hH(σ̃S)|s
hαH + |M lH(σ̃S)|s
lαH + |MhL(σ̃S)|s
hαL + |M lL(σ̃S)|s
lαL
= (|SHh | − |S
L
l |)s
hαH + (|SHl |+ |S
L
l |)s
lαH + (|SLh |+ |S
L
l |)s
hαL,and we may onlude that





= (|SHh |+ |S
H
l |)s






(|SHh | − |S
L
l |)s
hαH + (|SHl |+ |S
L
l |)s





= (|SHl |+ |S
L
l |)(s
h − sl)αH .
All marginal ontributions an be readily determined from Lemma 6.3.2.Corollary 6.3.3 Let Ψ = (N,α, s, s0) ∈ JiT 2,2h , i ∈ N and S ∈ 2N\{i}. If i ∈ NHh ,




(sh − sl)αH if S 6= ∅, SHh = ∅ and SLh = ∅;
(sh − sl)(αH − αL) if SHh 6= ∅ and |SHh | < |SLl |,or if SHh = ∅, SLl 6= ∅ and SLh 6= ∅,or if SHh = ∅, SLl = ∅, SHl 6= ∅and SLh 6= ∅;
0 otherwise.If i ∈ NLl ,




0 if S = ∅;
(sh − sl)αH if SHh 6= ∅ and |SHh | > |SLl |,or if SHh = ∅, SLl = ∅ and SHl 6= ∅;
(sh − sl)αL otherwise.If i ∈ NHl ,




0 if S = ∅;
(sh − sl)αL if SHh = ∅, SLl = ∅, SHl = ∅ and SLh 6= ∅;
(sh − sl)αH otherwise.Finally, if i ∈ NLh ,
vΨ(S ∪ {i})− vΨ(S) =
{
(sh − sl)αL if S 6= ∅, SHh = ∅ and SLh = ∅;
0 otherwise.
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ing games 117The following example illustrates both Lemma 6.3.2 and Corollary 6.3.3.Example 6.3.4 Consider the JiT sequening situation Ψ = (N,α, s, s0) ∈ JiT 2,2hsuh that N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, α = (5, 5, 5, 2, 2, 2), s = (3, 3, 1, 3, 1, 1) and s0 = 3.This means that NHh = {1, 2}, NHl = {3}, NLh = {4} and NLl = {5, 6}. Considerthe oalition S = {1, 3, 6}. The stand-alone osts for the players in this oalitionare γ1(σ̃{1}) = γ3(σ̃{3}) = 15 and γ6(σ̃{6}) = 6. Using Algorithm 1, we obtain
σ̃S(1) = 6, σ̃S(2) = 3 and σ̃S(3) = 2 for the optimal order σ̃S for oalition S. Hene,
γS(σ̃S) = 16 and vΨ(S) =∑i∈S γi(σ̃{i})− γS(σ̃S) = 20. This is in line with Lemma6.3.2, as (|SHl |+ |SLl |)(shαH − slαH) = 2(15− 5) = 20. By Corollary 6.3.3, we have
v({2, 3, 6})− v({3, 6}) = (sh− sl)αH = 10 whih is easily veried, as v({3, 6}) = 10.On the other hand, the marginal ontribution of player 2 when he joins oalition
{1, 3, 6} equals zero, as v({1, 2, 3, 6}) = v({1, 3, 6}). ⊳We use the expressions from Lemma 6.3.2 to show that every JiT sequening gamehas a nonempty ore. To this end, we dene the large instane based alloation rule
θ on the lass of JiT sequening situations JiT 2,2h .Denition 6.3.5 Let Ψ = (N,α, s, s0) ∈ JiT 2,2h . Then, for all i ∈ N ,
θi(Ψ) = (s






if i ∈ NHh ∪NLland |NHh | = |NLl |;










(αH − αL)(sh − sl) if i ∈ NHl , |NLh | > 0 and
|NHh | = |N
L





(sh − sl)αH if i ∈ NHl and N = NHl ;
0 otherwise.The ommon part of the expression for θ(Ψ), (sh − si)αi, gives an estimation ofthe ost savings that an be attributed to player i. This estimation is based onthe marginal osts of player i entering in a tive, `large' oalition. The part shαiare the stand-alone osts of player i. Now assume there is an order σ ∈ Π(N)
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ing situations with Just-in-Time arrival, and related gameswhere sσ(k) = si for some k. If player i is plaed in between player σ(k) and player
σ(k + 1), then the marginal osts equal siαi. Hene, we estimate the ost savingsby (sh − si)αi.The seond part serves as a orretion to this estimation: a player in NHh anda player in NLl together are responsible for more ost savings than we already al-loated to them. These additional ost savings go to the minority, the players in
NHh if |NHh | < |NLl | and the players in NLl if |NLl | < |NHh |, and is shared equally if
|NHh | = |N
L







(sh − sl)αH −
1
|NHl |
(sh − sl)(αH − αL)
)
− (|SHl | − 1)(s
h − sl)αH − (sh − sl)αL
= |SHl |
(
(sh − sl)αH −
1
|NHl |
(sh − sl)(αH − αL)
)
− (|SHl | − 1)(s




)(sh − sl)(αH − αL)
≥ 0,with equality if S = N , and therefore θ(Ψ) ∈ C(vΨ).
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ing games 119(ii) Assume |NHh |+ |NLl | > 0 and |Nh| > 0. For S ∈ N we have
θS(Ψ)− v
Ψ(S) ≥ |SHl |(s
h − sl)αH + |SLl |(s
h − sl)αL
+ min{|SHh |, |S
L
l |}(s
h − sl)(αH − αL)
− |SHl |(s
h − sl)αH − |SLl |(s
h − sl)αL
− min{|SHh |, |S
L
l |}(s
h − sl)(αH − αL)
≥ 0,again with equality if S = N , and therefore θ(Ψ) ∈ C(vΨ).(iii) Assume |Nh| = 0 and |NLl | > 0. For S ∈ N we have
θS(Ψ)− v
Ψ(S) ≥ |SHl |(s
h − sl)αH + |SLl |((s











≥ 0,with equality if S = N , and therefore θ(Ψ) ∈ C(vΨ).(iv) Finally, assume |NHh | = |NLl | = |NLh | = 0. For S ∈ N we have
θS(Ψ)− v
Ψ(S) = |SHl |((s










≥ 0,with equality if S = N , and therefore θ(Ψ) ∈ C(vΨ).
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For every JiT sequening situation Ψ = (N,α, s, s0) ∈ JiT 2,2h suh that
|NHh | = |N
L
l | > 1, the ore is the onvex hull of two vetors. We show this in The-orem 6.3.8. This struture of the ore is similar to the one for a spei type ofassignment games, alled Böhm-Bawerk horse market games (Böhm-Bawerk (1891),see also Chapter 5 in this dissertation), in the sense that the ore onsists of a linesegment, where one extreme point is `buyer'-optimal and the other extreme point is`seller'-optimal. In our setting, the players in NHh at as the buyers and players in
NLl at as the sellers. Translated into the terminology of horse market games, everyplayer in NHh is interested to buy the right on low set-up time, and every player in
NLl is interested to sell the right on low set-up time. By interating on the market,every pair of a buyer and a seller reates a prot that an be shared in an arbitrary,nonnegative way. This prot equals (sh − sl)αH .For a JiT sequening situation Ψ = (N,α, s, s0) ∈ JiT 2,2h with |NHh | = |NLl | > 1,and for j ∈ N dene
θj(Ψ) = (s
h − sj)αj +
{
(sh − sl)(αH − αL) if j ∈ NHh ;
0 else,
θj(Ψ) = (s
h − sj)αj +
{
(sh − sl)(αH − αL) if j ∈ NLl ;




(θ(Ψ) + θ(Ψ)),whih oinides the baryenter of the ore.Proof: First we establish that Conv{θ(Ψ), θ(Ψ)} ⊆ C(vΨ), by showing that
θ(Ψ) ∈ C(vΨ) and θ(Ψ) ∈ C(vΨ).Let S ∈ N . Then we have that







(sh − si)αi + |S
H
h |(s
h − sl)(αH − αL)− vΨ(S)
≥ |SHl |(s
h − sl)αH + |SLl |(s
h − sl)αL + |SHh |(s




h − sl)αH + |SLl |(s
h − sl)αL
)
+ min{|SHh |, |S
L
l |}(s









(sh − sl)(αH − αL)
≥ 0.Note that the rst inequality follows from Lemma 6.3.2, and that for S = N the twoinequalities hold with equality. Hene, θ(Ψ) ∈ C(vΨ). A similar reasoning showsthat θ(Ψ) ∈ C(vΨ).Now we show that C(vΨ) ⊆ Conv{θ(Ψ), θ(Ψ)}. It sues to show that for every
x ∈ C(vΨ) it holds that:(i) xi ≥ 0 for every i ∈ N .(ii) xi = 0 for every i ∈ NLh .(iii) xi = (sh − sl)αH for every i ∈ NHl .(iv) xi + xj = (sh − sl)αH for every i ∈ NHh and j ∈ NLl and, therefore,
xi = xk for all i, k ∈ NHh , and xj = xr for all j, r ∈ NLl .(v) (sh − sl)αL ≤ xi ≤ (sh − sl)αH for every i ∈ NLl .Note that (iv) and (v) together imply 0 ≤ xi ≤ (sh−sl)(αH −αL) for every i ∈ NHh .We prove (i) - (v) point by point. Take x ∈ C(vΨ).(i) As xi ≥ v({i}) and v({i}) = 0 for every i ∈ N , we have xi ≥ 0 for every i ∈ N .(ii) As vΨ(N\NLh ) = vΨ(N), we obtain xi = 0 for all i ∈ NLh .(iii) Take i ∈ NHl , and take j ∈ NHh , k ∈ NLl . Then
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∑
r∈N










≥ vΨ({i, j, k}) + vΨ(N\{j, k})









h − sl)αH.The seond equality holds by the observation that NHh ∩ (N\{j, k}) 6= ∅ and
NLl ∩ (N\{j, k}) 6= ∅, whih means that N\{j, k} is ontained in the rst aseof Lemma 6.3.2. We obtain xi ≥ (sh − sl)αH and by Corollary 6.3.3, we have
vΨ(N)− vΨ(N\{i}) = (sh − sl)αH . Therefore, xi = (sh − sl)αH .(iv) Take i ∈ NHh and j ∈ NLl . As vΨ({i, j}) = (sh−sl)αH = vΨ(N)−vΨ(N\{i, j})we have xi + xj = (sh − sl)αH.(v) Take j ∈ NHh and i, k ∈ NLl with j 6= k. The observation that v({i, j, k}) =
(sh−sl)(αH−αL)+2(sh−sl)αL and v(N\{j, k}) = (|NHl |+|NLl |−1)(sh−sl)αHleads with a similar reason as with (iii) to xi ≥ (sh − sl)αL. As vΨ({i, j}) =
(sh − sl)αH = vΨ(N)− vΨ(N\{i, j}) Furthermore, sine
v(N)− v(N\NLl ) = |N
L
l |(s
h − sl)αH ,it follows that xi ≤ (sh − sl)αH .Lastly, from Denition 6.3.5 we have
θi(Ψ) = (s




if i ∈ NHh ∪NLl
0 if i ∈ NHl ∪NLh .Now θ(Ψ) = 1
2
(θ(Ψ)+ θ(Ψ)) follows diretly from the denition of θ(Ψ) and θ(Ψ).Not only for JiT sequening situations with |NHh | = |NLl | > 1 we an nd an easyexpression for the struture of the ore of the orresponding game. If the player setontains at least one player of every type and |NHh | 6= |NLl |, the large instane basedalloation rule turns out to be the only ore element.
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ing games 123Theorem 6.3.9 Let Ψ = (N,α, s, s0) ∈ JiT 2,2h be suh that NHh , NHl , NLh and NLlare all nonempty, and |NHh | 6= |NLl |. Then θ(Ψ) is the only ore element of (N, vΨ)and, onsequently, θ(Ψ) = η(vΨ).Proof: For every x ∈ C(vΨ) and i ∈ N it holds that xi ≤ vΨ(N)− vΨ(N\{i}). ByTheorem 6.3.7, θ(Ψ) ∈ C(vΨ). It sues to show that θi(Ψ) = vΨ(N)− vΨ(N\{i})for every i ∈ N , as this implies that for every x ∈ C(vΨ), x 6= θ(Ψ) we have∑
i∈N xi <
∑
i∈N θ(Ψ) = v(N) whih ontradits the ore ondition ∑i∈N xi =





0 if i ∈ NHh ;
(sh − sl)αH if i ∈ NLl ;
(sh − sl)αH if i ∈ NHl ;
0 if i ∈ NLh ;





(sh − sl)(αH − αL) if i ∈ NHh ;
(sh − sl)αL if i ∈ NLl ;
(sh − sl)αH if i ∈ NHl ;
0 if i ∈ NLh ;
= θi(Ψ).
The oinidene between the large instane based alloation rule θ and the nuleolusan be extended to JiT sequening situations as onsidered in Theorem 6.3.8 withone further restrition.Theorem 6.3.10 Let Ψ = (N,α, s, s0) ∈ JiT 2,2h be a JiT sequening situation suhthat |NHh | = |NLl | > 1. Then θ(Ψ) = η(vΨ).Proof: We show that θ(Ψ) = η(vΨ) by showing that ω(θ(Ψ)) ≤L ω(x) for every
x ∈ C(vΨ). By Theorem 6.3.8, C(vΨ) = Conv{θ(Ψ), θ(Ψ)}. So, take c ∈ [0, 1] anddene xc = cθ(Ψ) + (1− c)θ(Ψ). By Lemma 6.3.2, the exesses are





−c(|SHh | − |S
L
l |)A if SHh 6= ∅ and |SHh | ≥ |SLl |;
−(1− c)(|SLl | − |S
H
h |)A if SHh 6= ∅ and |SHh | < |SLl |;
−(1− c)|SLl |A if SHh = ∅, SLl 6= ∅ and SLh 6= ∅;
−(1− c)|SLl |A− (s
h − sl)αL if SHh = ∅, SLl 6= ∅ and SLh = ∅;
−A if SHh = ∅, SLl = ∅, SHl 6= ∅ and SLh 6= ∅;
−(sh − sl)αH if SHh = ∅, SLl = ∅, SHl 6= ∅ and SLh = ∅;
0 if SHh = ∅, SLl = ∅ and SHl = ∅,where A = (sh − sl)(αH − αL) > 0.It is readily heked that the highest exess equals 0. This exess ours, independentof the value of c, for every oalition S ∈ N suh that either |SHh | = |SLl | > 0 or
S = SLh . For c = 0 or c = 1, there are additional oalitions with exess equal tozero whereas for c ∈ (0, 1) all other oalitions have a negative exess. Hene, both
x0 6= η(vΨ) and x1 6= η(vΨ). Sine −(sh − sl)αH < 0 and −(sh − sl)αL < 0, for
c ∈ (0, 1) the seond highest exess equals either −cA or −(1 − c)A, or a multipleof these values. Hene, the seond highest exess is minimized for c = 1
2
, implyingthat η(v) = x 12 = θ(Ψ). In general, the large instane based alloation rule does not oinide with the nu-leolus. In fat, the general expression for the nuleolus beomes quite involved asit depends not only on the number of players of every type as in the denition of
θ(N,α, s, s0), but on the spei values for sh, sl, αH , and αL as well.Example 6.3.11 Consider a JiT sequening situation Ψ = (N,α, s, s0) suh that
|NHh | = 0, |NLl | = 0, |NHl | > 1 and |NLh | = 1. By Lemma 6.3.2 we have
vΨ(N) = (|NHl | − 1)(s








(vΨ(N)− µ) if i ∈ NHl ;
µ if i ∈ NLh ,for some µ ∈ R. Let j be the unique element of NLh . The exesses are













(sh − sl)(αH − αL) + µ
)










(sh − sl)(αH − αL) + µ
) if SHl 6= ∅ and j ∈ S;





|N | ≤ 2α
H
αL
, the maximum of these exesses is minimized by taking µ = 1
2
(sh−sl)αL.If |N | > 2αH
αL












(sh − sl)αL if i = j and |N | ≤ 2αH
αL
;

























(sh − sl)αH if i = j and |N | > 2αH
αL
.It is readily heked that θ(Ψ) = x0, i.e., it distributes vΨ(N), irrespetive of thespei values of the parameters αH and αL, equally over the players in NHl , whilethe unique player in NLh obtains 0. ⊳
6.A Proof of Lemma 6.3.2Here, we proof the remaining ases of Lemma 6.3.2. For the onveniene of thereader, we repeat the lemma and the rst part of the proof.
Lemma 6.A.1 Let Ψ = (N,α, s, s0) ∈ JiT 2,2h . Then








h − sl)αH if SHh 6= ∅ and |SHh | ≥ |SLl |;
|SHh |(s
h − sl)(αH − αL) + |SHl |(s




h − sl)αH + |SLl |(s
h − sl)αL if SHh = ∅, SLl 6= ∅and SLh 6= ∅;
|SHl |(s
h − sl)αH + (|SLl | − 1)(s
h − sl)αL if SHh = ∅, SLl 6= ∅and SLh = ∅;
(|SHl | − 1)(s
h − sl)αH + (sh − sl)αL if SHh = ∅, SLl = ∅, SHl 6= ∅and SLh 6= ∅;
(|SHl | − 1)(s
h − sl)αH if SHh = ∅, SLl = ∅and SLh = ∅;










hαH + (|SLh |+ |S
L
l |)s
hαL,for every S ∈ N .




SHh 6= ∅ we have by Proposition 6.2.5 that either |MhH(σ̃S)| = 0 or |M lL(σ̃S)| = 0.It must hold that |M lL(σ̃S)| = 0, sine |SHh | ≥ |SLl | together with (6.1) and (6.3)implies that |MhH(σ̃S)| ≥ |M lL(σ̃S)|. So, we have
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hαL,and we may onlude that





= (|SHh |+ |S
H
l |)s






(|SHh | − |S
L
l |)s
hαH + (|SHl |+ |S
L
l |)s





= (|SHl |+ |S
L
l |)(s
h − sl)αH .
SHh 6= ∅ and |SHh | < |SLl |.Take S ∈ N suh that SHh 6= ∅ and |SHh | < |SLl |. Again, for every (optimal) order
σ̃S provided by Algorithm 1 we have sσ∗
S
(|S|) = s
h, and either |MhH(σ̃S)| = 0 or
|M lL(σ̃S)| = 0. It must hold that |MhH(σ̃S)| = 0, sine |SHh | < |SLl | together with
(6.2) and (6.4) implies that |M lL(σ̃S)| > |MhH(σ̃S)|. So, we have
γS(σ̃S) = |M
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h − sl)αL.




SLl 6= ∅, either |MhH(σ̃S)| = 0 or |M lL(σ̃S)| = 0. It must hold that |MhH(σ̃S)| = 0,sine |SHh | < |SLl | together with (6.2) and (6.4) implies that |M lL(σ̃S)| > |MhH(σ̃S)|.So, we have
γS(σ̃S) = |M
hH(σ̃S)|s
hαH + |M lH(σ̃S)|s
lαH + |MhL(σ̃S)|s
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lαL.We obtain
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SHh = ∅, SLl 6= ∅ and SLh = ∅.Take S ∈ N suh that SHh = ∅, SLl 6= ∅ and SLh = ∅. Sine SHh ∪ SLh = ∅, it holdsfor every (optimal) order σ̃S provided by Algorithm 1 that sσ∗
S
(|S|) = s
l. As SLl 6= ∅,Proposition 6.2.5 implies that either |MhH(σ̃S)| = 0 or |M lL(σ̃S)| = 0. It holdsthat |MhH(σ̃S)| = 0, sine |SHh | < |SLl | together with (6.2) and (6.4) implies that
|M lL(σ̃S)| ≥ |MhH(σ̃S)|. So, we have
γS(σ̃S) = |M
hH(σ̃S)|s
hαH + |M lH(σ̃S)|s
lαH + |MhL(σ̃S)|s
hαL + |M lL(σ̃S)|s
lαL
= |SHl |s
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h − sl)αH + (|SLl | − 1)(s
h − sl)αL.
SHh = ∅, SLl = ∅, SHl 6= ∅ and SLh 6= ∅.Take S ∈ N suh that SHh = ∅, SLl = ∅, SHl 6= ∅ and SLh 6= ∅. Algorithm 1 rstplaes all players in SLh but one, then all players in SHl and nally the last player in
NLh . So, we have
γS(σ̃S) = (|S
L
h | − 1)s
hαL + shαH + (|SHl | − 1)s










(|SLh | − 1)s
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= (|SHl | − 1)(s
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SHh = ∅, SLl = ∅ and SLh = ∅.Take S ∈ N suh that SHh = ∅, SLl = ∅ and SLh = ∅. This means S = SHl and
γS(σ̃S) = (|SHl | − 1)s
lαH + shαH . Hene,
vΨ(S) = |SHl |s
hαH − ((|SHl | − 1)s
lαH + shαH) = (|SHl | − 1)(s
h − sl)αH .
SHh = ∅, SLl = ∅ and SHl = ∅.Take S ∈ N suh that SHh = ∅, SLl = ∅ and SHl = ∅. This means S = SLh and
γS(σ̃S) = |SHl |s
hαL. Hene,
vΨ(S) = |SHl |s




Chapter 7A taxonomy of rankings intournaments
7.1 IntrodutionIn a world full of hoies and alternatives, rankings are beoming an inreasinglyimportant tool to help individuals and institutions to make deisions. In this hapterwe study the lassi problem of ranking a series of alternatives when we have infor-mation about a number of paired omparisons among them, but possibly not aboutall paired omparisons. The set of alternatives along with the matrix ontainingthis information will be referred to as a tournament. Tournaments appear in a widevariety of real life situations and take dierent forms. Beause of this, the issue ofdening rankings over tournaments has been studied in various elds and rankingmethods based on dierent motivations have been dened. Sport events and, inpartiular, hess, motivated the seminal work on rankings by Zermelo (1929). Lateron, sparked by Arrow's impossibility theorem (see Arrow (1953)), this topi emergedin the ontext of soial hoie and voting theory. The theory of rankings has alsoattrated statistiians and psyhologists, whih have studied it under the name ofpaired omparisons analysis.We onsider tournaments represented by a set of alternatives N and a non-negative N × N matrix A. Although dierent interpretations an be given to theentries of the matrix, we stik to the following interpretation throughout this hapter.The entry Aij represents the aggregate result of alternative i ∈ N in the diretpairwise omparisons with alternative j ∈ N ; it is assumed that Aii = 0 for everyalternative i ∈ N . The results of alternatives i and j in an elementary omparisonbetween these alternatives are non-negative and sum to one. This may indiate131
132 Chapter 7. A taxonomy of rankings in tournamentsa win, loss or draw, but ould also be a proxy for the relative strength in theomparison based on, e.g., goals sored in soer or IMPs in bridge. The sum ofthe aggregate results, Aij + Aji, represents the amount of elementary omparisonsbetween i and j. We allow for multiple elementary omparisons, and also allow
Aij + Aji to be non-integer, this way allowing for partially nished mathes or, intesting objets, a dierene in importane of the omparison of the same alternativesby dierent experts. We allow for partial information about all possible pairwiseomparisons, the amount of omparisons between two alternatives an be zero, sinethere are many situations where it is unfeasible to obtain omplete information. Thismay be beause there are a high number of alternatives to be ranked or just beauseit is too ostly to undergo eah pairwise omparison.In voting theory, tournaments are typially dened through omplete and asym-metri binary relations. In our terminology this would orrespond with a tournamentsuh that for eah pair of alternatives i, j ∈ N , Aij ∈ {0, 1} and Aij + Aji = 1. Weall suh a tournament binary. For binary tournaments the sore ranking method,whih for every alternative equals the sum of its aggregate results against all otheralternatives divided by his total number of omparisons, will not tell the whole storydue to the partial information about all pairwise omparisons. It seems reasonableto take into aount the quality of the alternatives it has been ompared with. Inthe literature on soial hoie and voting, several overviews of ranking methodsand their properties exist, mostly dealing with binary tournaments. Laslier (1997)presents a thorough analysis of dierent ranking methods and properties dened forbinary tournaments.1 This approah allows for set-valued rankings and the spirit ofmany of the properties revolve around the (possible) set-valuedness of the rankingmethods. Maybe more importantly, the analysis there is foused on the (important)appliation to voting situations. Bouyssou (2004) revisits the main ranking methodsin Laslier (1997) and studies their monotoniity properties.Our goal in this hapter is to take some of the ranking methods onsidered inthe dierent elds and ompare them by looking at their performane with respetto a set of natural properties. These properties originate from dierent ontexts,and therefore the desirability of these properties an depend on the appliation.Although our results are ontext free, we use motivation, terminology and interpre-tation from sports ompetitions throughout this hapter for expositional purposes.1Dutta and Laslier (1999) onsider a setting where this last restrition is generalized to allowfor intensities but ompleteness is still a requirement.
7.1. Introdution 133We ondut a detailed analysis of the properties of several well known ranking meth-ods and the newly introdued reursive Buhholz. Roughly speaking, the reursiveBuhholz ranking method adds depth to the ideas underlying Buhholz, as it notonly takes the strength of your opponents into aount, but also the strength of youropponents' opponents et.Our analysis mainly onentrates on ve ranking methods. First, the soresranking method whih is a natural hoie for binary tournaments (see Rubinstein(1980) for an axiomati haraterization). Seond, the fair bets ranking method,whih is a ranking method widely studied in soial hoie and eonomis (see, forinstane, Daniels (1969), Moon and Pullman (1970), Slutzki and Volij (2005) andSlutzki and Volij (2006)). Third, the maximum likelihood ranking method, themost ommon hoie in statistis and psyhology (see, for instane, Zermelo (1929)and Bradley and Terry (1952)). Lastly, we study two ranking methods stemmingfrom a new approah developed in Brozos-Vázquez et al. (2008): the reursiveperformane ranking method as introdued by Brozos-Vázquez et al. (2008) andthe newly introdued ranking method reursive Buhholz. Also, as a benhmark forfair bets and reursive Buhholz, we onsider the Neustadtl ranking method and theBuhholz ranking method.The main ontribution of this hapter is to study how the above ranking meth-ods perform with respet to a set of natural properties, in a general framework oftournaments. This analysis is important not only to get a better understanding ofthe dierent ranking methods, but also to learn about the strength and impliationsof the dierent properties. To give two examples, rst the property of independeneof irrelevant mathes laries an important dierene between the sore rankingmethod and the other ranking methods under onsideration, only the sore rankingmethod does not onsider the results of one's opponent to rank the players. Seond,maximum likelihood behaves well with respet to several properties. This is some-what surprising sine, beause of its nature, one would expet maximum likelihoodto have good statistial properties (for instane, in terms of asymptoti behavior),but there is no reason to expet good behavior with respet to some of the proper-ties we work with. As a byprodut we an extend the haraterization by Slutzkiand Volij (2005) of the fair bets ranking method to our domain. This hapter isstrutured as follows. In Setion 7.2 we present the main denitions and rankingmethods. In Setions 7.3 to 7.6 we dene and disuss several properties. Finally, wedisuss the results of our analysis in Setion 7.7.
134 Chapter 7. A taxonomy of rankings in tournaments7.2 Tournaments and ranking methodsThe framework of tournaments is used to obtain a ranking of a nite set of alterna-tives based on partial information about diret pairwise omparisons between thesealternatives. We rst introdue tournaments and a number of related notions. Then,we dene and disuss the ranking methods under onsideration in this hapter.We dene a tournament as a pair (N,A), where N is a nite set of alternatives,or players, and A ∈ RN×N is the tournament matrix. The results of players i and jin an elementary pairwise omparison, or math, between these players sum to one.The tournament matrix A is suh that Aij represents the aggregate result of player
i over all mathes against j. We assume Aij ≥ 0 for all i, j ∈ N and Aii = 0 for all
i ∈ N . To ensure that all ranking methods presented in this paper are well-dened,we make the standard assumption that the matrix A is irreduible. This meansthat for every pair of players i, j ∈ N , i 6= j, there has to be a sequene of players
(i = k0, k1, . . . , kn = j) suh that, for eah ℓ ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1}, Akℓkℓ+1 > 0.To eah tournament (N,A) we assoiate a (symmetri) mathes matrix M(A) =
A+A⊤. As the results of an elementary omparison sum to one, Mij(A) representsthe amount of mathes between i ∈ N and j ∈ N . A tournament is alled round-robin if Mij = 1 for all i, j ∈ N, i 6= j. For eah player i ∈ N , dene mi(A) =∑
j∈N Mij(A). So, mi(A) equals the total amount of mathes played by player
i ∈ N . For i, j ∈ N , dene M̄ij(A) = Mij(A)mi(A) to be the proportion of player i'smathes that he plays against j.A rating method r assigns to any tournament (N,A) a rating vetor r(A) ∈ RNwhere ri(A), i ∈ N , is a measure of the performane of player i ∈ N . A rankingmethod ϕ assigns to any tournament (N,A) a weak order ϕ(A) on N (transitive,omplete).For i, j ∈ N , we write i Rϕ(A) j if i is ranked weakly above j aording to ϕ(A);a strit ranking is denoted by i P ϕ(A) j and indierene is denoted by i Iϕ(A) j. Aweak order ϕ(A) is alled at if for eah pair i, j ∈ N , i Iϕ(A) j. For a rating method
r, the ranking method ϕr assigns to eah tournament A the weak order indued by
r(A): i Rϕr(A) j if and only if ri(A) ≥ rj(A).When no onfusion an arise, we use the shorthand notation M for M(A), m for
m(A), M̄ for M̄(A) and r for r(A).Below we introdue the orresponding rating methods used to dene the rankingmethods onsidered in this hapter. Two of them, the Neustadtl and Buhholz
7.2. Tournaments and ranking methods 135ranking methods are mainly dened as a benhmark for the fair bets and reursiveBuhholz methods, respetively.Denition 7.2.1 The sores rating method rs assigns to any tournament (N,A)the rating vetor rs(A) dened by rsi(A) =∑j∈N Aij/mi for all i ∈ N .It follows from the assumption that a tournament is irreduible that rsi ∈ (0, 1) forall i ∈ N . We illustrate the ranking methods with the following example.Example 7.2.2 Consider the tournament A desribed below, whih is an adapta-tion of an example in Borm et al. (2002) to a non round-robin setting.
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0 2 1 0
0 0 1 1
0 0 0 4





0 2 1 1
2 0 1 1
1 1 0 4




















), so the sores ranking method
ϕr
s ranks players 1 on top, followed by player 3, player 2 and lastly player 4. ⊳Denition 7.2.3 For any tournament (N,A), let the N × N matrix Â be denedby Âij = Aij/mi for every pair i, j ∈ N . The Neustadtl rating method rn assigns toany tournament (N,A) the rating vetor rn(A) = Ârs(A).For eah player i ∈ N , the Neustadtl rating vetor is a weighted sum of the soresof all other players, where the weight of player j's sore is proportional to the result
136 Chapter 7. A taxonomy of rankings in tournamentsof player i against player j.2 Thus, the idea behind Neustadtl is to reward a winagainst a player with a high sore more than a win against a player with a lowersore.For an arbitrary vetor a ∈ RN , diag(a) denotes the N ×N matrix given bydiagii(a) = ai for every i ∈ N , and diagij(a) = 0 for every i, j ∈ N , i 6= j. For everytournament (N,A), let LA = diag(A⊤eN ). So, for every i ∈ N , (LA)ii represents theaggregate result of all other players against player i.Denition 7.2.4 The fair bets rating method rfb assigns to any tournament (N,A)the rating vetor rfb(A), whih is dened as the unique solution to the systemof linear equations given by L−1A Ax = x and x⊤eN = 1 or, equivalently, by∑
j∈N Aijxj =
∑
j∈N Ajixi for all i ∈ N , and x⊤eN = 1.This method was originally dened for round-robin tournaments and has been stud-ied in a variety of elds under dierent names and interpretations: from the lassihapters by Daniels (1969) and Moon and Pullman (1970), to more reent referenessuh as Slutzki and Volij (2005) and Slutzki and Volij (2006). Note that for everytournament A, rfb(A) is positive.The fair bets ratings are suh that, if a bettor wins Aijrfbj (A) from the resultsof player i against player j and loses Ajirfbi (A) from the results of player j againstplayer i then for the results of player i total revenue (∑j∈N Aijrfbj (A)) equals totalloss (∑j∈N Ajirfbi (A)).Ranking methods using similar ideas as the fair bets ranking method are providedby Daniels (1969), Borm et al. (2002), Herings et al. (2005) and Slikker et al. (2011).Daniels (1969) introdues the invariant ranking method, where the underlying ratingvetor is suh that the rating of player i equals∑j∈N Aijrfbj (A). Borm et al. (2002)introdue the lambda ranking method whih, as Slikker et al. (2011) show, fortournaments (N,A) suh that Mij(A) ∈ {0, 1} for every i, j ∈ N , an be seenas a ompromise between the fair bets ranking method and the invariant rankingmethod. Although Borm et al. (2002) extend the lambda ranking method beyondround-robin tournaments, this is not diretly appliable to our domain sine theyassume that Aii > 0 for every i ∈ N .2This rule is ommonly known as Sonneborn-Berger, but it was originally proposed by HermannNeustadtl. Atually, this ranking method was dened just for round-robin tournaments and whatwe present here is a natural extension to our more general setting. The Neustadtl ranking is oftenused for breaking ties after applying the sores ranking method.



















 ,therefore, the Neustadtl rating vetor is given by rn(A) = (0.417, 0.208, 0.111, 0.125),whih puts player 1 ranked on top, followed by player 2, player 4 and player 3.Although player 3 has a relatively high sore, this was ahieved against players with alow sore. This makes that he is, ontrary to the sores ranking, ranked below player
2 and 4. The fair bets rating vetor is given by rfb(A) = (0.526, 0.158, 0.211, 0.105).So, the fair bets ranking oinides with the sores ranking. In omparison with theNeustadtl ranking, player 3 is ranked higher as he has a good result against player
4, who in turn has a good result against a player with a high sore, player 1. ⊳Next, we introdue the maximum likelihood ranking method.Denition 7.2.5 The maximum likelihood rating method rml assigns to any tour-nament (N,A) the rating vetor rml(A), dened for every player i ∈ N , by









The origins of this ranking method an be traed as far bak as Zermelo (1929)and it has also been studied in a wide variety of elds (see, for instane, Bradley3Refer, for instane, to Ford (1957) or David (1988).
138 Chapter 7. A taxonomy of rankings in tournamentsand Terry (1952), Moon and Pullman (1970) and David (1988)). The maximumlikelihood ranking method originates from the setting where the result of a mathis binary. It is assumed that eah player i ∈ N has a rating ri and that, giventwo players i, j ∈ N , i 6= j, the probability that player i beats player j is givenby a probability funtion F (ri, rj). In the lassi approah, used already in theearly works by Zermelo (1929) and redisovered by Bradley and Terry (1952), Fis based on the (standard) logisti distribution FL(x) = 1/(1 + exp(−x)), so that
F (ri, rj) = FL(ri−rj) = exp(ri)/(exp(ri)+exp(rj)). Then, the maximum likelihoodrating method looks for the ratings that maximize the probability of the matrix Abeing realized when all the mathes given in matrixM take plae. In our setting, theprobability funtion an be interpreted as the expeted result of a math betweenplayers i ∈ N and j ∈ N .The reursive performane ranking method, dened in Brozos-Vázquez et al.(2008), also builds upon probability funtions. Given a tournament (N,A), onewould like to assoiate with it a rating of the players that explains all the observedresults, that is, for eah pair of players i, j ∈ N , i 6= j, F (ri, rj) = AijMij , i.e.,the observed result of i against j is exatly what one would predit using F andthe ratings ri and rj . Unfortunately, nding suh ratings amounts to solving asystem with far more equations than variables whih, for most tournaments, willhave no solution. As we said above, what maximum likelihood does is to nd theratings under whih the probability of the observed results is maximized, whereasthe reursive performane nds the rating that explains the `average' result of eahplayer.Given a tournament (N,A), a rating vetor r ∈ RN , and a player i, the av-erage opponent of i in the tournament is (M̄r)i, i.e., the average rating of theopponents of i (weighted by the amount of mathes played against eah of them).The reursive performane looks for a rating suh that for eah player i ∈ N ,
F (ri, (M̄r)i) =
∑
j∈N Aij/mi = r
s
i(A). Again, we stik to the approah of using thelogisti distribution to dene F .Denition 7.2.6 For any tournament (N,A) and every i ∈ N let c(A) ∈ RN bedened by c(A)i = F−1L (rsi(A)) and let ĉ(A) = c(A) − m⊤c(A)m⊤eN eN . The reursiveperformane rating method rrp assigns to any tournament (N,A) the rating vetor
rrp(A), whih is the solution of the system of linear equations given by x⊤e = 0 and
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M̄x+ ĉ(A) = x.Hene, for eah player i, rrpi takes into aount the average strength of i's opponents(M̄rrp) and his own sore in the tournament (ĉi is inreasing in rsi). Althoughwe dene the reursive performane rating method as the solution of a system ofequations, the original denition introdues the rating method as the limit of theiterative method p(0) = M̄r + ĉ(A), p(t) = M̄p(t − 1) + ĉ(A) for t ∈ N, where ris an exogenously given vetor of initial ratings. In fat, the limit of this iterativemethod is independent of the initial rating vetor r.For round-robin tournaments, Buhholz is a tie-breaking rule that ranks playerswith an equal sore aording to the average sores of their opponents. To keepthis idea we introdue the Buhholz ranking method, that ombines the averagestrength of one's opponent and one's own sore. Thus, Buhholz uses the sameideas as reursive performane, but in a muh simpler way.Denition 7.2.7 The Buhholz rating method rb assigns to any tournament (N,A)the rating vetor rb(A), given by rb(A) = M̄rs(A) + rs(A).Reursive Buhholz is a new ranking method that ombines the ideas of Buhholzand reursive performane by adding to the Buhholz ranking method the samekind of depth that the fair bets added to Neustadtl. Not only the average sore ofyour opponents (M̄rs(A)) should be important, but also whether your opponentshave ahieved this average sore against weak or strong opponents. All else equal,having faed opponents with a high sore who have themselves played against strongopponents should be better than having faed opponents with a high sore who haveplayed against weak opponents. Again, further depth an be given to this argumentand reursive Buhholz aptures this idea.Denition 7.2.8 The reursive Buhholz rating method rrb assigns to any tourna-ment (N,A) the rating vetor rrb(A), dened as the unique solution of the system oflinear equations given by x⊤eN = 0 and M̄x+ r̂s(A) = x, where r̂s(A) = rs(A)− eN
2
.44Sine the reursive Buhholz an be seen as a variation of the reursive performane where
FL is taken to be the identity, the existene and uniqueness of rrb follows from Theorem 2 inBrozos-Vázquez et al. (2008)
140 Chapter 7. A taxonomy of rankings in tournamentsFor the reursive Buhholz ranking method the same remark holds as for the max-imum likelihood ranking method: although it is dened as the solution to a sys-tem of equations, it an also be obtained as the limit of the iterative method
p(0) = M̄r + r̂s(A), p(t) = M̄p(t − 1) + r̂s(A) for t ∈ N, where r is an exoge-nously given rating vetor. In fat, the limit of this iterative method is independentof the rating vetor r.Example 7.2.2 (ontinued) We have π(A) = (0.512, 0.236, 0.205, 0.047), sothe maximum likelihood rating vetor is given by rml(A) = (−0.669,−1.444,
−1.587,−3.055). Hene, player 1 is ranked on top, followed by player 2,player 3 and player 4. For the remaining rating methods, we have rrp(A) =
(0.971, 0.238, 0.086,−1.295), rb(A) = (1.208, 1.083, 0.986, 0.819) and rrb(A) =
(0.483, 0.317, 0.300, 0). Hene, ϕrml(A), ϕrrp(A), ϕrb(A) and ϕrrb(A) oinide. ⊳In the remainder, we use the shorthand notation ϕs for ϕrs. For the other rankingmethods, we use an equivalent shorthand notation.In the following setions we disuss several properties and study whether theabove ranking methods satisfy them. Most of the properties we disuss have beenstudied in the literature before. We will be expliit when dening properties thatwe have not found in the literature. We only onsider ordinal properties, relating tothe ranking of the players and not neessarily to the underlying rating vetor.7.3 Basi propertiesIn this setion we start our analysis by presenting three elementary properties thata ranking method ϕ an satisfy. In addition, we present a property that deals withbridge players and the sub-tournaments in whih suh players naturally divide agiven tournament.Denition 7.3.1 The ranking method ϕ satises anonymity (ano) if for any tour-nament (N,A), any i, j ∈ N and (N,A′) the tournament obtained from (N,A) bypermuting olumns i and j and rows i and j, ϕ(A) and ϕ(A′) are the same but withplayers i and j interhanged.
7.3. Basi properties 141Denition 7.3.2 The ranking method ϕ satises homogeneity (hom) if ϕ(kA) =
ϕ(A) for all tournaments (N,A) and all k > 0.Denition 7.3.3 A tournament (N,A) is symmetri if A = A⊤. The rankingmethod ϕ satises symmetry (sym) if ϕ(A) is at for any symmetri tournament
(N,A).These three properties require no motivation. It is readily veried that all ourranking methods satisfy these three properties.Theorem 7.3.4 The ranking methods ϕs, ϕn, ϕfb, ϕml, ϕrp, ϕb, and ϕrb all satisfyano, hom and sym.Given a tournament (N,A), a player b ∈ N is a bridge player if there exist N1, N2 ⊆
N with |N1| ≥ 2 and |N2| ≥ 2 suh that N1∪N2 = N , N1 ∩N2 = {b} and Mij = 0for all i ∈ N1\{b}, j ∈ N2\{b}. The sub-tournaments (N1, A1) and (N2, A2) aresuh that A1ij = Aij for every i, j ∈ N1, and A2ij = Aij for every i, j ∈ N2. Sineno player of N1\{b} has played against any player in N2\{b}, the irreduibility ofa tournament with bridge players depends ruially on these bridge players. Thesub-tournaments (N1, A1) and (N2, A2) satisfy our denition of a tournament. Byirreduibility of (N,A) and the observation that Aji = Aij = 0 for every i ∈ N1\{b}and j ∈ N\N1, it follows that for every pair i, j ∈ N1, i 6= j we an nd a sequeneof players (i = k0, k1, ..., kn = j) suh that kl ∈ N1 for eah l ∈ {1, ..., n−1} and, foreah l ∈ {0, ..., n− 1}, Aklkl+1 > 0. As Aij = A1ij for every i, j ∈ N1 this means that
(N1, A1) is irreduible. Note that, given a tournament (N,A) and a bridge player
b ∈ N , the assoiated sub-tournaments (N1, A1) and (N2, A2) need not be unique.Denition 7.3.5 The ranking method ϕ satises sub-tournament separability (ss)if for eah tournament (N,A), every bridge player b ∈ N , and any assoiated sub-tournaments (N1, A1) and (N2, A2), i Rϕ(A) j if and only if i Rϕ(A1) j for all i, j ∈ N1.With the presene of a bridge player a tournament is irreduible, but every om-parison aross the sub-tournaments has to be done via the bridge player. So, therelative strength of the players in one tournament with respet to the players in the
142 Chapter 7. A taxonomy of rankings in tournamentsother tournament an only be done by using their performane against the bridgeplayer as a referene point. Assuming that the bridge player plays with the samestrength in both tournaments, sub-tournament separability states that the resultsin one part of the tournament does not aet the relative ranking of the players inthe other part of the tournament.As the following theorems show, three ranking methods satisfy ss: fair bets,maximum likelihood and reursive Buhholz.Theorem 7.3.6 ϕfb satises ss.Proof: Let (N,A) be a tournament and let b ∈ N be a bridge player with respetto the subtournaments (N1, A1) and (N2, A2). Take x1 = rfb(N1, A1) and x2 =








x1i if i ∈ N1






































































































Ajbyb.Hene, y = rfb(N,A). Also, y and x1 resp. x2 indue the same rankings on theplayers in N1 resp. N2. From this, ss follows. Theorem 7.3.7 ϕml satises ss.Proof: Let (N,A) be a tournament and let b ∈ N be a bridge player with respetto the subtournaments (N1, A1) and (N2, A2). Take for all i ∈ N , x1i = πi(N1, A1) =








x1i if i ∈ N1















.Sine the maximum likelihood rating vetor assoiated with an irreduible tourna-ment is positive, the vetor y is well dened. Clearly, ∑i∈N yi = 1. Then, for


































j∈N\{i} yi + yj
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Hene, y = rml(N,A). Also, y and x1 resp. x2 indue the same rankings on theplayers in N1 resp. N2. From this, ss follows. 





b − a if i ∈ N1
x1b + x
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i )). Clearly, ∑i∈N yi = 0. Also,for i ∈ N1\{b} we have that, for all j ∈ N2, Aij = Aji = 0 so Mij = 0 and hene































































































































yj + r̂sb,where the last equality follows from r̂sb = m1bmb r̂s1b + m2bmb r̂s2b . So, we have y = rrb(N,A).
y and x1 resp. x2 indue the same rankings on the players in N1 resp. N2. Fromthis, ss follows. The other ranking methods under onsideration however do not satisfy ss. This isshown in the following example.
146 Chapter 7. A taxonomy of rankings in tournamentsExample 7.3.9 Consider the tournaments (N,A) and (N1, A1) where N =
{1, 2, 3, 4}, N1 = {1, 2, 3} and A, A1 are as desribed below:
A

0 1 20 39
1 0 20 0
20 20 0 0
1 0 0 0


rs rn rfb rml rrp rb rrb
0.732 0.140 0.331 −1.107 0.416 1.000 0.119
0.500 0.256 0.331 −1.107 1.398 1.011 0.119
0.500 0.308 0.331 −1.107 1.170 1.116 0.119








rs rn rfb rml rrp b rb
0.5 0.25 0.333 −1.099
0.5 0.25 0.333 −1.099
0.5 0.25 0.333 −1.099From Figure 7.3.1, it is easily seen that Player 1 is a bridge player in A with
N1 = {1, 2, 3} and N2 = {1, 4}. In tournament A1, all players are tied aording toall ranking methods. Yet, in A, players 1 and 3 are not tied anymore aording to
ϕs, ϕn, ϕrp, and ϕb. Hene, these rules do not satisfy ss. ⊳
41
2 31 2039
120 20201Figure 7.3.1: Graph representation of tournament A of Example 7.3.9
7.4 Response to vitories and lossesIn this setion we onsider two types of properties for a ranking method ϕ. Therst type deals with preserving a ranking when two tournaments (N,A) and (N,A′)are ombined. The seond type deals with the symmetri/asymmetri role vitoriesand losses play in a ranking method.Denition 7.4.1 The ranking method ϕ satises atness preservation (fp) if foreah pair of tournaments (N,A) and (N,A′) it holds that ϕ(A + A′) is at if both
ϕ(A) and ϕ(A′) are at.
7.4. Response to vitories and losses 147Denition 7.4.2 The ranking method ϕ satises symmetry between vitories andlosses (svl) if for eah tournament (N,A) and every i, j ∈ N , i Rϕ(A) j if and onlyif j Rϕ(A⊤) i.If we reverse all the results in a tournament, then the ranking should be reversedas well. In an example, Borm et al. (2004) disuss this property for the lambdaranking method. Note that svl trivially implies sym.Denition 7.4.3 Dene, for every λ ∈ RN++, Λ = diag((λi)i∈N). The rankingmethod ϕ satises negative response to losses (nrl) if, for eah (N,A) suh that
ϕ(A) is at and every λ ∈ RN++, i Rϕ(AΛ) j if and only if λi ≤ λj.This property is introdued in Slutzki and Volij (2005) and is the key ingredient ofthe haraterization they obtain for the fair bets ranking method. In words of theauthors: Negative responsiveness to losses onerns situations in whih all playersare equally ranked and the problem is irreduible. If a new problem is obtained bymultiplying eah player's losses by some positive onstant (whih may be dierentfor eah player), then the players should be ranked in the new problem in a waythat is inversely related to these onstants.Theorem 7.4.4 ϕs satises fp.Proof: Let (N,A) and (N,A′) be tournaments suh that ϕs(A) and ϕs(A′) are at.Let i ∈ N . Sine rsi (A) = 12 and rsi (A′) = 12 we have rsi (A+A′) = mirsi(A)+m′irsi(A′)mi+m′i = 12 .Hene, ϕs(A+ A′) is at. The following theorem relates atness of three ranking methods to atness of ϕs.Theorem 7.4.5 Let (N,A) be a tournament. Then for all ϕ ∈ {ϕrp, ϕrb, ϕml} itholds that ϕ(A) is at if and only if ϕs(A) is at.Proof: We start with the proof for ϕrp. For the `only if' part, assume that ϕrp(A) isat, so rrp = 0. Reall that rrp is a solution of (I−M̄)rrp = ĉ, where ĉi is inreasingon rsi . Then, (I − M̄)rrp = 0. Hene, ĉ = 0 and therefore, ϕs(A) is at.For the `if' part, assume that ϕs(A) is at, so rs = 1
2
e. Then, c = 0 and ĉ = 0. So,
148 Chapter 7. A taxonomy of rankings in tournamentsa partiular solution of (I − M̄)x = ĉ is 0. Hene, ϕrp(A) is at.Now onsider ϕrb. For the `only if' part, assume that ϕrb(A) is at, so rrb = 0.Reall that rrb is a solution of (I − M̄)rrb = r̂s, where r̂si is inreasing on rsi . Then,
(I − M̄)rrb = 0. Hene, r̂s = 0 and therefore, ϕs(A) is at.For the `if' part, assume that ϕs(A) is at, so rs = 1
2
e. Then, r̂s = 0. So, a partiularsolution of (I − M̄)x = r̂s is 0. Hene, ϕrb(A) is at.Lastly, onsider ϕml. For the `only if' part, let (N,A) be suh that ϕml(A) is at, so



















.Hene, rsi = 12 for every i ∈ N and therefore ϕs(A) is at.For the `if' part, assume that ϕs(A) is at, so rs = 1
2








.Also, ∑i∈N πi = 1. Hene, ϕml(A) is at. By fp of ϕs we obtain the following orollary.Corollary 7.4.6 ϕrp, ϕrb and ϕml satisfy fp.Slutzki and Volij (2005) shows that ϕfb satises fp on a domain that diers fromours, the extension to our domain is straightforward.








































(A+ A′)jixi.Therefore, rfb(A + A′) = x, so ϕfb(A+ A′) is at. The following example shows that ϕn and ϕb do not satisfy fp.Example 7.4.8 Consider the tournaments A and A′ desribed below:
A

0 0 2 2
0 0 2 2
1 1 0 0










0 1 2 1
1 0 2 1
1 1 0 1










0 1 4 3
1 0 4 3
3 3 0 1







0.227 0.966Then ϕn(A), ϕn(A′), ϕb(A) and ϕb(A′) are all at, but ϕn(A+A′) and ϕb(A+A′)are not. ⊳For the sore ranking method ϕs, svl is trivial.Theorem 7.4.9 ϕs satises svl.For various other ranking methods, svl an be shown by expliitly transforming therating vetor.
150 Chapter 7. A taxonomy of rankings in tournamentsTheorem 7.4.10 ϕml satises svl.Proof: Let (N,A) be a tournament. Reall that ϕml orders the players aordingto rml(A) where, for eah i ∈ N , rml(A)i = log(π(A)i) and vetor π(A) is suh that








.Let x̄ be dened, for eah i ∈ N , by x̄i = rmli − 1|N |∑j∈N rmlj (A). Then,∑i∈N x̄i = 0and, for eah i ∈ N , π(A)i = α exp(x̄i) with α = (∏j∈N π(A)j)1/|N | sine













































. (7.2)If we show that y = −x̄ solves this system, then (beause the transformation from
π to x̄ is monotoni) we are done sine player i's sore in A⊤ is 1 − rsi(A) and
M(A) =M(A⊤). Filling in y = −x̄ in the right hand side of (7.2) yields












































= exp(yi).So y = −x̄ solves the system for A⊤ and therefore, ϕml satises SVL. Theorem 7.4.11 ϕrp, ϕrb, and ϕb satisfy svl.Proof: Let (N,A) be a tournament. To show that ϕrp satises svl, observe thatif rrp solves M̄x + ĉ(A) = x, then −rrp solves the orresponding equation for A⊤,beause M̄ = M̄⊤ and ĉ(A⊤) = −ĉ(A) as a result of F−1 being symmetri around
1
2
. The argument for ϕrb is analogous. For ϕb, observe that rs(A⊤) = eN − rs(A),from whih it readily follows that rb(A⊤) = 2eN − (M̄rs(A) + rs(A)) = 2eN − rb(A)and so ϕb satises svl as well. Not all ranking methods satisfy svl, as is shown in de following example.Example 7.4.12 Consider the following tournaments A and A⊤
A

0 0.5 0.2 1
0.5 0 0.3 0.8
0.8 0.7 0 0.9








and A⊤ 0 0.5 0.8 00.5 0 0.7 0.20.2 0.3 0 0.1








.Sine player 2 is ranked above player 1 in both A and A⊤ and for both ϕn and ϕfb,these ranking methods do not satisfy svl. ⊳
152 Chapter 7. A taxonomy of rankings in tournamentsOur analysis of nrl builds upon Slutzki and Volij (2005), though some are is neededas they develop their haraterization of ϕfb for a lass that allows for reduibletournaments, but is restrited to tournament matries with integer entries.A tournament A is alled balaned if AeN = A⊤eN , i.e., if for every player, thetotal result against all his opponents equals the total result of all his opponentsagainst him. It is strongly balaned if, moreover, there is a onstant k suh that
AeN = keN , so the total result of a player against all other players (and the totalresult of all players against one player) is equal aross all players. The next resultis an adaptation of Lemmas 3 and 4 in Slutzki and Volij (2005).Lemma 7.4.13 Let ϕ be a ranking method satisfying ano, hom, sym and fp.Then ϕ is at on balaned tournaments.Proof: First, suppose that A is strongly balaned with Ae = ke. Then by Birkho'stheorem (Birkho (1946)), matrix A an be written as k times a onvex ombinationof permutation matries. By ano, ϕ is at on permutation matries. By hom, ϕ isalso at on the tournaments that result after the multipliation of the permutationmatries by positive numbers. Finally, by fp and hom again, ϕ is at also on matrix
A.If A is not strongly balaned, then A an be deomposed as the sum of a stronglybalaned tournament, in whih we have just seen that ϕ is at, and a symmetritournament (see the proof of Lemma 4 in Slutzki and Volij (2005)). By sym, ϕ isat on the symmetri tournament as well, and by fp it is then at on the originaltournament A. Most of the ranking methods we onsider in this hapter satisfy ano, hom, sym,and fp, and, therefore, these ranking methods oinide (and are at) for balanedtournaments. Slutzki and Volij (2005) provides a haraterization of fp on thedomain of all irreduible tournaments (N,A) suh that Aij is integer for every i, j ∈
N , i 6= j. The next result, whih adapts this result to our setting, illustrates thestrength of the nrl property.Theorem 7.4.14 The fair bets ranking method, ϕfb, is the unique ranking methodsatisfying ano, hom, sym, fp, and nrl.Proof: ϕfb was already shown to satisfy ano, hom, sym and fp. Regarding nrl,it is straightforward to extend the proof of Slutzki and Volij (2005) to our domain.










i (A).Then, A = A′(diag((rfbi (A))i∈N))−1. Sine ϕ satises ano, hom, sym, and fp, byLemma 7.4.13, ϕ(A′) is at. Then, by nrl, i Rϕ(A) j if and only if 1/rfbi (A) ≤
1/rfbj (A), so i Rϕ(A) j if and only if i Rϕfb(A) j. As a result of Theorem 7.4.14, ϕs, ϕml, ϕrp and ϕrb do not satisfy nrl beause theysatisfy all other properties in the haraterization. The following example showsthat ϕn and ϕb do not satisfy nrl either.Example 7.4.15 Let λ = (0.99, 2, 1, 1) and Λ = diag((λi)i∈N). Let A and AΛ beas follows:
A

0 2 1 1
2 0 1 1
1 1 0 2








and AΛ 0 4 1 11.98 0 1 10.99 2 0 2







0.264 1.046Note that both ϕn and ϕb are at on A but, despite λ1 ≤ λ3, rn3(AΛ) > rn1(AΛ) and
rb3(AΛ) > rb1(AΛ). ⊳7.5 Sore onsistenyIn this setion we investigate to what extent the various ranking methods preservesome of the features of the sores ranking method that make it quite appealing forround-robin tournaments.Denition 7.5.1 The ranking method ϕ satises sore onsisteny (s) if ϕ(A) =
ϕs(A) for every round-robin tournament (N,A).
154 Chapter 7. A taxonomy of rankings in tournamentsDenition 7.5.2 The ranking method ϕ satises strong sore onsisteny (ss)if, for all (N,A) and all i, j ∈ N suh that Mik =Mjk for all k ∈ N\{i, j}, i Rϕ(A) jif and only if i Rϕs(A) j.If i and j play the same amount of mathes against the other players, then theyshould be ranked aording to their sores. Note that ss trivially implies s.Example 7.5.3 The tournament A of Example 7.4.12 shows that ϕn and ϕfb donot satisfy s.
A

0 0.5 0.2 1
0.5 0 0.3 0.8
0.8 0.7 0 0.9







0.100 0.062 0.036It is readily heked that A is round-robin. Sine ϕs ranks player 1 above player 2and both ϕn and ϕfb rank player 2 above player 1, ϕn and ϕfb do not satisfy s. ⊳The remaining ranking methods all satisfy ss, and hene s.Theorem 7.5.4 ϕml satises ss.Proof: Let (N,A) and i, j ∈ N be tournaments suh that Mik = Mjk for all
k ∈ N\{i, j}. Using the denition of ϕml we have







is inreasing in πi(A), the right hand side of the equation is inreas-ing in πi(A). Then, beause Mik = Mjk for all k 6= i, j and therefore mi = mj , wehave that rsi(A) ≥ rsj(A) if and only if πi(A) ≥ πj(A). Hene, ϕml satises ss. If |N | = 2 we have that Mrs + rs = (rs1 + rs2, rs1 + rs2), so ϕb is at in two-playertournaments and therefore satises neither ss nor s.Theorem 7.5.5 If |N | > 2, then ϕb satises ss.Proof: Let (N,A) be a tournament and i, j ∈ N be suh that Mik = Mjk forall k ∈ N\{i, j}. Given i, j ∈ N , sine Mik = Mjk for all k 6= i, j, we have that
mi = mj and, hene, M̄ij = M̄ji. Then,
7.6. Monotoniity 155



















j(A)).Sine A is irreduible and |N | > 2, it annot be the ase that M̄ij = 1. Then,
(1− M̄ij) > 0 and ϕb and ϕs produe the same ranking. Theorem 7.5.6 ϕrb and ϕrp satisfy ss.Proof: Let (N,A) be a tournament and i, j ∈ N be suh that Mik = Mjk for all
k ∈ N\{i, j}. Reall that ϕrb solves (I − M̄)x = r̂s(A). So, in partiular




−M̄jixi + xj −
∑
k∈N\{i,j}
M̄jkxk = r̂sj(A).Substrating the two equations and using that M̄ij = M̄ji and M̄ik = M̄jk for allother k yields
(1 + M̄ij)(xi − xj) = r̂si(A)− r̂sj(A).Therefore, xi−xj and r̂si(A)− r̂sj(A) have the same sign. Hene, ϕrb satises ss.The proof for ϕrp is analogous, but with ĉ(A) in the right hand side. Sine ĉ(A) and
r̂s(A) indue the same ranking, the same argument works. 7.6 MonotoniityIn this setion we present three properties that deal with hanges in the tournamentmatrix. If an existing result is hanged or a new one is added, how should therankings hange? For independene of irrelevant mathes, we use the denition byRubinstein (1980)
156 Chapter 7. A taxonomy of rankings in tournamentsDenition 7.6.1 The ranking method ϕ satises independene of irrelevantmathes (iim) if, for eah (N,A), eah k, ℓ ∈ N and eah (N,A′) an identialtournament to (N,A) exept for the results between k and ℓ, i Rϕ(A) j if and onlyif i Rϕ(A′) j for every i, j ∈ N\{k, ℓ}.This property states that for any two players, their relative ranking is not inuenedby a hange in a result involving neither of them.Denition 7.6.2 The ranking method ϕ satises positive responsiveness to thebeating relation (prb) if, for eah (N,A), eah i, k ∈ N , i 6= k, eah tournament
(N,A′) idential to (N,A) exept that A′ik +A′ki = Aik +Aki and A′ik > Aik, and forevery j ∈ N\{i}, i P ϕ(A) j if i Rϕ(A) j. Note that this should hold in partiular for
k = j.Denition 7.6.3 The ranking method ϕ satises non-negative responsiveness to thebeating relation (nnrb) if, for eah (N,A), eah i, k ∈ N , i 6= k, eah tournament
(N,A′) idential to (N,A) exept that A′ik + A′ki = Aik + Aki and A′ik > Aik, andfor every j ∈ N\{i} the following holds: if i Rϕ(A) j then i Rϕ(A′) j and, if k = j,
i P ϕ(A
′) j.These two properties state that an improved result should always be beneial toyour ranking. Of ourse, prb trivially implies nnrb. Trivially, the sores rankingmethod satises iim and prb, and therefore nnrb.Theorem 7.6.4 ϕs satises iim, prb and nnrb.We show below that all the other ranking methods violate iim.Example 7.6.5 Consider the tournaments A and A′ desribed below:
A

0 1 1 1
2 0 1 1
1 1 0 2
1 1 1 0


rn rfb rml rrp rb rrb
0.224 0.2 −1.609 −0.201 0.959 −0.05
0.265 0.3 −1.204 0.201 1.041 0.05
0.265 0.3 −1.204 0.201 1.041 0.05
0.224 0.2 −1.609 −0.201 0.959 −0.05
A′

0 1 1 2
2 0 1 1
1 1 0 2
1 1 1 0


rn rfb rml rrp rb rrb
0.237 0.233 −1.430 −0.015 0.998 −0.004
0.278 0.308 −1.189 0.224 1.056 0.055
0.260 0.292 −1.230 0.182 1.038 0.045
0.205 0.167 −1.807 −0.390 0.920 −0.096
7.6. Monotoniity 157In tournament A, all ranking methods rank players 2 and 3 equally. In tournament
A′, exept for ϕs, all ranking methods rank player 2 on top of player 3, violatingiim. ⊳Note that every ranking method satisfying sore onsisteny satises iim on thedomain of round-robin tournaments. The sores ranking method ϕs also turns outto be the only one satisfying prb.Example 7.6.6 Consider the tournaments A and A′ desribed below:
A

0 1 20 20
1 0 20 0
20 20 0 0
20 0 0 0


rs rn rfb rml rrp rb rrb
0.5 0.25 0.25 −1.386 0 1 0
0.5 0.25 0.25 −1.386 0 1 0
0.5 0.25 0.25 −1.386 0 1 0
0.5 0.25 0.25 −1.386 0 1 0
A′

0 1 20 39
1 0 20 0
20 20 0 0
1 0 0 0


rs rn rfb rml rrp rb rrb
0.732 0.140 0.331 −1.107 0.416 1.000 0.119
0.500 0.256 0.331 −1.107 1.398 1.011 0.119
0.500 0.308 0.331 −1.107 1.170 1.116 0.119
0.025 0.018 0.008 −4.771 −2.984 0.757 −0.356Aording to all methods, players 1, 2 and 3 are equally ranked in A. In A′, player 1has a better result against player 4 than in A, but only rs ranks him above players 2and 3. Hene, all of them but rs violate prb. Moreover, ϕn, ϕrp and ϕb atuallyrank player 1 lower than 2 and 3 in A′, so these three methods do not satisfy nnrbeither. ⊳In the remainder of this setion we show that both ϕfb and ϕrb satisfy nnrb. Al-though we onjeture that ϕml also satises nnrb, this is still an open question.The result for ϕfb below extends the result in Levhenkov (1992) for round-robintournaments (we build upon the proof in Laslier (1997)). We start with an auxiliaryresult that will be ruial in the proof for both ϕfb and ϕrb.Lemma 7.6.7 Let B ∈ Rn×n be suh that(i) B is invertible,(ii) for all i 6= j, Bij ≤ 0, and(iii) ∑nj=1Bji ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N .
158 Chapter 7. A taxonomy of rankings in tournamentsThen, for all λ ∈ Rn+, B−1λ ≥ 0.Proof: First note that (i)-(iii) imply that Bii > 0 for all i sine invertibilitypreludes a zero olumn. We do the proof by indution on n, the size of the squarematrix B. For n = 1, the result follows immediately from B11 > 0. If n > 1, supposethe result is true for matries of size n− 1 and let λ ∈ Rn+ and γ = B−1λ. The lastequation of Bγ = λ an be written as
Bnnγn = λn −
n−1∑
j=1
Bnjγj. (7.3)Now, we substitute γn in the other equations and, for eah i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}, theequation ∑nj=1Bijγj = λi an be rewritten as
n−1∑
j=1
(BnnBij − BinBnj)γj = Bnnλi −Binλn.Dene B̄ ∈ R(n−1)×(n−1) by B̄ij = BnnBij −BinBnj for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n−1}. Also,dene γ̄, λ̄ ∈ Rn−1 by γ̄i = γi and λ̄i = Bnnλi − Binλn for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}.Then the above n − 1 equations an be expressed in matrix form as B̄γ̄ = λ̄. It isnow easy to hek that λ̄ ≥ 0, B̄ is invertible, and for all i 6= j, B̄ij ≤ 0. Thus, inorder to apply the indution hypothesis we just need to show that ∑n−1j=1 B̄ji ≥ 0:
n−1∑
j=1





























7.6. Monotoniity 159Therefore, we an apply the indution hypothesis to onlude that γ̄ is nonnegative.Finally, nonnegativity of γn easily follows from (7.3), Bnn > 0 and nonnegativity ofthe other omponents of γ. Theorem 7.6.8 ϕrb satises nnrb.Proof: Let (N,A) be a tournament, and let i, k ∈ N , i 6= k. Below we expliitlyharaterize how the reursive Buhholz ranking varies as a funtion of Aik and
Aki, provided that Mik stays onstant. Reall that rrb(A) is the unique solution of
M̄x + r̂s(A) = x suh that (rrb(A))⊤e = 0. Hene, (I − M̄)rrb(A) = r̂s(A). Dene











k (A). (7.4)with ℓ ∈ N̆ . Dene B̆ ∈ R(n−2)×(n−2) to be the matrix obtained from B by deletingthe rows and olumns orresponding to players i and k.We prove now that B̆ is invertible. Suppose, on the ontrary, that there is an
y ∈ RN̆ , y 6= 0, suh that y⊤B̆⊤ = 0. Let ℓ ∈ N̆ be suh that yℓ = maxh∈N̆ yh.We assume, without loss of generality, that yℓ > 0. For eah h 6= ℓ, B⊤hℓ ≤ 0and, hene, −yhB⊤hℓ ≤ −yℓB⊤hℓ, with equality only if yh = yℓ or B⊤hℓ = 0. Sine
























ℓℓand, hene, all the inequalities are indeed equalities. Therefore, B⊤iℓ = B⊤kℓ = 0 and,for eah h ∈ N̆\{ℓ}, yh = yℓ or B⊤hℓ = 0. Dene N̄ = {m ∈ N̆ | ym = maxh∈N̆ yh}.Now, for eah m ∈ N̄ , we have B⊤im = B⊤km = 0 and, further, for eah h ∈ N̆\N̄ ,
B⊤hm = 0. That is, no player outside N̄ has played against players inside N̄ , whihontradits the irreduibility of A.Dene C = (B̆)−1, r̆rb = (rrbh )h∈N̆ , r̆s = (rsh(A))h∈N̆ , Bi = (Bhi)h∈N̆ and Bk =
(Bhk)h∈N̆ . Then, using (7.4) we have B̆r̆rb = r̆s − Birrbi − Bkrrbk and hene, r̆rb =
C(r̆s − Birrbi − Bkrrbk ). So, for all ℓ ∈ N̆ ,
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rrbℓ = r̆rbℓ =∑
h∈N̆
Cℓh(r̆sh −Bhirrbi −Bhkrrbk ).Dene γsℓ = ∑h∈N̆ Cℓhr̆sh, γiℓ = −∑h∈N̆ CℓhBhi and γkℓ = −∑h∈N̆ CℓhBhk. Then,for eah ℓ ∈ N̆ ,










ℓ (A) = r̂
s
i(A). (7.6)Dene Γi,i = −∑ℓ∈N̆ Biℓγiℓ and Γi,k = −∑ℓ∈N̆ Biℓγkℓ . Then, plugging in the expres-sion of eah rrbℓ (A) (7.5) into (7.6) we get
(Bii − Γ
i,i)rrbi (A) + (Bik − Γi,k)rrbk (A) = r̂si −∑
ℓ∈N̆











k (A) = −
∑
ℓ∈N̆
γsℓ . (7.8)Dene σi = ∑ℓ∈N̆ γiℓ and σk = ∑ℓ∈N̆ γkℓ . Then, solving equations (7.7) and (7.8),we get
rrbi = r̂si(A)− (1− Bik−Γi,k1+σk )∑ℓ∈N̆ γsℓ(Bii − Γi,i)− (Bik − Γi,k)1+σk1+σi and rrbk = −∑ℓ∈N̆ γsℓ1 + σk − 1 + σi1 + σk rrbi .(7.9)To understand how rrbi (A) and rrbk (A) vary with r̂si(A), it is onvenient to knowthe signs of γi and γk. We laim that both γi and γk are nonnegative vetors. Bydenition, γi = −CBi and, sine C−1 = B̆, B̆γ = −Bi. Furthermore, −Bi ≥ 0.Sine matrix B̆ and vetors γi and −Bi satisfy the onditions of Lemma 7.6.7, γiis nonnegative. The argument for γk is analogous using −Bk instead of −Bi. Thenonnegativity of γi and γk implies that σi and σk are also nonnegative. Sine γk isnonnegative, also Γi,k is nonnegative and Bik − Γi,k is negative. Furthermore,
Bii − Γ





ℓ ≥ Bii +
∑
ℓ∈N̆
Biℓ ≥ 0.We reexamine now equation (7.9). Note that γs, γi, γk, Γi,i, Γi,k, Bii, and Bik onlydepend on B̆. Then, the denominator of the expression for rrbi (A) is positive and so
7.6. Monotoniity 161
rrbi (A) is stritly inreasing in r̂si(A). Further, sine rrbk (A) is stritly dereasing in
rrbi (A), it is stritly dereasing in r̂si(A).Now, beause of (7.5), rrbℓ is weakly inreasing in rrbi (A) and rrbk (A). Yet, sine rrbi (A)and rrbk (A) are stritly inreasing and dereasing, respetively, in r̂si(A), some extrawork is needed to understand how rrbℓ (A) varies with r̂si(A). To do so, we rst showthat all the omponents of γi and γk are no larger than 1. We prove it for γi, theproof for γk being analogous.







Bℓh +Bℓi +Bki = 0.Then, sine B̆eN − Bi is a nonnegative vetor, matrix B̆ and vetors eN − γi and
B̆eN −Bi are in the onditions of Lemma 7.6.7 and, hene, eN − γi is nonnegative.Therefore, we know that all the omponents of γi and γk are no larger than 1.Looking again at equation (7.5), we have that rrbℓ (A) annot inrease with r̂si(A)faster than rrbi (A) so rrbℓ (A)rrbi (A) is weakly dereasing in r̂si(A). Similarly, rrbℓ /rrbk is weaklyinreasing in r̂si(A). From this, the statement follows. Theorem 7.6.9 ϕfb satises nnrb.Proof: Let (N,A) be a tournament, and let i, k ∈ N , i 6= k. Below we expliitlyharaterize how the fair bets ranking varies as a funtion of Aik and Aki, providedthatMik stays onstant. Reall that rfb(A) is the unique solution of L−1A Ax = x suhthat (rfb(A))⊤e = 1, where LA = diag((ãi)i∈N) is the diagonal matrix in whih ãi =









k (A), (7.10)with ℓ ∈ N̆ . Dene B̆ ∈ RN̆×N̆ to be the matrix obtained from B by deleting therows and olumns orresponding to players i and k.
162 Chapter 7. A taxonomy of rankings in tournamentsWe prove now that B̆ is invertible. Suppose, on the ontrary, that there is an
y ∈ RN̆ , y 6= 0 suh that y⊤B̆ = 0. Let ℓ ∈ N̆ be suh that yℓ = maxh∈N̆ yh. Weassume, without loss of generality, that yℓ > 0. For eah h ∈ N̆\{ℓ}, Bhℓ ≤ 0 and,hene, −yhBhℓ ≤ −yℓBhℓ, with equality only if yh = yℓ or Bhℓ = 0. Sine y⊤B̆ = 0,∑
h∈N̆\{ℓ}−yhBhℓ = yℓBℓℓ. Further, sine ∑h∈N Bhℓ = 0, we have ∑h∈N̆\{ℓ}−Bhℓ =







−Bhℓ ≤ yℓBℓℓand, hene, all the inequalities are indeed equalities. Therefore, Biℓ = Bkℓ = 0 and,for eah h ∈ N̆\{ℓ}, yh = yℓ or Bhℓ = 0. Dene N̄ = {m ∈ N̆ | ym = maxh∈N̆ yh}.Now, for eah m ∈ N̄ , we have Bim = Bkm = 0 and, further, for eah h ∈ N̆\N̄ ,
Bhm = 0. That is, no player outside N̄ has sored against players inside N̄ , whihontradits the irreduibility of A.Dene C = (B̆)−1, r̆fb = (rfbh (A))h∈N̆ , Bi = (Bhi)h∈N̆ and Bk = (Bhk)h∈N̆ . Then,using (7.10) we have B̆r̆fb = −Birfbi (A)−Bkrfbk (A) and hene, r̆fb = C(−Birfbi (A)−
Bkrfbk (A)). So, for all ℓ ∈ N̆ ,






k (A)).Dene γiℓ = −∑h∈N̆ CℓhBhi and γkℓ = −∑h∈N̆ CℓhBhk. Then, for eah ℓ ∈ N̆ ,










ℓ (A) = 0. (7.12)Dene Γi,i = −∑ℓ∈N̆ Biℓγiℓ and Γi,k = −∑ℓ∈N̆ Biℓγkℓ . Then, plugging in the expres-sion of eah rrbℓ aording to (7.11) into (7.12), we get
(Bii − Γ











k (A) = 1. (7.14)
7.7. Disussion 163Dene σi =∑ℓ∈N̆ γiℓ and σk =∑ℓ∈N̆ γkℓ . Then, solving equations (7.13) and (7.14),we get
rfbi (A) = 1




and rfbk (A) = 1




.(7.15)To understand how rfbi (A) and rfbk (A) vary with Bik and Bii, it is onvenient to knowthe signs of γi and γk. We laim that both γi and γk are nonnegative vetors. Bydenition, γi = −CBi and, sine C−1 = B̆, B̆γ = −Bi. Furthermore, −Bi ≥ 0.Beause matrix B̆ and vetors γi and −Bi satisfy the onditions of Lemma 7.6.7, γiis nonnegative. The argument for γk is analogous using −Bk instead of −Bi. Then,beause γk is nonnegative, also Γi,k is nonnegative and Bik − Γi,k is non-positive.It follows, using (7.13) and the fat that all the omponents of rfb(A) are positive,that Bii − Γi,i is non-negative. The nonnegativity of γi and γk implies that σi and
σk are also nonnegative.We reexamine now equation (7.15). Note that γi, γk, Γi,i and Γi,k only depend onmatrix B̆. Dereasing the performane of player i against player k orresponds withstritly dereasing −Bik(= Aik), inreasing −Bki by the same amount, and a stritinrease of Bii. Therefore, Bii−Γi,i−Bik+Γi,k stritly inreases and so (7.15) shows that rfbi (A)stritly dereases and rfbk (A) stritly inreases.Finally, we an also ombine (7.11) and (7.13) to obtain the expression for rfbℓ (A),with ℓ ∈ N̆ . In this ase we get








weakly derease. From this,the statement follows. 7.7 DisussionTable 7.7.1 summarizes the behavior of the ranking methods we have studied withrespet to the dierent properties. The sores ranking method satises several at-trative properties suh as prb and svl. However, a potential drawbak is revealedby the property iim: the sores ranking method only looks at the aggregate soreof eah player, ignoring the opponents he has faed to obtain this sore. All other
164 Chapter 7. A taxonomy of rankings in tournamentsranking methods under onsideration are responsive to the strength of the oppo-nents of eah player. One an argue that iim is a natural property for round-robintournaments. Within this lass of tournaments the ranking methods that satisfys also satisfy iim.Besides the sores ranking, fair bets and reursive Buhholz are the two rankingmethods that satisfy the property of nnrb. Note that this is an advantage of fairbets and reursive Buhholz with respet to their `simple' ounterparts Neustadtland Buhholz. From our point of view a drawbak of the fair bets ranking is that itviolates svl, whih imposes the natural requirement that if we reverse all the resultsin the tournament, then the orresponding ranking should be obtained by revertingthe original ranking as well. Provided that our onjeture regarding maximumlikelihood and nnrb holds, maximum likelihood and reursive Buhholz satisfy thesame set of onsidered properties. One potential advantage of ϕrb with respet to
ϕml is that, sine ϕml requires to solve a system of non-linear equations, it may bevery hard to ompute in settings where there is a high number of alternatives to beranked. Sores Neustadtl Fairbets Maxi-mumLikeli-hood ReursivePerfor-mane Buh-holz Reur-siveBuh-holzano X X X X X X Xhom X X X X X X Xsym X X X X X X Xss X X X X X X Xfp X X X X X X Xsvl X X X X X X Xnrl X X X X X X Xs X X X X X X* Xss X X X X X X* Xiim X X X X X X Xprb X X X X X X Xnnrb X X X ? X X X*Requires |N | > 2.Table 7.7.1: Ranking methods and properties.
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